

Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear **Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2019**

Commission Meeting December 8, 2020 CMD 20-M36.C









Updates to CMD 20-M36.A

Presentation CMD 20-M36.C replaces CMD 20-M36.A with the following changes:

- Slide 3 was duplicated in error and has been removed
- Slide 16 and 39 were updated to provide trend arrows
- Slides 55-57 were added to provide information on the participant funding program recipients and interventions received for this ROR

Supplemental CMD 20-M36.B addresses comments from interventions received









Presentation Outline

- Overview of CNSC Regulatory Oversight
 - Safety and control area performance ratings
 - Independent Environmental Monitoring Program
 - Public and Indigenous engagement
- Safety Performance of Uranium Processing Facilities
- Safety Performance of Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities
- Participant Funding and Interventions

Uranium Processing Facilities

Cameco Blind River Refinery

Cameco Port Hope Conversion Facility

Cameco Fuel Manufacturing Inc.

BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc.

Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities

SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.

Nordion (Canada) Inc.

Best Theratronics Ltd.









CNSC Regulatory Oversight Reports - 2019

- **November 5, 2020:** Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada
- December 8 to 10, 2020:
 - Uranium Processing and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities
 - Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites
 - Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites
 - Uranium Mines and Mills

Summary and highlights of CNSC staff oversight activities across nuclear industry for 2019









Follow Up from Last Year's Regulatory Oversight Report (ROR)

Commission requested two follow-up actions from last year's ROR:

- Licensee to provide a direct point of contact to CNSC staff so that it can then be made publicly available to assist intervenors
 - Status: Completed
- CNSC staff to provide a summary of the basis behind Derived Release Limits (DRLs)
 - Status: Attached as Appendix M of CMD 20-M36









ROR for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2019

Key Topics:

- CNSC's regulatory efforts
- Ratings of licensee performance for the 14 safety and control areas (SCAs) with a focus on:
 - Radiation protection
 - Environmental protection
 - Conventional health and safety
- Licensing and compliance verification activities, significant events and changes in performance ratings at uranium and nuclear substance processing facilities









CNSC REGULATORY OVERSIGHT









CNSC Regulatory Oversight

Regulatory oversight includes licensing, compliance verification and reporting activities.

Compliance is verified through:

- Inspection/verification activities
- Reviews of operational activities and documentation
- Licensee reporting of performance data, including annual reports and unusual occurrences

Risk-informed and performance-based approach



CNSC inspector during a facility walkdown at Cameco Blind River Refinery in 2019. *Source: CNSC*











CNSC Regulatory Oversight Ratings and Performance

Safety and control areas (SCAs) are used to assess and evaluate licensee performance.

CNSC staff rate performance as:

- Satisfactory (SA)
- Below expectations (BE)

Ratings are derived from results of regulatory oversight activities.







Safety and Control Areas

Management System

Human Performance Management

Operating Performance

Safety Analysis

Physical Design

Fitness for Service

Radiation Protection

Conventional Health and Safety

Environmental Protection

Emergency Management and Fire Protection

Waste Management

Security

Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Packaging and Transport









CNSC Regulatory Oversight Ratings and Performance

CNSC staff use expert professional judgement to rate performance based on multiple inputs, including:

- Key performance indicators
- Results of compliance verification activities
- Repeat instances of non-compliance
- Effectiveness of licensee corrective actions

Ratings represent an holistic summary of each SCA











Independent Environmental Monitoring Program (IEMP)

CNSC staff sample air, water, soil, vegetation, and various foods to independently verify that the public and the environment are protected.

In 2019, CNSC staff conducted IEMP sampling around:

- **BWXT Toronto**
- **BWXT** Peterborough



CNSC staff taking water samples near the Blind River facility in Blind River, Ontario in 2020.

Source: CNSC

All IEMP results are posted on the CNSC's website









Public and Indigenous Engagement

CNSC staff routinely engage with the public and Indigenous groups. Examples include:

- Participation in relevant community events as a means to inform the public of the CNSC's role
 - Engagement with local municipalities
 - CNSC Open House events
 - Participation in licensee events
- Engagement and consultation with Indigenous groups to discuss issues of concern regarding CNSC-regulated activities



CNSC staff providing information to participants attending an open house in Peterborough, 2020.

Source: CNSC










URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITIES







Nuclear Fuel Cycle











Uranium Processing Facilities

Facility	Licence Expiry	Financial Guarantee (approx.)
Cameco Blind River Refinery	February 2022	\$48M
Cameco Port Hope Conversion Facility	February 2027	\$128.6M
Cameco Fuel Manufacturing Inc.	February 2022	\$21M
BWXT Toronto and Peterborough	December 2020	\$52.4M

Cameco Fuel **Ontario** Manufacturing Inc. and Cameco Blind Cameco Port Hope River Refinery **Conversion Facility BWXT** Peterborough **BWXT Toronto**

All uranium processing facilities have valid financial guarantees in place for decommissioning











Uranium Processing Facilities Regulatory Oversight 2019

Legend: Trend arrows indicate change from 2018

Denotes Decrease Denotes Increase **→** Denotes No change

	Blind River Refinery	Port Hope Conversion Facility	Cameco Fuel Manufacturing	and	
Person Days for Licensing	11 🕇	7	17	302	337
Person Days for Compliance	157 🗼	275	200	232	864 ↓
Number of Inspections	4	4 ↓	3	3	14 ↓
Inspection Action Items	26 🗼	17 🗼	17	5	65 →
Enforcement Actions	0>	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
Number of Safeguards Inspections led by IAEA*	5 1	6	4	6	21

^{*}Note: Canada has met its international obligations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.









Uranium Processing Facilities Performance Ratings 2019

Legend

SA = Satisfactory


BE = Below Expectations

Blind River Refinery	Port Hope Conversion Facility	Cameco Fuel Manufacturing	BWXT Toronto and Peterborough
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
SA	SA	SA	SA
	SA S	Refinery SA	Refinery SA





CNSC Regulatory Oversight Regulatory Limits and Action Levels














Radiation Protection 2019 Average and Maximum Effective Doses to Nuclear Energy Workers (NEWs)




Note: In addition to the annual effective dose limit of 50 mSv in any one year, a regulatory dose limit of 100 mSv over a defined five-year dosimetry period is applied for a NEW





Radiation Protection Dose to Nuclear Energy Workers (NEWs) 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend





Radiation Protection Action Level Exceedances

Two radiation protection action levels exceeded at Blind River Refinery

Parameter	Dose (mSv)	Action Level (mSv)
Quarterly Whole Body Dose	0.72	0.7
Quarterly Skin Dose	13.62	6.0

- Cameco initiated an investigation in accordance with their corrective action process, determined that exposures were mostly non-personal in nature
- Cameco has implemented additional administrative controls

CNSC staff reviewed and are satisfied with response taken by licensee









Radiation Protection Action Level Exceedances

One radiation protection action level exceeded at Cameco Fuel Manufacturing

Parameter	Dose (mSv)	Action Level (mSv)
Quarterly Extremity Dose	73.7	55

- Cameco initiated an investigation in accordance with their corrective action process, determined that exposures were mostly non-personal in nature
- Cameco has implemented additional administrative controls

CNSC staff reviewed and are satisfied with response taken by licensee









Uranium Processing Facilities Dose to Public (mSv) 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend


Eacility		Regulatory				
Facility	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Limit
Cameco Blind River Refinery	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	
Cameco Port Hope Conversion Facility	0.006	0.020	0.153*	0.173	0.127	
Cameco Fuel Manufacturing	0.025	0.023	0.022	0.030	0.027	1 mSv/year
BWXT Toronto	0.010	0.0007	0.0175	0.0004	0.023	
BWXT Peterborough	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	0.0115	

^{*}For 2017, Cameco PHCF's increased dose to the public is due to an update to their public dose calculations which include a more conservative dose estimate compared to previous years. There has been no increase in environmental releases or gamma dose from the PHCF and, as a result, there is no increased risk to the public.





Environmental Protection Uranium in Ambient Air 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend




Note: BWXT Peterborough does not conduct ambient air monitoring as emissions at the point of release are already below the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (MECP) air quality standard for uranium.







Environmental Protection Uranium Concentrations in Soil 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend



^{*}Cameco Fuel Manufacturing (CFM) samples soil on a 3-year frequency

Note: BWXT Peterborough does not conduct soil monitoring due to extremely low stack emissions.

CCME = Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment







^{**} Below Laboratory Detection Limit



Environmental Protection Action Level Exceedances

- In 2019, PHCF reported a fluoride measurement of 266 grams of hydrogen fluoride per hour (g HF/h) which exceeds the action level of 230 g HF/h
- The action level was exceeded due to a small leak due to a seal failure and did not pose a risk to people or the environment
- Cameco isolated the cell which resulted in fluoride concentrations returning to normal
- Corrective actions include revising the procedure on how to troubleshoot a cell failure and how to adequately implement isolation and purging techniques.

CNSC staff reviewed and are satisfied with response taken by licensee









Environmental Protection Action Level Exceedances

- In 2019, PHCF reported 18 action level exceedances for uranium discharges from the sanitary sewer
- Cameco's investigations attributed this to heavy rainfall leading to groundwater infiltration into sanitary sewer piping
- Releases were below regulatory limits with no impact on the environment
- Corrective actions include sealing the identified infiltration sources and upgrading the sanitary sewer system

CNSC staff reviewed and are satisfied with response taken by licensee











Conventional Health and Safety Lost-Time Injuries (LTI) 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend

Facility	Statistic	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Common Direct Direct	LTI	0	0	0	0	0
Cameco Blind River	Severity Rate	0	0	0	0	0
Refinery	Frequency Rate	0	0	0	0	0
Compace Doub House	LTI	1	4	1	2	0
Cameco Port Hope Conversion Facility	Severity Rate	7.64	2.40	1.67	7.58	0
	Frequency Rate	0.26	0.80	0.28	0.49	0
Cameco Fuel Manufacturing	LTI	1	0	0	0	0
	Severity Rate	0.6	0	0	0	0
	Frequency Rate	0.6	0	0	0	0
BWXT Peterborough and Toronto	LTI	0	0	0	0	0
	Severity Rate	0	0	0	0	0
	Frequency Rate	0	0	0	0	0

Severity rate: (Total days lost to injury)/(number of hours worked for the year) * 200,000 person-hours Frequency rate: (Number of LTIs)/(number of hours worked for the year) * 200,000 person-hours









FACILITY HIGHLIGHTS









Facility Highlights Uranium Processing Facilities

Highlights	BRR	PHCF	CFM	BWXT
Changes to facility operations	0	0	0	0
Licensing decisions	0	0	0	0
Licence Conditions Handbook Update	0	0	0	0
Regulatory limit exceedances	0	0	0	0
Action Level exceedances	2	19	1	0
Lost-time Injuries	0	0	0	0







Facility Highlights Blind River Refinery

- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted four inspections in 2019:
 - General
 - **Emergency Management and Fire Protection**
 - Packaging and Transport
 - Fitness for Service
- One event reported to the CNSC in accordance with **CNSC** reporting requirements



UO₃ tote bin loading and handling station at the Blind River Refinery.

Photo source: Cameco









Facility Highlights Port Hope Conversion Facility

- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted four inspections in 2019:
 - Two General
 - Security
 - Emergency Management and Fire Protection
- Thirteen events reported to the CNSC in accordance with CNSC reporting requirements



Side view of Port Hope Conversion Facility

Source: Cameco









Facility Highlights Port Hope Conversion Facility

- Cameco continues to carry out work related to its Vision in Motion Project
 - Building demolition completed at the Centre Pier
 - Demolition waste transferred to Port Hope Area Initiative's (PHAI) Long-Term Waste Management Facility (LTWMF)
- CNSC staff conducted an inspection in 2019 to verify activities at Centre Pier
 - Confirmed that Centre Pier can be safely removed from PHCF's licensed area
 - Centre Pier is currently under the care and control of CNL to undergo further remediation



CNSC inspector observing demolition activities at Centre Pier in Port Hope, 2019.

Source: CNSC









Facility Highlights Cameco Fuel Manufacturing

- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted three inspections in 2019:
 - General
 - Management System
 - **Emergency Management and Fire Protection**
- One event reported to the CNSC in accordance with **CNSC** reporting requirements



A CFM worker performing a final inspection on a fuel bundle prior to packaging.

Photo source: Cameco











Facility Highlights BWXT Toronto and Peterborough

- Increase in licensing effort due to licence renewal application submission in November 2018
- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted three inspections in 2019:
 - General
 - Management System
 - Radiation Protection
- BWXT reported two events (minor fender bender and OEL exceedance) in accordance with its regulatory reporting requirements



CNSC inspector during a facility walkdown at BWXT Toronto, 2019.

Source: CNSC









NUCLEAR SUBSTANCE PROCESSING FACILITIES









Nuclear Substance Processing

Facilities





Image of a 70 MeV cyclotron manufactured by BTL.

Source: BTL



Nordion personnel working with a hot cell manipulator.

Source: Nordion





Exit Signs



Safety Markers



Safety Signs





Raw Light Sources



Tactical Devices









Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities

Facility	Licence Expiry	Financial Guarantee (approx.)
SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.	June 2022	\$0.73M
Nordion (Canada) Inc.	October 2025	\$45.1M
Best Theratronics Ltd.	June 2029	\$1.8M

All nuclear substance processing facilities have valid financial guarantees in place for decommissioning











Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities Regulatory Oversight in 2019

Legend: Trend arrows indicate change from 2018

	SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.	Nordion (Canada) Inc.	Best Theratronics Ltd.	Totals
Person Days for Licensing	2>	20 ↓	225	247
Person Days for Compliance	110	91	66 ↓	267 ↓
Number of Inspections	2>	4	1>	7 🕇
Inspection Action Items	6	3	1 1	10
Enforcement Actions	0 ->	0 1	0 ->	o ↓
Number of Safeguards Inspections led by IAEA*	N/A	1 1	0 ->	1 1

^{*}Note: The IAEA reported a satisfactory result for the inspection.









Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities Performance Ratings 2019

Legend

SA = Satisfactory

N/A = Not Applicable

BE = Below Expectations

Safety and Control Area	SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.	Nordion (Canada) Inc.	Best Theratronics Ltd.
Management System	SA	SA	SA
Human Performance Management	SA	SA	SA
Operating Performance	SA	SA	SA
Safety Analysis	SA	SA	SA
Physical Design	SA	SA	SA
Fitness for Service	SA	SA	SA
Radiation Protection	SA	SA	SA
Conventional Health and Safety	SA	SA	SA
Environmental Protection	SA	SA	SA
Emergency Management and Fire Protection	SA	SA	SA
Waste Management	SA	SA	SA
Security	SA	SA	SA
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation	N/A	SA	SA
Packaging and Transport	SA	SA	SA












Radiation Protection 2019 Average and Maximum Effective Doses to Nuclear Energy Workers (NEWs)




Note: In addition to the annual effective dose limit of 50 mSv in any one year, a regulatory dose limit of 100 mSv over a defined five-year dosimetry period is applied for a NEW





Radiation Protection Dose to Nuclear Energy Workers (NEWs) 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend













Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities Dose to Public 2015-2019 (mSv) – 5 Year Trend

Eacility	Year					Regulatory
Facility	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	limit
SRB Technologies	0.0068	0.0046	0.0033	0.0038	0.0021	
Nordion	0.0057	0.0021	0.000052	0.000067	0.00087	1 mSv/year
Best Theratronics	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

N/A = Not applicable

Public dose estimates are not provided for Best Theratronics Ltd. because its licensed activities involve sealed sources and there are no discharges to the environment











Conventional Health and Safety Lost-Time Injuries (LTI) 2015-2019 – 5 Year Trend

Facility	Statistic	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
	LTI	0	0	3	0	0
SRBT	Severity Rate	0	0	17.7	0	0
	Frequency Rate	0	0	7.6	0	0
	LTI	0	3	1	0	2
Nordion	Severity Rate	0	70.04	5.61	0	4.15
	Frequency Rate	0	2.32	0.93	0	0.69
	LTI	1	3	1	2	2
BTL	Severity Rate	0.68	37.61	15.04	8.21	5.47
	Frequency Rate	0.68	2.05	0.68	1.37	1.37

Severity rate: (Total days lost to injury)/(number of hours worked for the year) * 200,000 person-hours Frequency rate: (Number of LTIs)/(number of hours worked for the year) * 200,000 person-hours









Conventional Health and Safety Lost-Time Injuries

Nordion reported two LTIs in 2019

- An employee sustained a low back injury when trying to open double lead doors on one of the hot cells
- An employee incurred lower back pain when removing wood bracing from the ground of a sea crate container

Nordion conducted investigations and implemented corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

CNSC staff reviewed and are satisfied with response taken by licensee









Conventional Health and Safety **Lost-Time Injuries**

BTL reported two LTIs in 2019

- An employee strained their back when physically moving wooden ramps to loading dock
- An employee cut their hand while working on a product that was not deburred

BTL conducted investigations and implemented corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

CNSC staff reviewed and are satisfied with response taken by licensee









FACILITY HIGHLIGHTS









Facility Highlights Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities

2019 Highlights	SRBT	Nordion	BTL
Changes to facility operations	0	0	0
Licensing decisions	0	1	1
Licence Conditions Handbook Updates	0	2	1
Regulatory limit exceedances	0	0	0
Action Level exceedances	0	0	0
Lost-time Injuries	0	2	2





Facility Highlights SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.

- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted two inspections in 2019:
 - General
 - **Environmental Protection**
- Two events reported to the CNSC in accordance with CNSC reporting requirements



SRBT employee performing tritium filling operations Source: SRBT












Facility Highlights SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. **Groundwater Concentrations**

- Tritium levels surrounding the facility continue to decrease compared to previous years
- Elevated tritium concentrations originated from past operations
- Low values near and in Muskrat River and residential areas

Public and environment around the facility remain protected











Facility Highlights Nordion (Canada) Inc.

- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted four inspections in 2019:
 - Security
 - Packaging and Transport
 - Emergency Management and Fire Protection
- Four events reported to the CNSC in accordance with CNSC reporting requirements



Nordion personnel working with a hot cell manipulator Source: Nordion











Facility Highlights Best Theratronics Ltd.

- Increase in regulatory effort due to licence renewal application submission in September 2018
- Following a public hearing in May 2019, the Commission renewed BTL's Class IB licence for a tenyear period in June 2019.
- Regular compliance verification activities
- CNSC staff conducted one inspection in 2019
- BTL reported two events in accordance with CNSC regulatory reporting requirements



Photograph of Cobalt-60 teletherapy machine *Source: BTL*









SAFETY PERFORMANCE CONCLUSIONS









Safety Performance Conclusions Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities

CNSC staff have confirmed that in 2019, licensees operating uranium and nuclear substance processing facilities in Canada:

- Adequately controlled radiation exposures to keep doses ALARA
- Maintained releases to levels protective of the environment
- Continued to protect workers with conventional health and safety programs
- Continued to effectively implement programs in support of all SCAs
- Addressed all areas of non-compliance in a timely manner

CNSC staff are satisfied that licensees continue to protect the health and safety of workers, public and the environment









PARTICIPANT FUNDING AND INTERVENTIONS









Participant Funding Program (PFP) and Interventions

Total of eight interventions received

PFP Recipients	Other interveners
Curve Lake First Nation	Canadian Nuclear Laboratories
Canadian Environmental Law Association	Canadian Nuclear Workers Council
Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation	Municipality of Port Hope
Swim Drink Fish Canada/ Lake Ontario Waterkeeper	
Algonquins of Ontario	









Participant Funding Program (PFP) and Interventions

Key Themes from Interventions

Positive Comments	Concerns/Recommendations
Satisfaction with safe operation of regulated facilities to protect workers, the public and the environment	Indigenous Consultation and Engagement
Industry well regulated	Accessibility of Information
Support for the regulatory oversight reporting process	Timeliness of information-sharing
	Lack of public access to detailed environmental data used to determine environmental risks

Concerns and Recommendations from interventions dispositioned in CMD 20-M36.B









CONCLUSION









Conclusions

CNSC staff's regulatory oversight activities confirmed that:

- Licensees are taking action in a timely manner
- Licensees' programs are implemented effectively
- Priority areas using a risk-informed approach and verification activities are maintained
- Trends across the uranium and nuclear substance processing facilities demonstrate that the industry continues to operate safely

Operations at Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities were conducted safely









2020 Regulating Under COVID-19 Restrictions

- Refer to CMD 20-M36 for more information on CNSC response to COVID-19 and modified oversight approach for the nuclear fuel cycle program
- Licensees implemented business continuity plans and shut down non-essential activities
- Where activities continued, enhanced hygiene, screening protocols and physical distancing were implemented while reducing onsite workforce to essential workers only
- CNSC staff continued:
 - Inspections using a combination of remote and onsite methods
 - Conduct of desktop reviews of licensee reports and submissions
 - Remote engagement with applicants and licensees
 - Remote engagement with Indigenous groups and the public

Safety and Security maintained at all times









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