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SUPPLEMENTAL/COMPLÉMENTAIRE

CMD : 21-M36.B

Date signed/Signé le :

Reference CMD/CMD de référence : CMD 21-M36

Commission Request for Information

Demande d'information de la Commission

***Regulatory Oversight  
Report for Canadian  
Nuclear Power  
Generating Sites: 2020***

***Rapport de surveillance  
réglementaire des sites de  
centrales nucléaires au  
Canada : 2020***

Public Meeting

Réunion publique

Scheduled for :

15 December 2021

Prévue pour :

15 Décembre 2021

Submitted by:

CNSC Staff

Soumise par :

Le personnel de la CCSN

## Summary

The purpose of this supplemental Commission Member Document (CMD) is to provide additional information to what is presented in CMD 21-M36, including:

- CNSC staff responses to key themes from interventions on the current report
- Updates on topics requested by the Commission and CNSC staff recommendations to close the requests
- Errata to CMD 21-M36

This CMD is for information, but also includes requests for the Commission to close actions assigned to CNSC staff for specific updates.

## Résumé

L'objectif de ce CMD supplémentaire est d'apporter des informations supplémentaires à ce qui est présente dans CMD 21-M36, comprenant:

- Les réponses du personnel de la CCSN aux commentaires reçus à travers les interventions pour le présent Rapport
- Les mises à jour demandées par la Commission et les recommandations du personnel de la CCSN pour clore les demandes
- Les Errata au CMD 21-M36

Ce CMD est fourni à titre d'information, mais comprend aussi les demandes de la Commission pour fermer les actions assignées au personnel de la CCSN pour des mises à jour spécifiques.

**Signed/signé le**

December 8<sup>th</sup>, 2021



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... 1**

**1. OVERVIEW .....2**

**2. RESPONSES TO INTERVENTIONS ON 2020 NPGS ROR .....2**

**3. FOLLOW UP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM THE COMMISSION .....5**

**4. ERRATA..... 11**

**5. CONCLUSION..... 14**

**REFERENCES ..... 15**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CMD 21-M36.B is a supplemental CMD to the *Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2020* (hereafter referred to as the 2020 NPGS ROR). This CMD provides CNSC staff responses to key themes identified from interventions received on the 2020 NPGS ROR. It also provides information requested by the Commission during previous Commission Proceedings. CNSC staff recommend that the Commission close 2 of the 10 requests. Finally, this CMD outlines some errata that were identified during review of the 2020 NPGS ROR that will be corrected prior to its posting.

## 1. OVERVIEW

This CMD 21-M36.B is a supplemental CMD to the *Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2020*, CMD 21-M36 (hereinafter referred to as the 2020 NPGS ROR [1]). The main purpose of this supplemental CMD is to:

- provide CNSC staff clarifications and/or responses to key themes identified from interventions on 2020 NPGS ROR;
- describe how requests from the Commission for specific information have been addressed, and recommend closure for 2 of the 10 associated action items on CNSC staff; and
- identify errors in the 2020 NPGS ROR to be corrected before posting.

Documents referenced in this CMD are listed at the end of this CMD and are available to the public.

Note that the 2020 NPGS ROR is meant to be read in tandem with an online document containing information deemed static in nature and repeated yearly in the NPGS RORs. This document is called *General Description of Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Generating Sites* [2].

## 2. RESPONSES TO INTERVENTIONS ON 2020 NPGS ROR

The CNSC received 5 interventions from the public, Indigenous Nations and communities, and civil society organizations concerning the 2020 NPGS ROR. CNSC staff reviewed all the interventions carefully; clarifications and responses for key themes identified in the interventions, and within the scope of the 2020 NPGS ROR, are provided in the following table.

Comment	CNSC Staff Response
Curve Lake First Nation [CMD 21-M36.4] and Gordon Dalzell [CMD 21-M36.3] Topic: Fisheries Act/Fish Impingement	The <i>Fisheries Act</i> Authorization (FAA) for each facility describes in detail aquatic monitoring initiatives to be undertaken, which are specific to each site.  The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) granted FAAs for Darlington NGS in 2015, Pickering NGS in 2018, and for Bruce NGS in 2019. The NB Power application process is currently ongoing. Each FAA is specific and has a detailed set of conditions that relate to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• measures and standards, to avoid and mitigate impacts to fish</li> <li>• monitoring and reporting of measures and standards, to avoid and mitigate the impacts</li> </ul>

Comment	CNSC Staff Response
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the offsetting of those impacts</li> <li>• monitoring and reporting of implementation of offsetting measures</li> </ul> <p>The DFO and CNSC work collaboratively, with the assistance of other experts when needed, to develop and implement each FAA, and to ensure that monitoring programs specified in the FAA are adequate.</p>
<p>Canadian Environmental Law Association [CMD 21-M36.2] Topic: Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) Technical Study</p>	<p>The Technical Study Report on the PNERP was made available for request from the Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management (OFMEM) on the Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) website as of June 30, 2021. The study and its recommendations, which are meant to improve the PNERP, is owned by the OFMEM and the distribution method is under their purview.</p> <p>Details of CNSC staff review of the PNERP Technical Study and its implications for Ontario's NPGSs will be included in future RORs. The OFMEM is seeking feedback from its stakeholders and the Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee (NEMCC), (note that CNSC is a member of this committee and recently received a draft copy of the revised PNERP) by December 31, 2021. All comments received will be dispositioned prior to a public consultation in 2022 and will be taking the following into consideration:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Findings from the Enercon Technical Study report on the PNERP planning basis</li> <li>b. Alignment with national and international standards and guidance</li> <li>c. Progress in operational procedures, and organizational and support plans through on-going engagement with NEMCC members</li> <li>d. Technical Clarifications</li> <li>e. Administrative updates including updated ministry names</li> </ol>
<p>Canadian Environmental Law Association [CMD 21-M36.2] And Gordon Dalzell [CMD 21-M36.3] Topic: Derived</p>	<p>Derived release limits (DRLs) are site-specific calculated rates of release of radionuclides that could, if exceeded, expose an individual of the most highly exposed group to a committed dose equal to the regulatory annual dose limit of 1mSv/year.</p> <p>During an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission that took place September 3-13, 2019, a recommendation was made to add dose constraints to</p>



Comment	CNSC Staff Response
Release Limits/ Tritium Emissions	<p>radiological releases. The CNSC has committed to making this improvement. More information on dose constraints will be documented in the draft REGDOC-2.9.2, <i>Controlling Releases to the Environment from Nuclear Facilities</i>, which was posted for public consultation in the summer of 2021. CNSC staff are currently dispositioning the comments received during the consultation period.</p> <p>The CNSC and Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) are working to improve public access to radionuclide release information, through linkages between the National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) and CNSC's Open Government Portal.</p> <p>Of radionuclides released from NPPs, tritium is of principal interest. Tritium is generated in the fuel of all reactors, however, CANDU reactors also generate tritium as a result of neutron capture by deuterium in the heavy water coolant and moderator. Releases of tritium from all of the nuclear power plants (NPPs) have and continue to be well below both their licence limits and respective action levels. In addition, the environmental monitoring data (including measuring tritium concentrations in air, drinking water, local foodstuffs, etc.) and the associated public dose calculations indicate that resulting exposures are well below the public dose limit, thus confirming that public health and the environment are protected.</p> <p>Actual releases will vary from site to site specifically due to differences in facility design and operational activities. Pickering has been working to reduce tritium releases as part of its continuous improvement plans.</p> <p>In 2020 tritium releases at the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station were at 0.05% and 0.64% of the DRL for liquid and air releases respectively. The annual estimated Dose to the public remained low at 1.2 uSv.</p> <p>À la suite de l'arrêt du réacteur de Gentilly-2 en 2012, Hydro-Québec a entamé des opérations à la préparation du stade d'entreposage sous surveillance. Certaines de ces opérations sont à l'origine de faibles rejets de radionucléides dont le tritium rapporté par Hydro-Québec depuis 2012. Ce sont, par exemple, la vidange du réacteur, le déplacement du combustible irradié du réacteur vers la piscine de refroidissement, et le transfert de ce combustible irradié refroidi vers les modules d'entreposage à sec sur le site. Toutefois, ces rejets de radionucléides sont faibles, très</p>

Comment	CNSC Staff Response
	inférieurs aux limites permises, et vont baisser avec le temps. Les risques qu'ils posent pour l'environnement et le public sont très faibles

### 3. FOLLOW UP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM THE COMMISSION

As a result of the licensing hearings in 2018 for Pickering and Bruce NGS, as well as presentations at other Commission meetings, the Commission has requested specific information to be presented in the 2020 NPGS ROR. Important requests for such information are captured in the Regulatory Information Bank (RIB) used by CNSC staff. The RIB numbers in this supplemental CMD refer to specific entries in this database, which CNSC staff track to closure.

The following table describes how specific requests for information from the Commission have been addressed. Where appropriate, the table indicates the requests for which CNSC staff believe the action has been completed. That is, for those requests, CNSC staff are of the professional opinion that the information provided has addressed the underlying issue.

Action	CNSC staff response
[RIB 23134] Provide an update on asbestos phase-out	An update on the asbestos management plans for each of the NPGS is provided in section 2.15 of the 2020 ROR.  <b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b>
[RIB 22116] Provide updates on matters related to emergency management and emergency preparedness at PNGS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) 2017 PNERP</li> <li>(ii) The PNGS implementation plan</li> <li>(iii) Results from the PNERP technical study</li> <li>(iv) The province of Ontario's unified transport management plan</li> </ul>	<b>The Commission had previously closed items (i), (ii), and (iv)</b>  The 2020 NPGS ROR described: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(iii) Updates regarding web link to PNERP technical study in section 2.10</li> <li>(v) In lieu of provincial coordination, Durham Region Emergency Management and the City of Toronto Office of Emergency Management, developed a 5-year public education plan focused on public education and awareness related to nuclear emergency</li> </ul>

<p>(v) OPG's review and revision of the PNGS PIDP in regard to emergency preparedness and the provision of information to populations beyond the DPZ.</p>	<p>preparedness, funded by Ontario Power Generation, to fulfill the PNERP obligations within the nuclear emergency management program and public alerting requirements.</p> <p>Durham Region and the City of Toronto report annual public education activities to the Pickering Darlington Nuclear Public Awareness and Education Subcommittee and, as required, the Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee. Annual activities are also reported to the Office of the Fire Marshall and Emergency Management and OPG.</p> <p>Based on market research conducted in 2019, Durham Region and the City of Toronto developed an integrated communications framework to amplify messaging, identify synergies, co-ordinate strategic decisions, and share resources which uses a combination of traditional and digital communication products to reach and engage with a broader resident audience. Of note, traditional tools included neighbourhood signage, digital print and broadcast advertising. In 2020, the team executed a fall public alerting campaign with the goal of raising awareness among those who work, play, live or attend school within 10 km of the Darlington and Pickering nuclear generating stations. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the team did not execute the spring public alerting campaign, however it intends to continue to execute public alerting campaigns in spring and fall moving forward.</p> <p>The campaign's effectiveness was measured by various indicators including media impressions, micro-conversations, conversion rates, social media analytics, website metrics, and media coverage.</p>
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	<p>The focus for the 2021 public education and awareness is to further improve and enhance the understanding of the public's knowledge in nuclear emergency preparedness through a nuclear awareness social research project in collaboration with Ontario Tech University. In addition, the spring and fall public alerting campaign will investigate further communication strategies with stakeholders to differentiate messaging used in the 0-3km zone and the 3-10 km zone.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that items (iii) and (v) remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 20544]</p> <p>Present how many IIP commitment in each NGS were planned, completed, reviewed and closed</p>	<p>Status of IIP commitments for each NGS provided in CNSC staff presentation CMD 21-M36.A.</p> <p>Further details of IIP commitments are provided in the introduction section for each NGS where they are applicable (3.1.0, 3.3.0 and 3.5.0).</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 17557]</p> <p>Following the 2018 PNGS licence renewal hearing, the Commission requested CNSC staff to provide annual updates regarding several additional matters of interest pertaining to the Pickering site [3]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) CNSC staff's regulatory oversight of OPG's progress and performance with respect to the PNGS integrated implementation plan (IIP) activities</li> <li>(ii) whole-site PSA methodology and progress for the PNGS site</li> <li>(iii) joint fuel machine reliability</li> </ul>	<p><b>The Commission had previously closed item (ii), and item (iv) is tracked via RIB 19575, outside of NPGS ROR reporting</b></p> <p>As a follow-up to the licence renewal for Pickering NGS, the 2020 NPGS ROR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) provided an update of the status of the IIP in section 3.3.0</li> <li>(iii) provided an update on the joint fuel machine reliability project in section 2.6</li> </ul> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that items (i) and (iii) remain open.</b></p>

<p>project</p> <p>(iv) decision made by ECCC on the nomination to include radionuclides as chemicals of mutual concern (COMCs) (via memo)</p>	
<p>[RIB 16516]</p> <p>Following the 2018 PNGS licence renewal hearing, the Commission requested CNSC staff to provide annual updates related to fish and fisheries in the vicinity of Pickering [3]:</p> <p>(i) improvements and resulting fish impingement rate</p> <p>(ii) results of Ontario Power Generation's (OPG's) thermal plume monitoring</p> <p>(iii) a) OPG's compliance with its <i>Fisheries Act</i> authorization and b) involvement of Indigenous groups in activities related to the authorization</p>	<p>The 2020 NPGS ROR described:</p> <p>(i) improvements and resulting fish impingement rate in section 3.3.0</p> <p>(ii) results of OPG's thermal plume monitoring in section 3.3.0</p> <p>(iii) a) OPG's compliance with its <i>Fisheries Act</i> authorization in section 3.3.0 and b) involvement of Indigenous groups in activities related to the authorization in section 2.15</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 14761]</p> <p>Following the 2018 Bruce A and B licence renewal hearing, the Commission requested CNSC staff to monitor Bruce Power's continual enhancements to bring internal fire risk to below the safety goal target for the Bruce A units ([4], paragraph 146).</p>	<p>Bruce Power submitted the 2018 PSA update for REGDOC-2.4.2 compliance, which included an update to the Bruce A Internal Fires PSA. Bruce Power's Large Release Frequency (LRF) was above the administrative target for the 2018 PSA update (5.37E-06 occurrences/yr. compared to the administrative target of 1.00E-06 occurrences/yr.). Bruce Power subsequently credited Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus (VESDA), which improved the LRF to 1.70E-06 occurrences/yr.; however, it was still slightly above the administrative target.</p> <p>As per the Bruce Power's procedure on PSA, Bruce Power is to perform an identification and a review of the proposed mitigation strategies to identify cost effective improvements which can be implemented as part of Business Risk Management, in order to reduce the LRF value below the</p>

	<p>administrative target.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 14757]</p> <p>Following the 2018 Bruce A and B licence renewal hearing, the Commission directed CNSC staff to describe developments related to pressure tube fracture toughness for Bruce A and B, including:</p> <p>i) fracture toughness modelling</p> <p>ii) estimates of the maximum amount of equivalent hydrogen</p> <p>([4], paragraphs 216, 231, and 449).</p>	<p>(i) The work on developing new models for pressure tube fracture toughness and the hydrogen equivalent (<math>H_{eq}</math>) content in pressure tubes at Bruce A and B is addressed in sections 2.6 of the 2020 NPGS ROR.</p> <p>(ii) The estimates of the maximum amount of equivalent hydrogen are provided in Appendix C of the 2020 NPGS ROR.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 14755]</p> <p>Following the 2018 Bruce A and B licence renewal hearing, the Commission directed CNSC staff to report annually on the implementation of electronic data transfer without human intervention (transition to the fully automated DLAN system) from Bruce NGS to the CNSC emergency operations centre ([4], paragraphs 331 to 334).</p>	<p>Bruce Power's implementation to a fully-automated data transfer to the CNSC is addressed in section 3.5.10 of the 2020 NPGS ROR.</p> <p>Bruce Power phased out the DLAN system at the end of 2019 and implemented a web-based solution for data transfer. CNSC staff accepted this solution in December 2019. Furthermore, in response to Bruce Power's latest update on the system in March 2021, CNSC staff concluded that Bruce Power made sufficient progress in implementing the data transfer system such that a set schedule for updates are no longer required.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request be closed.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 14753]</p> <p>Following the 2018 Bruce A and B licence renewal hearing, the Commission requested updates from CNSC staff on the status of the major component replacement (MCR) in NPP Status Reports, as well as the NPGS ROR. In</p>	<p>Progress toward the MCR is addressed in section 3.5.0 of the 2020 NPGS ROR.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>

<p>addition, the Commission requested to be informed of any significant changes to the plans, schedules, or any other work related to the MCR - should it occur before or after October 31, 2019 ([4], paragraphs 43, 50, and 454).</p>	
<p>[RIB 8504]</p> <p>As a result of a presentation by NPP licensees on PSA, the Commission expects CNSC staff to establish a proposed regulatory position on risk aggregation ([5], paragraph 49).</p>	<p>CNSC staff were actively engaged in international projects on Site-Level PSA and risk aggregation (2015-2019). The projects included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NEA/WGRISK Project (2015-2020): Status of Site-Level (Including Multi-Unit) PSA Developments. This task consisted in its phase 2 of an international workshop on Site-Level PSA including the discussion on risk aggregation.</li> <li>2. IAEA Project on Multi-unit PSA (2016-2019).</li> <li>3. IAEA Project on Risk Aggregation (2018-2019). This has led to a publication for a limited distribution of the working document titled: “Methodology for Aggregation of Various Risk Contributors for Nuclear Facilities”</li> </ol> <p>The completion of these projects showed there is no international consensus among the regulatory bodies on risk aggregation, and these projects reaffirmed that risk aggregation should be considered more than just the numerical addition of mean values of piece-parts of PSA. These projects also reaffirmed that the scope of risk aggregation is highly dependent on the regulatory requirements, as well as on the intended uses and applications of the PSA.</p> <p>The results of these extensive projects, have led CNSC staff to reiterate their position with regard to risk aggregation which remains as stated in Section 4.2.2 guidance of REGDOC-2.5.2:</p>

	<p>“Calculations of the safety goals include all internal and external events as per REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants. However, aggregation of internal event and other hazard risk metrics performed through simple addition to demonstrate that the risk metrics (core damage frequency, small release frequency and large release frequency) are not exceeded might not be appropriate. It is recognized that when the risk metrics for external events are conservatively estimated, their summation with the risk metrics for internal events can lead to misinterpretation. Should the aggregated total exceed the safety goals, conclusions should not be derived from the aggregated total until the scope of the conservative bias in the other hazards is investigated”.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request be closed.</b></p>
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#### 4. ERRATA

Some minor errors in the 2020 NPGS ROR were identified through reviews by CNSC staff, licensees and intervenors. Prior to publication, the following errors will be corrected in the report:

- In figure 1, titled “Locations and facilities of nuclear power generating sites in Canada”, two incorrect titles in the legend: “In-service” and “In-service & refurbished” were stated. These titles should be replaced with “In-service within design life” and “Returned to service” respectively.
- In figure 8, titled “Trend of average effective doses of monitored persons”, incorrect Gentilly-2 effective dose values (mSv) of “0.01” for 2016 and “0.01” for 2020 were stated. These values should be replaced with “0.17” for 2016 and “0.08” for 2020.
- In table 3, in subscript note “d”, an incorrect number of “4” certified health physicists was stated for Bruce NGS. This should be replaced with “3”



- In table 12, titled “List of Inspection at DNGS”, the inspection title “Engineering Change Control: DRPD-2020-03408” should be replaced with “Reliability Program: DRPD-2020-03408”
- In table 16, titled “List of Inspection at PNGS”, the inspection title “REGDOC-2.24 Implementation: PRPD-2020-05333” should be removed since this is captured under the inspection title “Managing Worker Fatigue: PRPD-2020-06899”. In addition, the inspection number “PRPD-2020-06899” should be replaced with “PRPD-2020-05333”
- In table 22, titled “List of Inspections at WWMF”, both inspection reports were sent to OPG in “April 2021” and not in “January 2021”. These inspections were not considered in the ratings for the 2020 NPGS ROR, but will be considered in the 2021 NPGS ROR. However, CNSC staff are satisfied with the current progress made by OPG to address the non-compliant findings from these inspections.
- In table 23, titled “List of Inspection at PLNGS”, the inspection title “Self-Assessment: GPLRPD-2020-08356” should be replaced with “Independent Assessments: GPLRPD-2020-08356”.
- In section 2.6, under “Equipment fitness for service / equipment performance”, it was incorrectly stated that “the tests were completed successfully by Bruce Power”. This statement should be replaced with “the special safety system tests were scheduled for a later date as per Bruce Power’s governance documents”.
- In section 2.7, under “Worker dose control”, an incorrect range of 0.01 to 2.42 mSv per year was stated for the average effective dose at each facility. The range should be 0.17 to 3.97 mSv per year.
- In section 3.1.6 and section 3.3.6, under “Periodic Inspection Testing”, an incorrect title to the CSA N285.8 was stated. This should be replaced with “Technical requirements for in-service evaluation of zirconium alloy pressure tubes in CANDU reactors”
- In section 3.3.0, under “Thermal Plume Monitoring”, an incorrect Record of Decisions was referenced. This should be replaced with [Detailed Record of Decision](#) – OPG – Licence Renewal for Pickering Nuclear Generating Stations.
- In section 3.3.0, under “Fisheries Act Authorization”, an incorrect value of “3,573 kg” was stated for the biomass of all species and ages impinged in 2020. This should be replaced with “3,525.72 kg”.
- In section 3.3.0, under “Fisheries Act Authorization”, the text on Sporadic large fish impingement events stated that they occur between “November 1 and May 1 2020”. The intent was to state that these events occur between November and May of any year. The year “2020” will be removed from this statement.

- In section 3.3.3, the wrong SCA was stated in the text: “CNSC staff concluded that OPG met the applicable regulatory requirements and CNSC staff expectations, for the SCA Human Performance at the PNGS in 2020”. The “SCA Human Performance” will be replaced with “SCA Operating Performance”
- In section 3.3.4, the following statement: “OPG developed a software package to estimate the source term and doses to members of the public following a reactor accident. CNSC staff assessed the adequacy of calculation assumptions, appropriateness of the input data, and ensured the software package meets the required Quality Assurance documentation based on CSA N286.7 Quality assurance of analytical, scientific, and design computer programs” should be removed since it is a duplication, and it pertains to severe accident analysis (original statement is under section 2.4)
- In section 3, under the respective facility sub-sections, a statement to indicate if any event initial reports were submitted to the Commission for the reporting period was missing. The following text will be inserted for each facility:
  - In section 3.1.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to DNGS were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021.
  - In section 3.2.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to DWMF were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021
  - In section 3.3.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to PNGS were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021
  - In section 3.4.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to PWMF were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021
  - In section 3.5.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to BNGS A and B were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021
  - In section 3.6.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to WWMF were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021
  - In section 3.7.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to PLNGS were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021

- In section 3.8.0 – “No event initial reports pertaining to Gentilly-2 were submitted to the Commission for the period covering January 1, 2020 to June 1, 2021

## **5. CONCLUSION**

This CMD provides CNSC staff responses to key themes identified from interventions received on the 2020 NPGS ROR, as well as errata identified in the 2020 NPGS ROR which will be corrected before the ROR is posted.

Further, this CMD summarizes the status of the Commission information requests to CNSC staff that were addressed through the 2020 NPGS ROR and CNSC staff presentation at the December 2021 Commission Meeting. CNSC staff have provided responses to 10 Action Items, of which CNSC staff recommend the closure of 2 Action Items [RIB 14755 and 8504]. CNSC staff will provide updates on the remaining Action Items in future RORs.

## REFERENCES

1. Submission from CNSC staff on [Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2020](#), CMD 21-M36.
2. General Description of [Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Generating Sites](#).
3. [Detailed Record of Decision](#) on Application by OPG to Renew the Nuclear Power Reactor Operating License for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, April 4, 2018 and June 24-29, 2018.
4. [Record of Decision](#) on Application by Bruce Power Inc. to Renew the Power Reactor Operating License for Bruce A and Bruce B Nuclear Generating Station, March 14, 2018 and May 28-31, 2018.
5. [Minutes](#) of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on March 27, 2014.