



Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on
September 2, 2026

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) meeting held virtually on September 2, 2026, beginning at 9:00 am (ET) at 280 Slater St, Ottawa, ON. The meeting was webcast live via the CNSC website, and video archives are available on the [CNSC website](#).

Present:

P. Tremblay, President
T. Berube
A. Hardie
J. Hopwood
M. Lacroix
V. Remenda

C. Salmon, Commission Registrar
C. Maheux, Commission Counsel
T. Najem, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisors: H. Davis, E. Lemoine, A. Bulkan, K. Hazelton, N. Greencorn, M. Cherif Gacem, A. Pirazzi, M. Hitchon, K. Whiteaker, S. Castellarin, M. Fabian Mendoza, V. Sesin, K. Gorzkowski, A. McAllister, K. Owen-Whitred

Other contributors:

- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: C. Axler, S. Irvine
- Bruce Power: M. Burton
- New Brunswick Power: J. Nouwens, J. Lennox
- Denison: J. Switzer, J. Giroux
- Canadian Nuclear Laboratories: J. Osborne, G. Snell
- Health Canada: K. Henderson, L. Bergman

Constitution

1. With the Notice of Meeting, Commission Member Document (CMD) [26-M30](#), being properly given and quorum for a meeting of the Commission being met,¹ the meeting was properly constituted.
2. For the meeting, [CMD 26-M32.1 to CMD 26-M38](#) were distributed to Commission Members. These documents are further detailed in [Appendix A](#).

Adoption of the Agenda

3. The revised agenda, [CMD 26-M31.B](#), was adopted as presented.

Chair and Registrar

4. President Tremblay chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by C. Salmon, Commission Registrar.

Minutes of Previous Commission Meetings

5. The minutes of the Commission meetings held on [March 24-26, 2026](#), and [May 27-28, 2026](#), were approved secretarially in advance of this meeting.

Participant Funding Program

6. There was no participant funding allocated for this meeting.

Status Report on Power Reactors

7. With reference to [CMD 26-M35](#), which included the status of the power reactor facilities as of July 21, 2026, CNSC staff presented the following additional updates:
 - for the Bruce A and B Nuclear Generation Stations (NGS):
 - on May 2026, Bruce Power appropriately managed a positive random drug test in accordance with its fitness-for-duty program; no safety concerns were identified
 - for the Darlington NGS:
 - on August 3, 2026, Unit 2 entered a forced outage following a pump motor trip; a leak on the body of a

¹ Commission Member A. McEwan did not participate in the meeting.

primary heat transport liquid relief valve was identified during the outage

- on July 31, 2026, Unit 4 entered a forced outage due to a leak in generator stator cooling water system pipework
- CNSC staff is satisfied with Ontario Power Generation Inc.'s (OPG) response and ongoing corrective actions
- for the Point Lepreau NGS
 - on August 19, 2026, following completion of a planned maintenance outage, the reactor was taken offline after a steam leak developed during power ascension
 - New Brunswick Power (NB Power) is carrying out repairs and investigating the cause of the leak, with CNSC staff monitoring outage activities and corrective actions
- for the Darlington New Nuclear Project (DNNP)
 - CNSC staff inspected OPG's human performance program and safety culture, including a review of corrective actions related to previously reported worker injuries;² CNSC staff is currently assessing the inspection results

Discussion

8. The Commission asked for additional information concerning the Darlington NGS Unit 2 pump trip. OPG representatives and CNSC staff provided the following responses:
 - OPG reported that the plant and safety systems responded as designed, with shutdown systems actuating as expected following the pump motor trip
 - regarding the root cause investigation, OPG stated that a liquid relief valve leak was identified as the cause during the outage; inspections of similar valves found no comparable leaks
 - regarding the reliability of the pump control electronics, OPG stated that the cause remains under investigation, with the control circuit identified as the leading area of focus and forensic analysis ongoing; the affected control electronics were relatively new, and that control system testing is performed on a periodic basis

² Injuries previously reported in [CMD 25-M36](#).

- CNSC staff remain actively engaged in monitoring the investigation and extent-of-condition reviews, and will ensure industry operating experience is shared as appropriate
9. Regarding the Darlington NGS Unit 4 generator cooling water leak, the Commission sought additional information including the root cause and the identification of the issue during refurbishment prior to the unit return to service. OPG representatives provided the following responses:
- OPG identified and repaired the source of the generator leak and confirmed that the issue was unrelated to the generator stator fault experienced at the Point Lepreau NGS³
 - refurbishment inspections had not identified any similar vulnerabilities, and no at-risk locations were found during generator rewind activities
 - OPG is expanding its investigation, engaging industry expertise, and installing enhanced monitoring to better understand the cause and improve reliability
10. The Commission also asked questions on the following topics:
- the investigation into the Point Lepreau NGS reheater steam leak
 - the return to service of Bruce NGS A Unit 3⁴
 - an overview of Bruce Power's drug testing and fitness-for-duty programs
11. NB Power and Bruce Power representatives provided the following responses:
- NB Power reported that the investigation into the reheater steam leak was ongoing, with inspections underway focused on gasket failure
 - Bruce Power stated that Unit 3 has operated reliably since returning to service, with only a minor heat transport pump seal issue that was being monitored

³ The unit was shut down on [April 6, 2024](#), for a planned maintenance outage. During start-up, a ground fault was identified on the generator.

⁴ The final regulatory hold point for Bruce A Unit 3 was removed on June 2nd, following CNSC staff verification that the relevant pre-requisites had been met. This allowed Unit 3 to return to full power operation; regulatory oversight now continues under the CNSC's normal compliance verification program. ([CMD 26-M35](#))

- Bruce Power provided an overview of its drug testing program, which includes pre-placement, random, and post-incident testing, along with worker education, industry benchmarking, and reviews of worker activities following any fitness-for-duty concern

12. CNSC staff added the following responses:

- CNSC staff plans to conduct targeted inspections of the reheater repairs at the Point Lepreau NGS, while continuing to monitor NB Power's response as the investigation progresses
- CNSC staff is satisfied with Bruce Power's return to service of Unit 3, with no significant safety concerns identified; CNSC staff will also monitor the pump seal issue, which is not a safety concern
- Bruce Power's fitness-for-duty program meets regulatory requirements and was implemented effectively, with no resulting nuclear safety concerns identified

13. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff and licensees regarding this item. The Commission expects to receive updates on the following items at a future Commission meeting:

ACTIONS
by
December
2026

- root cause analysis regarding the outages for Darlington NGS Units 2 and 4; the update is to include information on the testing frequency and validation methods for the primary heat transport pump control electronics
- root cause analysis regarding the latest Point Lepreau NGS shutdown associated with the reheater steam leak

Update on incidents involving injuries at the DNNP construction site (CMD 26-M34.1 and CMD 26-M35)^{5, 6} (Action Item #38695)

⁵ At the October 7, 2025, [Commission Meeting](#), CNSC staff and OPG provided information regarding two separate incidents at the DNNP construction site that resulted in injuries to workers ([CMD 25-M36](#)). The Commission requested that OPG and CNSC staff provide an update on this matter, including OPG's common cause analysis and CNSC staff's oversight (Paragraph 33 of the October 7, 2025, [Commission Meeting Minutes](#)).

⁶ Additional information from CNSC staff regarding this item can be found in [CMD 26-M35](#). CNSC staff reported that it is satisfied that the corrective actions taken by OPG have addressed the common causes related to the events in 2025, are in compliance with regulatory requirements and construction licence, and that adequate measures remain in place to ensure the protection and safety of workers at the DNNP site.

14. With respect to this matter, an OPG representative provided the Commission with the following verbal remarks:
- OPG assessed the effectiveness of the corrective actions implemented following worker safety incidents at the DNNP; the assessment found measurable improvements in safety culture, leadership engagement, procedural compliance, and work planning and coordination
 - enhanced oversight, increased field presence, and improved issue identification and resolution have contributed to positive safety performance trends
 - OPG continues to focus on sustaining improved performance

Discussion

15. The Commission sought additional information from OPG and CNSC staff, including on the following topics:
- OPG's safety performance metrics
 - workers' adherence to procedures
 - OPG's organizational capabilities
 - CNSC staff's satisfaction with OPG's root-cause analysis
16. An OPG representative provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:
- OPG is assessing its improvements using field observation and oversight metrics that track low-level events and trends, with targets being met and exceeded; the targets are made available to CNSC staff
 - OPG is improving procedural adherence through enhanced work readiness reviews, pre-job briefings, and field supervision, with positive worker engagement
 - OPG strengthened oversight of specialized DNNP activities by engaging external experts and building internal expertise to support safe execution and future projects
17. CNSC staff provided the following responses:
- CNSC staff observed improved procedural compliance in the field, supported by ongoing inspections, oversight, and worker engagement initiatives

- CNSC staff consider its inspection program to be effective for overseeing the DNNP; CNSC staff continues to enhance its expertise through regulatory collaboration, international engagement, and ongoing inspector training
- CNSC staff's inspections, increased field oversight, and reviews of corrective actions support the conclusion that appropriate measures are in place to protect worker safety, while ongoing monitoring continues to verify sustained effectiveness

18. The Commission expressed its appreciation to all participants for the information provided. The Commission is satisfied with the update provided on this item.

ACTION
#38695
Closed

Update on the root cause of generator fault at the Point Lepreau NGS (CMD 26-M32.1)⁷ (Action Item #38692)

19. With respect to this matter, an NB Power representative presented the root cause investigation results for a generator fault identified during a 2024 planned outage at the Point Lepreau NGS. The presentation included the following information:
- the investigation determined that manufacturing defects in generator stator bars allowed cooling water to enter and degrade insulation, leading to the fault
 - a comprehensive extent-of-condition review identified additional susceptible stator bars, prompting repairs and temporary corrective measures in 2024
 - during the 2025 outage, all 144 stator bars were replaced, with enhanced manufacturing oversight and quality controls implemented to prevent recurrence
 - NB Power shared lessons learned with industry peers and emphasized its commitment to safe, reliable operation and continuous learning
20. The Commission asked about the safety significance of the generator stator fault. NB Power stated that it was not a safety

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issue but an equipment reliability issue. NB Power and CNSC staff confirmed that it did not pose a nuclear safety concern.

21. The Commission sought additional information regarding the following topics:
 - quality assurance, verification, and acceptance criteria used for the replacement stator bars
 - whether corrosion affects other CANDU⁸ generators
 - whether NB Power considered alternative stator bar materials, such as stainless steel, to reduce the potential for corrosion
22. NB Power representatives provided the following responses:
 - NB Power enhanced oversight and quality assurance during the manufacture of replacement stator bars, including design improvements, direct monitoring of manufacturing activities, and additional destructive testing
 - the fault resulted from a combination of minor surface corrosion and manufacturing deficiencies in the stator bars that allowed water ingress and insulation degradation; replacement stator bars were manufactured with improved quality
 - NB Power considered alternative designs but selected an improved version of the existing design to enable timely replacement, with design enhancements and chemistry controls expected to minimize the risk of recurrence
23. The Commission asked whether OPG and Bruce Power were aware of the issue and what actions they were taking. Representatives from OPG and Bruce Power, and CNSC staff provided the following responses:
 - OPG confirmed it was aware of the issue and supported related maintenance activities; OPG is incorporating lessons learned into its generator inspection, refurbishment, and reliability programs
 - Bruce Power confirmed it was monitoring the issue and has identified similar, though less significant, degradation in one of its units; Bruce Power has planned equipment upgrades

⁸ The CANDU (Canada deuterium uranium) is a Canadian pressurized heavy-water reactor design used to generate electric power.

including the use of stainless-steel stator bars to address potential issues

- CNSC staff confirmed that lessons learned were being shared across the industry, and that licensees were assessing potential implications for their facilities

24. The Commission asked whether the manufacturing deficiencies could have been identified through oversight inspections and what lessons were learned from the event. NB Power reported enhancing its vendor oversight and quality verification. CNSC staff noted that NB Power had followed its processes and met applicable requirements during the generator rewind.

25. The Commission expressed its appreciation to all participants for the information provided. The Commission is satisfied with the update provided on this item.

ACTION
#38692
Closed

INFORMATION ITEMS

Canada's participation in the 10th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety ([CMD 26-M36](#))

26. With reference to [CMD 26-M36](#), CNSC staff presented information on Canada's participation in the 10th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The presentation included a description of the CNS, peer review results for Canada, and Canada's contributions to the execution of the review meeting and process improvements.

Discussion

27. The Commission asked questions about the following topics:

- the process of country group assignment
- examples of Good Practices from other countries and their potential application in Canada
- overview of the evolution of the CNS review process since its inception and significant changes that have strengthened nuclear safety worldwide

- Canada's co-signing of a statement on Russia's invasion of Ukraine⁹
- how initiatives addressing human resources, knowledge management, and generational workforce challenges are coordinated across organizations and internationally¹⁰
- opportunities for discussion between contracting parties outside of the CNS review meetings
- how challenges are identified, adopted, and selected for follow-up by contracting parties
- clarification on the statement "CNS peer review process not always robust"¹¹

28. CNSC staff provided the following responses:

- the grouping methodology was revised for the 10th Review Meeting using a random selection process within defined country tiers to form the review groups
- relevant Good Practices are being assessed for potential application in Canada, including specialized nuclear training platforms and regulatory engagement on artificial intelligence
- a description of the evolution of the CNS review process, including enhancements to reporting requirements following Fukushima and increased participation by additional contracting parties, and Canada's leadership in process improvements
- statements on Ukraine were issued outside of the CNS's technical review process, coordinated with Government of Canada officials, and did not affect the scientific, technical, or regulatory discussions conducted under the CNS
- CNSC staff explained that responsibility for coordinating and implementing solutions for knowledge management and generational workforce challenges rests with individual contracting parties
- discussions initiated through the CNS review process can be pursued through bilateral engagements, follow-up peer

⁹ The Commission referenced the statement "Canada also co-signed a joint statement following the 10th RM that expanded on the concerns and called for an immediate end to Russia's invasion and occupation." Slide 17 of [CMD 26-M36](#).

¹⁰ The Commission referenced Slide 23 of [CMD 26-M36](#).

¹¹ The Commission referenced Slide 25 of [CMD 26-M36](#).

review activities, and ongoing collaboration among participating countries

- challenges are primarily identified through peer review and tracked through subsequent review cycles until they are addressed or revised; unresolved challenges remain open and are subject to continued review and reporting in future review cycles until contracting parties demonstrate sufficient progress or resolution
- the peer review process can be limited by consensus requirements and compressed review timelines, which may reduce the identification and scrutiny of challenges and sometimes result in contracting parties proposing challenges for themselves

29. The Commission recognized the quality of the work associated with the CNS by the Canadian delegation and expressed its appreciation for the information provided during the question period.

Final Update on Decision on Radionuclides as Chemicals of Mutual Concern ([CMD 26-M38](#)) (Action Item #19575)

30. In its Record of Decision, [DEC 18-H6](#),¹² the Commission directed CNSC staff and Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) to provide updates on the nomination of radionuclides as Chemicals of Mutual Concern under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA).¹³ The Commission requested updates on ECCC's decision to add radionuclides as Chemicals of Mutual Concern. This is the 8th annual update provided to the Commission on this matter.
31. CNSC staff reported that, on May 14, 2026, the Great Lakes Executive Committee announced and posted its final decision stating that Canada and the U.S. have determined that no additional binational action for radionuclides under the GLWQA is warranted.

¹² Record of Decision in the Matter of Ontario Power Generation's Application to Renew the Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licence for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station. CNSC, December 20, 2018, para. 414.

¹³ The GLWQA is an agreement between Canada and the US, signed in 1972 and amended in 2012 to include Annex 3: Chemicals of Mutual Concern. The purpose is to identify Chemicals of Mutual Concern from anthropogenic sources that both countries agree to being harmful to human health and the environment.

32. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff regarding this item.

ACTION
#19575
Closed

INFORMATION ITEMS

Workplace Injury at Denison Mines Corp.'s Wheeler River Project (CMD 26-M37)

33. With reference to [CMD 26-M37](#),¹⁴ CNSC staff provided verbal remarks, including the following information:
- the event was reported by Denison Mines Corp. (Denison) and independently verified by a CNSC inspector
 - Denison has reported that all identified corrective actions have been implemented; CNSC staff will verify the implementation of the corrective actions during a future inspection
34. The Commission sought additional information including on the following topics:
- conventional health and safety hazards and controls, including equipment design, lifting practices, line-of-fire risks, hazard assessments and lessons learned from the event
 - effectiveness of Denison's management system and safety culture in supporting safe work execution, contractor oversight, and worker training,
 - CNSC oversight, including inspection planning, compliance verification, and monitoring of corrective actions
35. Regarding conventional health and safety hazards and controls, Denison representatives provided the following responses:
- the incident resulted from improper equipment use rather than the T-pin design itself, and Denison has since replaced

¹⁴ On July 13, 2026, a crusher foreman/equipment operator sustained a serious injury to two fingers (index and ring fingers) on their right hand while assisting with the adjustment of a 60-foot stacker during crusher setup activities at the Wheeler River Project crusher pad. [CMD 26-M37](#) describes the causal factors, immediate causes, root causes, immediate and corrective actions taken by Denison and CNSC staff, and actions that are in progress.

the equipment with a hydraulic system that reduces manual handling risks¹⁵

- Denison discussed the circumstances that led workers to deviate from the approved lifting plan, including the absence of a qualified operator and the lack of a reassessment of hazards
- Denison acknowledged the need to reinforce stop-work expectations and hazard reassessments when work plans change
- Denison stated that lessons learned from the event highlighted opportunities to improve the quality and effectiveness of hazard assessments and to strengthen awareness and mitigation of line-of-fire hazards

36. Regarding the effectiveness of Denison's management system and safety culture, Denison representatives provided the following responses:

- Denison described its contractor management and how it oversees contractor safety
- Denison reported that all workers receive site orientation and safety training and that additional oversight and safety resources are being deployed to reinforce safety culture
- Denison indicated that workforce turnover among major contractors has been limited, although smaller contractors may experience higher turnover

37. Regarding CNSC staff's oversight, CNSC staff provided the following responses:

- CNSC staff accepted Denison's corrective actions and will verify their implementation through future inspections and compliance activities
- CNSC staff advanced a planned management system inspection to examine issues related to Denison's management system

¹⁵ To adjust the stacker height, positioning T-pins securing the telescoping frame sections had to be removed and relocated in a different set of predrilled positioning holes designed into the frame. The original plan was to use an excavator equipped with a lifting harness to support the stacker during the adjustment, however, the crew elected to use a front-end loader instead.

- Denison's contractor management program was found acceptable during licensing and will be a focus of future inspections by CNSC staff
- regarding its inspection frequency, CNSC staff stated that its inspection plans can be adjusted as needed; future oversight levels will be reassessed based on inspection results and lessons learned

38. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by Denison and CNSC staff regarding this item. The Commission expects Denison to provide an update on the outcomes of its investigation. The Commission also directs CNSC staff to provide an update on its oversight of the implementation and effectiveness of Denison's corrective actions.

ACTION

By
March
2027

UPDATE ON AN ITEM FROM A PREVIOUS COMMISSION PROCEEDING

Update on the root cause of an off-site contamination from Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CMD 26-M33 and CMD 26-M33.1)¹⁶ (Action Item # 39012)

39. A Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Ltd. (CNL) representative provided verbal remarks regarding this item, including the following information:
- CNL appropriately managed the contamination event once identified; CNL conducted a comprehensive review to determine causes and assess the extent of condition
 - CNL completed corrective actions to strengthen processes, governance, and controls related to the release of materials and waste from CNL sites
 - CNL conducted reviews at other CNL-managed sites, with improvements implemented where necessary
 - CNL emphasized its commitment to transparency, continuous improvement, and strengthening organizational performance to prevent similar events in the future

¹⁶ At the December 12, 2025, [Commission Meeting](#) CNL and CNSC staff provided a verbal updated concerning this offsite contamination event. The Commission directed CNL to provide an update on the root cause of the off-site contamination. The Commission also directed CNSC staff to provide an update on its oversight of CNL's corrective actions, including whether CNL's measures have adequately addressed any common causes. Paragraph 35 of the December 12, 2025, [Commission Meeting Minutes](#).

40. With reference to [CMD 26-M33](#), CNSC staff provided verbal remarks to the Commission including the following:
- CNL's corrective actions and remedial actions appropriately addressed the root causes of the release event
 - CNSC staff will enhance its regulatory oversight until CNL completes the corrective actions, including the effectiveness review
41. The Commission asked the about long-term sustainability of CNL's corrective actions and process improvements. CNL representatives stated that CNL sustains corrective actions through ongoing assessments, training, and the integration of lessons learned into procedures and management systems. CNSC staff added that it will continue oversight through inspections and effectiveness reviews of corrective actions and broader management system improvements.
42. The Commission asked about CNL's engagement with the public and Indigenous communities following the event's occurrence. CNL representatives stated that CNL addressed concerns from Indigenous communities and stakeholders regarding the event through direct engagement, and public disclosures. CNSC staff described its efforts in sharing information on its regulatory oversight with Indigenous communities and the public. CNSC staff added that it will continue providing updates through ongoing engagement and public reporting.
43. The Commission sought additional information regarding the following topics:
- timeline of event identification, internal reporting, and the decision to conduct radiological surveys at the Deep River Landfill
 - upstream waste identification and characterization processes to prevent the release of contaminated material
 - processes, responsibilities, and controls governing the release of waste and materials from CNL sites
44. CNL representatives provided the following responses:
- radiological surveys were triggered after contamination was detected on waste during cleanup activities

- CNL stated that it is strengthening knowledge management and the use of historical site information to support waste characterization and operational decision-making
 - CNL explained that releases of radiological, chemical, and biological waste are governed by established characterization, verification, authorization, and documentation processes
45. CNSC staff commented that it is reviewing CNL's governance-related corrective actions and updated procedures and will assess their effectiveness through ongoing oversight and effectiveness reviews.
46. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNL and CNSC staff regarding this item.

ACTION
#39012
Closed

Closure of the Public Meeting

47. The public meeting closed at 2:35 pm (ET) on September 2, 2026. These minutes reflect both the public meeting itself and the Commission's considerations following the meeting.

**Najem,
Tarek**
Digitally signed by
Najem, Tarek
Date: 2026.10.29
10:56:49 -04'00'

Recording Secretary

October 29, 2026

Date

**Salmon,
Candace**
Digitally signed by
Salmon, Candace
Date: 2026.10.29
10:47:22 -04'00'

Commission Registrar

October 29, 2026

Date

APPENDIX A – Commission Member Documents

CMD	Date
CMD 26-M30	May 12, 2026
Notice of Commission Meeting for September 2, 2026	
CMD 26-M31	August 14, 2026
Agenda for the September 2, 2026 Commission Meeting	
CMD 26-M38	August 14, 2026
Written submission from CNSC Staff - Final Update on Decision on radionuclides as Chemicals of Mutual Concern	
CMD 26-M36	August 14, 2026
Presentation from CNSC Staff - Canada's participation in the 10th Review Meeting of the convention on Nuclear Safety	
CMD 26-M35	August 14, 2026
CMD 26-M35 - Written submission from CNSC Staff - Status Report on Power Reactors	
CMD 26-M34.1	August 14, 2026
Written submission from OPG - Update on incidents involving injuries at the Darlington New Nuclear Project construction site	
CMD 26-M33.1	August 14, 2026
Written submission from CNL - Update on the root cause of an off-site contamination from Canadian Nuclear Laboratories	
CMD 26-M33	August 14, 2026
Written submission from CNSC Staff - Update on the root cause of an off-site contamination from Canadian Nuclear Laboratories	
CMD 26-M31.A	August 20, 2026
Revised Agenda for the September 2, 2026 Commission Meeting	
CMD 26-M32.1	August 20, 2026
Presentation from NB Power - Update on the root cause of generator fault at the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station	
CMD 26-M37	August 26, 2026
CNSC Staff Submission - Event Initial Report Workplace Injury at Denison Mines Corp.'s Wheeler River Project	

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