



Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on
May 27-28, 2026

Minutes of the hybrid Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) meeting held in person and virtually on May 27-28, 2026, beginning at 9:00 am (ET) at the Holiday Inn Peterborough Waterfront located at 150 George St. N., Peterborough, Ontario. The meeting was webcast live via the CNSC website, and video archives are available on the [CNSC website](#).

Present:

P. Tremblay, President
T. Berube
A. Hardie
J. Hopwood
M. Lacroix
V. Remenda
A. McEwan

C. Salmon, Commission Registrar
A. Mazur, Commission Counsel
T. Najem, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisors: A. Viktorov, A. Oussoren, C. Pike, C. Crann, V. Weisflock, J. Amalraj, E. Dagher, R. Jammal, W. Islam, A. Levine, N-O. Kwamena, J. Burt, T. Panichevska, P. Bourassa

Other contributors:

- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: C. Axler, B. Jankowski, B. Witruk
- Bruce Power: M. Burton, J. Marshall
- New Brunswick Power: N. Reicker
- McMaster University: D. Cappon
- Ontario Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development: M. Fedorowich
- BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada: A. Collyer, B. Walker, M. Duarte, J. MacPhee, S. Duffy, R. Parker
- Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks: C. Redmond

Constitution

1. With the Notice of Meeting, Commission Member Document (CMD) [26-M12](#), being properly given and all Commission Members present, the meeting was properly constituted.
2. For the meeting, [CMD 26-M13 to CMD 26-M17](#) were distributed to Commission Members. These documents are further detailed in [Appendix A](#).

Adoption of the Agenda

3. The revised agenda, [CMD 26-M16.B](#), was adopted as presented. The agenda was later revised to reflect changes that arose during the meeting ([CMD 26-M16.C](#)).

Chair and Registrar

4. President Tremblay chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by C. Salmon, Commission Registrar.

Minutes of Previous Commission Meetings

5. The minutes of the Commission meeting held on [March 24-26, 2026](#), were not available at the time of this meeting and would be provided to the Commission for approval ahead of the next Commission meeting on [September 2, 2026](#).

Participant Funding Program

6. In its Notices of Participation at a Commission Meeting and Participant Funding,^{1,2} the CNSC invited members of the public to intervene, by way of written and/or oral submission regarding BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc.'s (BWXT NEC) safety performance over the current licensing period.
7. The CNSC announced the availability of funds through its [Participant Funding Program](#) (PFP). A Funding Review Committee (FRC) was established to review the funding applications and to make recommendations on the allocation of funding to eligible applicants. Details of the PFP amounts allocated are provided in paragraph 23 of the minutes.

Status Report on Power Reactors

¹ [CNSC Notice of Participation at a Commission Meeting and Participant Funding, November 28, 2025.](#)

² [CNSC Revised Notice of Participation at a Commission Meeting, April 15, 2026.](#)

8. With reference to [CMD 26-M14](#), which included the status of the power reactor facilities as of April 24, 2026, CNSC staff presented the following additional updates:
- for the Bruce Nuclear Generation Station (NGS) sites A and B:
 - on May 6 and May 21, 2026, the second³ and third⁴ regulatory hold points (RHP-2 and RHP-3), respectively, were removed for Bruce A Unit 3
 - RHP-4⁵ for Bruce A Unit 3 is scheduled for removal in early June 2026
 - on April 20, 2026, tritiated heavy water was found in bolt holes on a Bruce Power tritiated heavy water transportation package at the Darlington NGS; there were no personnel intakes or environmental releases, and corrective actions were completed
 - on May 12, 2026, wind toppled lockers being moved between Bruce A and B, causing a lost-time injury; the event was reported, and the area was secured for investigation
 - on May 13, 2026, a technician fell on the Unit 3 vault, injuring their wrist; ladder positioning and reduced visibility were contributing factors
 - for both injuries, CNSC staff verified Bruce Power's corrective actions and is currently reviewing the event reports
 - for the Darlington NGS:
 - on May 21, 2025, the RHP⁶ corresponding to Ontario Power Generation (OPG) declaring the production of yttrium-90 and lutetium-177 available for service was removed
 - for Unit 4, OPG identified and repaired a hydrogen leak in the stator cooling water system during a forced outage;⁷ the unit was expected to return to service and reach full power on May 27, 2026
 - for the Darlington New Nuclear Project (DNNP)

³ RHP-2 corresponds to Guaranteed Shutdown State.

⁴ RHP-3 corresponds to increasing reactor power above 1%.

⁵ RHP-4 corresponds to increasing above 35% full power.

⁶ This RHP was established by the Commission in the [Record of Decision](#) – Application to Amend Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Power Reactor Operating Licence 13.05/2025 for the Production of Additional Isotopes using the Target Delivery System, May 23, 2025.

⁷ Unit 4 was taken offline on April 12, 2026, due to indications of a hydrogen leak into the generator stator cooling water system on the secondary, non-nuclear, side of the station. Page 3 of CMD 26-M14.

- the two stop-work orders issued by the Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development (MLITSD) were lifted after OPG's completion of corrective actions⁸
9. In reference to the Hilti anchor installation deficiencies,⁹ a representative from Bruce Power stated that affected systems remain safe despite the deficiencies, while broader corrective actions and lessons learned are being implemented. CNSC staff added that it would continue working with Bruce Power to ensure corrective actions, fleet-wide learning, and improved oversight. A New Brunswick (NB) Power representative added that NB Power reviewed its own anchor applications and procedures, and it will continue to incorporate additional learnings to strengthen programs.

Discussion

10. The Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- details regarding the Darlington NGS Unit 4 hydrogen leak
 - Bruce Power's safety culture review related to the Hilti anchor installation issue
 - OPG's operator training readiness for the DNNP
11. Representatives from OPG and Bruce Power provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:
- OPG reported that abnormal hydrogen consumption and stator cooling water indications led operators to conservatively shut down the unit; repairs are complete, and no explosive mixture was detected while the weld crack root cause remains under investigation
 - Bruce Power discussed its review of its safety culture and the identified gaps in its reporting systems
 - OPG stated that the operator training was on track to begin in March 2027
12. Further to the Hilti anchor installation issue, the Commission asked about broader contractor performance and quality assurance. Bruce Power stated that the issue reflected both vendor and internal

⁸ Additional information about the two stop-work orders can found on pages 5-6 of CMD 26-M14.

⁹ CNSC staff identified improper installation, through a whistleblower's confidential report, of Hilti anchors used to support the Temporary Replacement Emergency Water System project at Bruce B NGS. These deficiencies prompted a broader extent-of-condition review of Hilti anchors at both Bruce A and B NGS to determine potential safety and operability implications. Appendix A of CMD 26-M14.

oversight gaps. Bruce Power committed to sharing expectations with the construction/vendor community.

13. The Commission asked about OPG's lessons learned from MLITSD's stop-work orders at the DNNP. OPG stated that the event resulted from misinterpreting the regulatory transition from excavation to tunnel work, and that OPG had updated planning and readiness checks to confirm applicable requirements before field execution. CNSC staff outlined its oversight role during the stop-work actions and noted continued collaboration with MLITSD and follow-up on OPG's corrective actions.
14. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff and licensees regarding this item. The Commission expects to receive an update on OPG's corrective actions to close the stop-work orders. The Commission expects this information to be presented at a future Commission meeting.

ACTION
by
December
2026

EVENT INITIAL REPORTS

Workplace Injury at McMaster Nuclear Reactor (MNR) ([CMD 26-M17](#))

15. CNSC staff provided a verbal update to the Commission regarding this item:
 - on May 14, 2026, the worker was medically cleared to return to work
 - CNSC staff conducted the planned inspection noted in the event initial report (EIR)
 - it reviewed a preliminary copy of MNR's investigation report into the worker's injury
 - MNR submitted the final report to the CNSC on May 26, 2026
16. MNR provided the Commission with the following verbal remarks:
 - the MNR worker was injured when slings from a moving unloaded overhead crane snagged on equipment, causing a component to break and strike the worker
 - MNR identified gaps in crane training related to unloaded crane hazards, issued immediate safety communications, completed a root cause investigation, and began implementing corrective actions to strengthen training, supervision and crane-specific procedures

Discussion

17. The Commission sought additional information from MNR and CNSC staff, including on the following topics:
 - the presence of qualified supervisors during the event
 - review of lift-operator training
 - requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE)
 - details on CNSC staff's inspection and follow-up
 - potential impacts to the reactor from the incident, including debris control and reactor operating status
 - delay in CNSC staff determining that the event required an EIR
 - the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage in the event review
 - supervision requirements during crane operation
 - MNR's post-trip review process for the reactor
18. An MNR representative and CNSC staff provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:
 - MNR stated that no one was directly with the individual at the time of the incident
 - MNR confirmed that training enhancement would be addressed through corrective actions, including a review of the on-the-job training program; CNSC staff added that it followed up on the event to verify MNR's information and corrective actions
 - MNR stated that PPE was not required for the operator
 - MNR confirmed that no material entered the reactor pool, and that the reactor was safely shut down and returned to service after inspection and review
 - CNSC staff described its follow-up oversight of the event, including inspection activities and a planned future review; no additional concerns were identified beyond MNR's proposed corrective actions
 - CNSC staff stated that it initially did not classify the injury as requiring an EIR but later submitted one after the lost-time injury was confirmed
 - CNSC staff stated that the CCTV footage provided useful information for reviewing the event
 - CNSC staff noted that crane training requirements were focused on supervision for loaded crane use; MNR stated that it is committed to strengthening supervision going forward

- MNR confirmed that the post-trip review process for the reactor is codified, and that MNR followed all requirements of the reactor restart decision procedure
19. The Commission was satisfied with the information provided on this item. The Commission noted that CNSC staff should consider initiating an EIR earlier for potential head trauma injuries requiring a hospital assessment.

UPDATE ON ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS

Mid-Term Update from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. on Licensed Activities at its Toronto and Peterborough Facilities (Action #22505)

20. As directed in the Commission's 2020 [Record of Decision](#) on the renewal of the fuel facility licences for BWXT NEC's Toronto and Peterborough facilities, BWXT NEC provided a mid-term update of licensed activities for the 2021-2025 period ([CMD 26-M13.1](#) and [CMD 26-M13.1A](#)). The presentation included the following:
- facility-specific information including location, operations, and number of employees
 - the status of the licences
 - the safety performance of the two facilities, including industrial safety performance, radiation protection of workers and the public, and environmental protection performance
 - improvements made at both facilities to enhance safety, reliability, and efficiency
 - engagement activities with Indigenous Nations and communities
 - conclusions on compliance, facility upgrades, independent monitoring programs, and public outreach
21. CNSC staff presented information on BWXT NEC's mid-term update ([CMD 26-M13](#) and [CMD 26-M13.A](#)). The presentation included the following:
- CNSC staff's regulatory oversight activities for the Peterborough and Toronto facilities
 - CNSC staff's engagement with Indigenous Nations and communities
 - environmental monitoring and extended sampling at Peterborough
 - responses to key issues raised by intervenors

22. CNSC staff reported that, throughout the first half of the licence period, it has been satisfied with BWXT NEC's safety performance. CNSC staff will continue its regulatory oversight to ensure that people and the environment remain protected.

Interventions

23. With respect to the availability of PFP funding for the Commission Meeting, the [FRC recommended](#) that up to \$61,578.81 be distributed to the following applicants:
- Hiawatha First Nation (HFN) ([CMD 26-M13.26](#), [CMD 26-M13.26A](#)) approved for \$11,619.89 in funding
 - Curve Lake First Nation (CLFN) ([CMD 26-M13.27](#), [CMD 26-M13.27A](#)) approved for \$13,938.29 in funding
 - Radiation Safety Institute of Canada ([CMD 26-M13.31](#)) approved for \$12,000.00 in funding
 - Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) ([CMD 26-M13.39](#), [CMD 26-M13.39A](#)) approved for \$8,806.13 in funding
 - Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation ([CMD 26-M13.41](#)) approved for \$15,214.50 in funding
24. The Commission also received the following interventions regarding BWXT NEC's mid-term update:
- Erica Martin ([CMD 26-M13.2](#))
 - Roger Desrochers ([CMD 26-M13.4](#))
 - Rotary Club of Peterborough ([CMD 26-M13.5](#))
 - Kelly McDowell ([CMD 26-M13.6](#))
 - Stephanie Benn ([CMD 26-M13.7](#))
 - Jonathan Campbell ([CMD 26-M13.8](#))
 - Lora Vassiliadis ([CMD 26-M13.9](#))
 - Caroline Tennent ([CMD 26-M13.10](#))
 - Angel Hamilton ([CMD 26-M13.11](#))
 - Zahir Topan ([CMD 26-M13.12](#))
 - Emily Straka ([CMD 26-M13.13](#))
 - Pete Woolidge ([CMD 26-M13.14](#))
 - Jessica Rowland ([CMD 26-M13.15](#))
 - William G. Templeman ([CMD 26-M13.16](#))

- Roy Brady ([CMD 26-M13.17](#))
- Oasis Dufferin Community Centre ([CMD 26-M13.18](#))
- Deirdre McGahern ([CMD 26-M13.19](#))
- Conexus Nuclear Inc. ([CMD 26-M13.20](#))
- Jake Wadland ([CMD 26-M13.21](#))
- Catherine Vakil, M.D. ([CMD 26-M13.22](#))
- Corina McCoy ([CMD 26-M13.23](#))
- Creative Fire LP | Des Nedhe Group ([CMD 26-M13.24](#))
- Unifor Local 599-O ([CMD 26-M13.25](#))
- Ken Brown ([CMD 26-M13.28](#))
- Barbara Chisholm ([CMD 26-M13.29](#))
- Janet Harris ([CMD 26-M13.30](#))
- Canadian Nuclear Association ([CMD 26-M13.32](#))
- Port Hope Community Health Concerns Committee (PHCHCC) ([CMD 26-M13.33](#))
- James Wilkes ([CMD 26-M13.34](#))
- Rebecca Schillemat ([CMD 26-M13.35](#))
- Unifor Locals 252, 524 and 599-O ([CMD 26-M13.36](#))
- Janice Keil ([CMD 26-M13.37](#), [CMD 26-M13.37A](#))
- Wendy Trusler ([CMD 26-M13.38](#))
- Peter Harris ([CMD 26-M13.40](#), [CMD 26-M13.40A](#))
- Timothy Wilson ([CMD 26-M13.42](#))
- Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council ([CMD 26-M13.43](#))
- Mark Achbar ([CMD 26-M13.44](#))
- Jane Scott ([CMD 26-M13.45](#))
- Lakelands Public Health ([CMD 26-M13.46](#))
- Corinne Mintz ([CMD 26-M13.47](#))
- Nicholas Lato ([CMD 26-M13.48](#))

25. In addition to their written submissions, the following intervenors presented orally: CELA on behalf of Citizens Against Radioactive Neighbourhoods; Unifor Locals 252, 524 and 599-O; Pete Woolidge; Peter Harris; William G. Templeman; Deirdre McGahern; James

Wilkes; Jane Scott; Nicholas Lato; HFN; CLFN; PHCHCC; Erica Martin; Angel Hamilton; and Janice Keil.

26. Intervenors raised the following issues:

- concerns about risks from uranium and beryllium, including cumulative impacts with legacy contamination
- potential pelleting operations at the Peterborough facility¹⁰
- concerns about the proximity of the Peterborough facility to a nearby public school
- General Electric (GE) Vernova's proposed demolition of buildings on the industrial site where the BWXT NEC Peterborough facility is located,¹¹ and potential contamination risks
- the adequacy of BWXT NEC's financial guarantee for decommissioning and cleanup
- effectiveness of oversight and environmental monitoring practices
- adequacy of beryllium sampling as part of the CNSC's [Independent Environmental Monitoring Program](#) (IEMP)
- climate change impacts on facility operations
- BWXT NEC's envisioned updates to its public dose assessment methodologies¹²
- transparency and public disclosure of information
- worker participation in safety oversight and accountability
- BWXT NEC's safety culture and regulatory compliance

27. HFN's presentation focused on the Peterborough facility. HFN emphasized early involvement rather than procedural consultation, the importance of rebuilding trust through transparent actions, and

¹⁰ BWXT NEC currently conducts pelleting operations at its Toronto facility. In its licence renewal decision, the Commission authorized BWXT NEC to conduct pelleting operations at either the Peterborough facility or the Toronto facility but not both. Pelleting operations at the Peterborough facility are subject to a regulatory hold point requiring authorization from the Commission, and BWXT NEC has not sought this authorization.

¹¹ BWXT NEC leases its facility from GE Vernova.

¹² In reference to "BWXT NEC Toronto has reviewed its methodology for assessing public dose and will be implementing enhancements in 2026, including the use of additional background badges and updated dose assessment approaches to ensure continued protection of the public." (Section 3.7.13, PDF page 92 of CMD 26-M13.1) and "Looking ahead, the methodology for assessing public dose may be revised in conjunction with BWXT NEC Toronto to ensure alignment across both facilities. These updates are planned to be implemented in 2026 but are not expected to result in any notable change to the estimated doses for Peterborough, given the historically negligible results observed to date." (PDF page 31 of CMD 26-M13.1).

acknowledged BWXT NEC's progress in engagement. HFN also raised concerns about the need for sufficient time, capacity, and information to participate effectively in decision-making, and how monitoring programs, long-term trends and cumulative effects are assessed and used in decisions.

28. CLFN's presentation focused on the Peterborough facility. CLFN emphasized the importance of meaningful inclusion and consent, and raised concerns about the pace and structure of regulatory processes. CLFN also highlighted the positive, ongoing, experiential engagement with BWXT NEC and CNSC staff.
29. Issues raised by intervenors are further discussed below.

Discussion on BWXT NEC's Mid-term Update

30. The Commission asked questions on the following topics:
 - follow-up on a fire alarm event reported at the Peterborough facility and lessons learned¹³
 - the Peterborough Community Liaison Committee (PCLC)
 - the higher number of reportable events at the Peterborough facility compared to the Toronto facility¹⁴
 - BWXT NEC's management of treated wastewater
 - high worker compliance with the use of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs)
 - benefits of installing shielding over the grinding room windows at the Toronto facility
 - community feedback results from BWXT NEC's community surveys
 - long-term health monitoring for workers
 - trends in sampling frequency, number of workstations sampled, and concentration of airborne uranium dioxide (UO₂)¹⁵
31. BWXT NEC representatives provided the following responses:
 - a summary of BWXT NEC's response to the fire alarm event, which was a precautionary building evacuation; BWXT NEC

¹³ In reference to "During the licensing period there was one event that activated the emergency organization on September 25, 2025. A fire alarm was pulled for a potential gas leak, Peterborough Fire Services responded to the scene and there was no detection of gas, smoke, or fire, and no release of radioactive materials." Section 3.10, page 40, CMD 26-M13.1.

¹⁴ In reference to slide 11 of CNSC staff's presentation, CMD 26-M13.A.

¹⁵ In reference to Table 3 in Section 3.7.5, page 21 of CMD 26-M13.1.

noted that no gas or oxygen-displacement issue was found, and the emergency response functioned effectively

- the PCLC is an accessible forum for public dialogue, with membership broadly promoted and meeting topics shaped by community interests; meeting information is made publicly available online
- the higher number of reportable events at the Peterborough facility was due to its larger workforce and broader operations; BWXT NEC noted that there was no common trend, and that it was conducting an ongoing review for lessons learned
- wastewater is treated before release, and the resulting waste is managed off-site
- TLD compliance is supported by a strong safety culture
- installation of lead shielding was part of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) improvements and it reduced gamma radiation by ~30%
- community surveys are conducted every two years, with the next survey scheduled for 2028¹⁶
- worker health is monitored through ongoing medical surveillance programs with regular screening in place to address health concerns
- reduced sampling was due to changes in workstation use, while later increases reflected a precautionary expansion of monitoring; higher concentrations of airborne UO₂ were attributed to localized buildup, which has since been addressed; potential increases in sampling frequency are planned

32. CNSC staff confirmed the information provided by BWXT NEC. CNSC staff noted its participation in the PCLC to engage with the public and provide information to address community concerns.

33. The Commission asked about the trends of increasing public dose at the BWXT NEC's Toronto facility¹⁷ and how public dose is estimated. In response, BWXT NEC representatives:

- confirmed that gamma radiation is the largest contributor to public dose and that ongoing mitigation efforts have reduced the dose by 20%

¹⁶ On May 29, 2026, BWXT NEC submitted the requested information in [CMD 26-M13.1B](#).

¹⁷ In reference to Table 14, Section 3.7.13, page 28 of CMD 26-M13.1.

- described public dose modelling as conservative and protective, accounting for gamma radiation and vulnerable nearby populations
34. Regarding intervenors' concerns about uranium and beryllium risks, including cumulative impacts with legacy contamination, the Commission asked BWXT NEC and CNSC staff questions about the following topics:
- studies on public health impacts from potential synergistic radiological and conventional pollutant exposures
 - the safety margin between beryllium emissions and applicable environmental guidelines, and potential health impacts
 - the fate of beryllium following human inhalation
 - whether BWXT NEC's current production processes involve the broader range of hazardous materials associated with historical GE site operations
35. In response to the Commission's questions, BWXT NEC representatives:
- stated that BWXT NEC was not aware of studies on synergistic effects
 - emphasized that BWXT NEC relies on meeting established regulatory limits that are protective of the public and environment, and that its emissions are well below action levels and licence limits
 - confirmed that historical hazardous materials on the GE Vernova site are not from BWXT NEC's current production processes, and that GE Vernova is responsible for the site
36. In response to the Commission's questions, CNSC staff stated that monitoring showed no increasing contaminant trends; the presence of beryllium is historical in nature and public health, and the environment remain protected. CNSC staff also noted that any abnormal beryllium releases would be addressed through regulatory monitoring tools, and any unexpected findings could be assessed through back-modelling and source evaluation.
37. With respect to the absorption of beryllium through the lungs, CNSC staff took an undertaking to provide a more comprehensive written response.¹⁸ CNSC staff also reaffirmed that there is negligible risk to the environment or to human health from beryllium in locations surrounding the BWXT NEC Peterborough facility. CNSC staff noted

¹⁸ On June 12, 2026, CNSC staff submitted the requested information in [CMD 26-M13.B](#).

that BWXT NEC's beryllium emissions are well below the Ontario Ambient Air Quality Criteria level established to be protective of human health.¹⁹

38. Regarding intervenors' concerns about potential pelleting operations at the Peterborough facility, the Commission asked CNSC staff to explain the regulatory steps that would be required if BWXT NEC were to pursue those operations. CNSC staff outlined that pelleting at the Peterborough facility could only proceed after BWXT NEC meets specific licence conditions, including establishing acceptable monitoring programs and submitting an acceptable commissioning report. BWXT NEC representatives stated that BWXT NEC has no current plans to implement pelleting at the Peterborough facility and that any future decision to do so would follow regulatory requirements. BWXT NEC added that it would communicate with the local community and Indigenous nations.
39. Regarding intervenors' concern about GE Vernova's building demolition and related contamination risks, the Commission asked about historical activities on the site involving the use of radioactive substances. In response to the Commission's questions:
- BWXT NEC representatives clarified that BWXT NEC has no demolition planned for its licensed site, and that any potential demolition related to GE Vernova is outside of BWXT NEC's licensed activities, with details and timelines still unknown
 - CNSC staff confirmed that the proposed GE Vernova demolition is outside of BWXT NEC's CNSC-regulated operations, with oversight resting with the City of Peterborough and Ontario Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks (MECP)
 - CNSC staff noted that certain buildings on the GE Vernova site were released from CNSC regulatory control in 2016 after inspections and record reviews found no radioactive waste or related storage concerns
 - an MECP representative clarified that oversight of GE Vernova's demolition plans would be led through the City of Peterborough's permitting process, with the Ministry reviewing plans for health and environmental protection once available
40. Regarding intervenors' concern about the adequacy of BWXT's financial guarantee for decommissioning, the Commission asked about BWXT NEC's decommissioning plans and the lifecycle

¹⁹ The reported maximum in-stack concentrations ranged from 0.001 to 0.003 µg/m³ over the 2021-2025 period, prior to any environmental dilution. These values are well below the beryllium Ontario Ambient Air Quality Criteria of 0.01 µg/m³. ([CMD 26-M13.B](#), page 4).

regulatory oversight of the licensee's facilities. BWXT NEC representatives and CNSC staff provided the following responses:

- BWXT NEC confirmed that it has no current decommissioning plans for its licensed sites, with only a preliminary decommissioning plan (PDP) and a financial guarantee in place; the PDP is updated regularly, with summaries publicly available
- CNSC staff described the CNSC's lifecycle regulatory framework related to decommissioning, which is supported by planning and financial guarantees to ensure safe cleanup without burdening the public, and confirmed that BWXT NEC's current PDP and associated financial guarantee meet applicable requirements
- CNSC staff noted that the Commission accepted BWXT NEC's reduced financial guarantee in 2024, and that the reduction was due to changes in packaging and disposal pathways

41. Regarding intervenors' concern about the effectiveness of oversight and environmental monitoring practices, the Commission asked about the following topics:

- uncertainty in BWXT NEC's uranium-in-air monitoring due to sampling limitations
- how air monitoring and soil sampling are used together to assess environmental contamination over time and location
- whether the environmental sampling frequency is sufficient to detect trends and environmental concerns
- how radiation and contaminant levels are measured in the environment and how those measurements are interpreted to estimate public dose and risk

42. In response to the Commission's questions, BWXT NEC representatives:

- discussed confidence in environmental monitoring results, noting that emissions at the stack remain well below regulatory limits and are close to background levels after dispersion
- stated that soil sampling locations are informed by facility proximity, surrounding community areas, and public input
- stated that annual sampling is adequate due to very low emissions of beryllium
- explained that very low airborne uranium measurements may be reported as "0.000" due to rounding after conversion into concentrations over large air volumes

43. In response to the Commission's questions, CNSC staff:

- described its risk-informed oversight and stated that people and the environment are protected; additional continuous atmospheric monitoring is not required
 - explained that soil sampling is guided by environmental transport modelling; monitoring results validate conservative model predictions and support the assessment of environmental risk
 - stated that soil and air sampling is conducted 3 times over 10 years through the IEMP, and that BWXT NEC's environmental sampling is risk-informed
 - stated that the reported public dose reflects only the facility's contribution above natural background, which can appear as zero when the levels are very low
44. The Commission sought additional details regarding intervenors' concern about the method used to extract beryllium from soil samples during IEMP sampling (partial extraction and not full extraction). CNSC staff explained that the soil analysis method used was refined to assess the health-relevant, bioavailable portion of beryllium. CNSC staff added that some forms of beryllium are not readily absorbed by the body because they are bound in mineral structures such as silicates or zircons.
45. Regarding intervenors' concern about potential climate change impacts on facility operations, the Commission asked about how BWXT NEC accounts for climate change. BWXT NEC representatives stated that its safety analysis considers climate-related hazards and that the analysis is periodically updated to account for changing conditions. CNSC staff confirmed that BWXT NEC's analysis meets requirements and considers climate-related events. CNSC staff added that no significant changes in climate-related risk considerations had arisen since the 2020 hearing, and that the licensee's safety case remains within the licensing basis.
46. The Commission asked for additional details regarding BWXT NEC's updated public dose assessment methodologies. A BWXT NEC representative explained that the assessment approach was the same for both facilities, and that the assessment for each facility considers vulnerable populations near the facilities. CNSC staff explained that the updates to public dose estimates aim to improve accuracy by using more realistic assumptions about how people are exposed.
47. Regarding transparency and public disclosure of information, the Commission asked CNSC staff and BWXT NEC about how information on health, community impacts, and operational plans is

made available to the public. BWXT NEC representatives stated that BWXT NEC uses multiple communication channels to share information with the public and noted that any future changes in operations would be openly communicated. CNSC staff stated that health information is publicly available online and is being updated to improve accessibility. CNSC staff added that BWXT NEC's public information program meets requirements and supports effective communication to the public.

48. With respect to CELA's presentation, the Commission sought additional information on BWXT NEC's approach to minimize radiation doses and monitor employee health. BWXT NEC representatives explained that BWXT NEC's radiation protection program is risk-based and multi-layered, with monitoring and controls to ensure that worker doses remain ALARA. CNSC staff confirmed its verification of BWXT NEC's ALARA program to ensure that that requirements are being met.
49. Following Unifor Locals' presentation, the Commission asked about Unifor Locals members' participation in BWXT NEC's safety committees. Unifor Locals representatives described established committee processes for raising and tracking safety concerns and sharing results with workers. Representatives from BWXT NEC described multiple mechanisms for workers to raise safety concerns and characterized the mechanisms as part of a healthy safety culture.
50. Following Pete Woolidge's presentation, the Commission asked about how BWXT NEC applies lessons learned from events at other BWXT NEC sites or broader industry facilities. BWXT NEC representatives stated that operating experience (OPEX) is shared across its global organization and that lessons are used to identify improvements to its facilities. CNSC staff added that OPEX is a shared learning framework across licensee, national and international levels, and that lessons are shared with industry to support continuous improvement.
51. Following William G. Templeman's presentation, the Commission asked for more information regarding a water leak incident at the Peterborough facility,²⁰ as well as BWXT NEC's programs to ensure the integrity of its equipment. In response, BWXT NEC representatives detailed the root cause of the water leak, follow up, and corrective actions, including improved inspection and maintenance practices. BWXT NEC also described its program for tracking preventative maintenance and facility improvements. CNSC

²⁰ On March 14, 2023, "water leaking in a piping tunnel under the plant was identified. The sources included city water from the single pass cooling water system along with parts wash water and floor wash water..." Section 4.1.11, page 60, CMD 26-M13.1.

staff confirmed that BWXT NEC implemented corrective actions and described its oversight of BWXT NEC's fitness for service program.

52. Following James Wilke's presentation, the Commission asked about BWXT NEC's responsibilities regarding city zoning. A BWXT NEC representative noted that BWXT NEC is aware of nearby residential growth and engages with residents but has limited involvement in zoning decisions.
53. Following PHCHCC's presentation, the Commission asked about the following topics:
 - regulations pertaining to the transportation and packaging of nuclear material²¹
 - detail regarding a reportable event involving a single UO₂ pellet²²
 - association of cancer incidences and industrial activities at Peterborough
54. BWXT NEC representatives and CNSC staff provided the following responses:
 - CNSC staff explained that nuclear materials are transported under strict federal regulations with safety ensured through risk-based packaging requirements
 - BWXT NEC representatives explained that the root cause of the reportable event was human error and outlined the corrective measures that were implemented; CNSC staff confirmed that the event was addressed as a minor non-compliance, with corrective actions implemented and verified as effective
 - CNSC staff stated that health studies in nuclear host communities show no unusual disease patterns or cancer clusters
55. Following Janice Keil's presentation expressing concerns about a potentially contaminated property in Peterborough,²³ the Commission asked whether the property in question was part of the BWXT NEC facility or within CNSC regulatory oversight. BWXT NEC representatives clarified that the property was not part of the BWXT NEC leased facility. CNSC staff added that the property was outside of the CNSC's jurisdiction.

²¹ The Commission referenced a presentation slide on page 22 of CMD 26-M13.33.

²² In reference to "In March 2024, a reportable event occurred when a single uranium dioxide pellet was inadvertently shipped back to the Toronto facility in a skid that had been returned to the Toronto facility." Section 3.14, page 43, CMD 26-M13.1.

²³ CMD 26-M13.37A.

56. Further to Janice Keil's presentation, the Commission asked for more information on environmental sampling methods to measure beryllium. CNSC staff responded that the current monitoring focuses on soil sampling as it better reflects contaminant accumulation compared to sampling vegetation.
57. Following HFN's intervention, the Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- integration of Indigenous knowledge into CNSC work
 - communication approaches that would support HFN's understanding of information
 - the difference between "procedural" consultation and engagement and "meaningful" consultation and engagement
 - improving communication, building relationships and strengthening engagement across the nuclear sector
58. In response, BWXT NEC representatives:
- emphasized that engagement with HFN is at an early stage and focused on building mutual understanding through shared learning and communication over time
 - stated that engagement will require ongoing, practical collaboration and adapting communication approaches based on HFN's needs
 - stated that effective engagement requires balancing procedural requirements with meaningful dialogue and learning, rather than treating them as separate activities
 - recognized the broader sector-wide collaboration needs, including academia; suggested standardization of engagement frameworks to improve efficiency; highlighted the reduction of administrative burden to focus on community-specific engagement
59. CNSC staff:
- described the progress in integrating Indigenous Knowledge into regulatory work through collaborative approaches, and emphasized that knowledge-sharing occurs at the pace and readiness of each Nation
 - stated that building trust involves two-way learning, and described ongoing efforts to improve communication and engagement with Indigenous communities

- stated that advancing meaningful engagement is a gradual and long-term process that requires continuous effort beyond procedural improvements
 - emphasized the importance of cross-sector collaboration, including First Nations to share knowledge and support relationship-based approaches
60. HFN provided the following responses to the Commission:
- meaningful engagement requires building foundational trust before effective participation and knowledge-sharing can occur
 - challenges remain in making technical information accessible to communities that build understanding and reduce fear
 - noted that engagement is still largely procedural but improving, with emerging progress toward more open meaningful dialogue
 - emphasized the need for making consultation and engagement more efficient and less repetitive for the community
61. The Commission noted that there is a need for clearer, more accessible communication that reduces jargon and improves public understanding and trust. BWXT NEC agreed with the Commission's comment, and CNSC staff highlighted ongoing efforts to reduce technical jargon and improve communication. An HFN representative emphasized the need for open-minded engagement without rigid regulatory frameworks.
62. In closing, HFN stated that continued respectful engagement and consistent interaction will gradually strengthen relationships and lead to better communication over time.
63. Following CLFN's presentation, the Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- opportunities for CLFN to collaborate in monitoring and reporting programs
 - whether BWXT NEC's cultural awareness program or training involves First Nation engagement and/or Indigenous-led training²⁴
 - how medical isotope information was communicated and how it could be improved for understanding and access
64. In response, BWXT NEC representatives:

²⁴ Raised by CLFN in its written submission, Appendix B of CMD 26-M13.27, points 10 and 11, page 7.

- stated that engagement with First Nations should be collaborative and guided by dialogue rather than predefined steps
- emphasized flexibility to adapt engagement based on evolving needs
- explained that information was shared through in-person demonstrations, and noted expanding community outreach and dialogue to improve understanding and trust

65. CNSC staff:

- described ongoing efforts to expand collaboration in monitoring and oversight activities
- stated that cultural awareness and Indigenous engagement training should be considered an essential baseline training for both regulators and industry
- expressed openness to engage and provide information on medical isotopes as needed

66. CLFN representatives:

- described the need for the integration of culturally relevant approaches to monitoring
- noted emerging opportunities for knowledge-sharing to support mutual learning between CLFN, BWXT NEC, and CNSC staff
- emphasized the need for greater understanding and clearer communication about medical isotopes to communities

67. In closing, the CLFN emphasized fostering open and trust-building approaches to engagement and dialogue.

68. The Commission expressed its appreciation to all participants for the information provided. The Commission is satisfied with the update provided on this topic.

ACTION
#22505
Closed

INFORMATION ITEMS

Update on the Designated Officer Program: 2025 ([CMD 26-M15](#))

69. CMD 26-M15 provides information about the Designated Officer (DO) Program for the 2025 calendar year. This CMD, along with quarterly memos to the Commission on reportable DO decisions, fulfills the requirement to report on specific DO decisions pursuant to subsection 37(5) of the [Nuclear Safety and Control Act](#).

Discussion

70. The Commission asked whether the DO program has adequate resources to support increased activities such as radioisotope production, transport, and exports. CNSC staff confirmed that the DO program is prepared to support future potential increases in isotope production and exports.
71. The Commission expressed its appreciation to CNSC staff for the information provided on this item.

Closure of the Public Meeting

72. The public meeting closed at 1:19 pm (ET) on May 28, 2026. These minutes reflect both the public meeting itself and the Commission's considerations following the meeting.

Recording Secretary

August 19, 2026
Date

Commission Registrar

August 19, 2026
Date

APPENDIX A – Commission Member Documents

CMD	Date
26-M12	April 22, 2026
Notice of Commission Meeting for May 27-28, 2026	
26-M16	April 24, 2026
Agenda for the May 27-28, 2026 – Commission Meeting	
26-M16.A	May 7, 2026
Revised Agenda for the May 27-28, 2026 – Commission Meeting	
26-M16.B	May 19, 2026
Revised Agenda for the May 27-28, 2026 – Commission Meeting	
26-M16.C	June 1, 2026
Revised Agenda for the May 27-28, 2026 – Commission Meeting	
26-M14	May 12, 2026
Status Report on Power Reactors	
Written submission from CNSC Staff	
26-M17	May 27, 2026
Event Initial Report – Workplace Injury at McMaster Nuclear Reactor	
Written submission from CNSC Staff	
26-M13.1	February 25, 2026
Mid-term update from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. on licensed activities at its Toronto and Peterborough facilities	
Written submission from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc.	
26-M13.1A	May 13, 2026
Mid-term update from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. on licensed activities at its Toronto and Peterborough facilities	
Presentation from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc.	
26-M13	February 25, 2026
Mid-term update from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. on licensed activities at its Toronto and Peterborough facilities	
Presentation from CNSC Staff	

26-M13.A	May 7, 2026
Mid-term update from BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. on licensed activities at its Toronto and Peterborough facilities	
Presentation from CNSC Staff	
26-M13.39	April 17, 2026
Written submission from the Canadian Environmental Law Association for Citizens Against Radioactive Neighbourhoods	
26-M13.39A	May 13, 2026
Presentation from the Canadian Environmental Law Association for Citizens Against Radioactive Neighbourhoods	
26-M13.36	April 17, 2026
Presentation from Unifor Locals 252, 524 and 599-O	
26-M13.14	April 17, 2026
Presentation from Pete Woolidge	
26-M13.40	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Peter Harris	
26-M13.40A	May 15, 2026
Presentation from Peter Harris	
26-M13.16	April 12, 2026
Presentation from William G. Templeman	
26-M13.19	April 15, 2026
Presentation from Deirdre McGahern	
26-M13.34	April 17, 2026
Presentation from James Wilkes	
26-M13.45	April 17, 2026
Presentation from Jane Scott	
26-M13.48	May 15, 2026
Presentation from Nicholas Lato	
26-M13.26	April 16, 2026

Written submission from the Hiawatha First Nation	
26-M13.26A	May 13, 2026
Presentation from the Hiawatha First Nation	
26-M13.27	April 16, 2026
Written submission from the Curve Lake First Nation	
26-M13.27A	May 13, 2026
Presentation from the Curve Lake First Nation	
26-M13.33	April 17, 2026
Presentation from the Port Hope Community Health Concerns Committee	
26-M13.2	March 4, 2026
Presentation from Erica Martin	
26-M13.11	April 10, 2026
Presentation from Angel Hamilton	
26-M15	May 11, 2026
Information Item – Update on the Designated Officer Program: 2025	
26-M13.37	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Janice Keil	
26-M13.37A	May 28, 2026
Presentation from Janice Keil	
26-M13.4	March 12, 2026
Written submission from Roger Desrochers	
26-M13.5	March 19, 2026
Written submission from the Rotary Club of Peterborough	
26-M13.6	March 20, 2026
Written submission from Kelly McDowell	
26-M13.7	April 1, 2026
Written submission from Stephanie Benn	
26-M13.8	April 3, 2026

Written submission from Jonathan Campbell	
26-M13.9	April 9, 2026
Written submission from Lora Vassiliadis	
26-M13.10	April 9, 2026
Written submission from Caroline Tennent	
26-M13.12	April 10, 2026
Written submission from Zahir Topan	
26-M13.13	April 10, 2026
Written submission from Emily Straka	
26-M13.15	April 11, 2026
Written submission from Jessica Rowland	
26-M13.17	April 14, 2026
Written submission from Roy Brady	
26-M13.18	April 14, 2026
Written submission from the Oasis Dufferin Community Centre	
26-M13.20	April 15, 2026
Written submission from Conexus Nuclear Inc.	
26-M13.21	April 15, 2026
Written submission from Jake Wadland	
26-M13.22	April 15, 2026
Written submission from Catherine Vakil, M.D.	
26-M13.23	April 16, 2026
Written submission from Corina McCoy	
26-M13.24	April 16, 2026
Written submission from Creative Fire LP Des Nedhe Group	
26-M13.25	April 16, 2026
Written submission from Unifor Local 599-O	
26-M13.28	April 16, 2026

Written submission from Ken Brown	
26-M13.29	April 16, 2026
Written submission from Barbara Chisholm	
26-M13.30	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Janet Harris	
26-M13.31	April 17, 2026
Written submission from the Radiation Safety Institute of Canada	
26-M13.32	April 17, 2026
Written submission from the Canadian Nuclear Association	
26-M13.35	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Rebecca Schillemat	
26-M13.38	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Wendy Trusler	
26-M13.41	April 17, 2026
Written submission from the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation	
26-M13.42	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Timothy Wilson	
26-M13.43	April 17, 2026
Written submission from the Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council	
26-M13.44	April 17, 2026
Written submission from Mark Achbar	
26-M13.46	April 20, 2026
Written submission from the Lakelands Public Health	
26-M13.47	April 24, 2026
Written submission from Corinne Mintz	