Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on October 7, 2025

Minutes of the hybrid Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) meeting held in person and virtually on Tuesday October 7, 2025, beginning at 9:00 a.m. EST at the Outaouais Room, 140 Promenade du Portage, Phase IV, Gatineau, Quebec. The meeting was webcast live via the CNSC website, and video archives are available on the CNSC website.

Present:

P. Tremblay, President
T. Berube
A. Hardie
J. Hopwood
M. Lacroix
V. Remenda

J. Samson, Deputy Commission Registrar
L. Thiele, Senior General Counsel
T. Najem, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisors: E. Lemoine, A. Viktorov, S. Eaton, C. Krasnaj, A. Baig, A. Bulkan, B. Rzentkowski, E. Lemoine, K. Lun, N. Greencorn, S. Watt

Other contributors:

- New Brunswick Power: J. Nouwens, J. Maciejko
- Bruce Power: M. Burton, A. London, J. Marshall, R. Hoare, L. Van Wieringen,
- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: S. Sharma, S. Irvine, J. Downey, B. Vulanovic, D. Popovic, K. Aggarwal
- Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: P. McClelland
- Natural Resources Canada: D. Wilkinson
- Nuclear Waste Management Organization: S. Dolatshahi

Constitution

1. With the Notice of Meeting, Commission Member Document (CMD) 25-M30, being properly given and all Commission Members present, the meeting was properly constituted.

2. For the meeting, CMD 25-M32 to CMD 25-M36 were distributed to Commission Members. These documents are further detailed in Appendix A.

Adoption of the Agenda

3. The revised agenda, CMD 25-M31, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Registrar

4. President Tremblay chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by J. Samson, Deputy Commission Registrar.

Minutes of Previous Commission Meetings

5. The minutes of the Commission meeting held on June 3, 2025, were approved secretarially in advance of this meeting.

Participant Funding Program

There was no participant funding for this meeting.

Status Report on Power Reactors

6. With reference to CMD 25-M32, which included the status of the power reactor facilities as of September 9, 2025, CNSC staff presented the following additional updates:

    - For Bruce Nuclear Generation Station (NGS) site A:
        - on September 12, 2025, Unit 5 was returned to service after a forced outage
        - on September 20, 2025, Unit 2 was taken offline for a planned maintenance outage
        - Units 1, 6, 7, and 8 were at full power, while Units 3 and 4 were undergoing Major Component Replacement (MCR)
        - on September 30, 2025, Bruce NGS A experienced an electrical transient that originated at Unit 3, which caused station wide electrical impacts, triggered protection systems,

and temporarily reduced redundancy of the offsite Class IV power supply

- For Pickering NGS:
  - on September 18, 2025, Unit 6 was shut down for a planned maintenance outage
  - on September 19, 2025, Unit 1 was declared fully defueled and dewatered

7. Further to the Bruce Unit 3 transient, CNSC staff added that the disruption affected some station loads, including lighting and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Core Discharge Monitors at Units 2 and 3. Power was fully restored within 2 hours, and CNSC staff confirmed stable conditions, allowing resumption of work including the MCR project at Units 3 and 4. CNSC staff stated that Bruce Power was investigating the cause of the event, and that CNSC staff would continue to monitor and review the event as part of its routine oversight.

8. CNSC staff also reported that it was reviewing the final research and development reports on hydrogen equivalent concentration submitted by Bruce Power and Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG). CNSC staff noted that the findings would be presented at a Commission meeting in 2026.

Discussion

9. The Commission requested an update and additional information on the electrical transient event at Bruce NGS A. A Bruce Power representative provided the following in their response:

- Bruce Power was conducting complex troubleshooting of 20 failure modes, of which 10 had been ruled out, and the remaining 10 remained under high-priority investigation
- Bruce Power was undertaking a formal corrective action process to identify root causes, corrective measures, and prevent recurrence

10. Referencing the reported[1] injuries to workers,[2] the Commission sought more information on the following subjects:

- Bruce Power's approach to addressing the reported incidents from a system-wide and safety culture perspective

[1] Bruce NGS B, Status Report on Power Reactors (CMD 25-M32), page 2.
[2] The *Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations* state that ***worker*** means a person who performs work that is referred to in a licence.

- whether Bruce Power had examined if its work planning and workload management may have played a role in the underlying causes to worker injuries
- whether Bruce Power considered training or reorientation at the management level
- a comparative assessment of injury counts between the current and previous MCR projects, along with an explanation for the rise in reported worker injuries

11. Bruce Power representatives and CNSC staff provided the following in their responses to the Commission's questions:

    - Bruce Power paused work to address systemic issues by reviewing past corrective actions, reinforcing supervision, and strengthening safety expectations, including consistent use of work plans and personal protective equipment
    - Bruce Power was reviewing its work planning and training processes to ensure safety is fully integrated
    - Bruce Power was investigating the recent negative trend in safety performance to address performance gaps, and early indications suggest that the recent issues could be linked to the increased number of trades workers and supervisors on-site during a busy project phase
    - CNSC staff issued a formal warning letter to address the broader pattern of safety concerns and would review the effectiveness of planned corrective actions
    - Bruce Power was reviewing its supervisor training and human performance modules to identify gaps and enhance safety oversight.

12. Referencing the instrument line leak event,[3] the Commission asked about radiation exposure, protective actions, and improvements in leak prevention. Bruce Power representatives and CNSC staff included the following in their responses:

    - that the cause of the leak was due to stress corrosion cracking, rather than by fretting as previously observed
    - a description of past mitigation efforts that mainly focused on reducing fretting rather than the new mechanism
    - that the new failure occurred in a hard-to-access location and the repair resulted in about 100 mSv whole-body dose, which is consistent with previous repairs

[3] On September 7, 2025, Bruce NGS B Unit 5 was taken offline to repair an increasing instrument line leak on the heat transport system. Bruce Power performed a leak search followed by repairs to stop the leak. The unit was returned to service on September 12, 2025.

- Bruce Power's decision on expanding inspection programs will balance the radiation dose to workers with the benefit of detecting leaks
- CNSC staff noted that throughout the outage, CNSC inspectors verified that Bruce Power was taking appropriate corrective measures, and that CNSC staff would confirm the cause and potential broader impacts to the Unit

13. Referencing the incident of misplaced fission detectors,[4] the Commission requested additional information, including:

- the type of material in the fission detectors
- the extent of radiation exposure to personnel
- planned changes to procedures to prevent recurrence
- the timing and duration of misplacement

14. OPG representatives provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:

- the fission chambers are made of and contain ~2.6 grams of highly enriched uranium (~93% enriched)
- the workers involved were trained and qualified to handle the fission chambers, and no appreciable radiological hazard to them was expected due to the short half-life of activation products[5]
- OPG is committed to investigating the event and implementing corrective actions to prevent recurrence
- the fission chambers were initially entered into the waste management stream in May 2025, identified as missing in July 2025, and subsequently recovered in August 2025

15. CNSC staff noted that it would review both the event report and the corrective actions taken by OPG.

16. The Commission asked about the following in relation to the Darlington New Nuclear Project (DNNP):

- training and work management during on-site construction activities

[4] On July 29, 2025, OPG notified the CNSC Duty Officer of three misplaced fission detectors that were used for refurbishment start-up activities. These detectors are essential for neutronic monitoring when the reactor operates at very low power levels, and standard monitoring is unavailable due to off-scale low indications.

[5] Activation products are radioactive isotopes formed as a result of nuclear reactions, particularly in environments with high neutron flux such as nuclear reactors and particle accelerator facilities.

- progress pertaining to shaft tunneling for the Condenser Cooling Water (CCW)[6] and the Reactor Building

17. OPG representatives included the following in their response to the Commission's questions:

    - for the DNNP construction, Aecon Kiewit Nuclear Partners manages planning, hiring, and training of the contractor workforce, while OPG ensures all personnel are qualified before starting field work
    - the excavation of the reactor shafts has reached bedrock level and is expected to finish by year-end; preparation for the CCW tunnelling will follow, including specialized training for staff, with tunnelling set to begin by the end of the first quarter of next year

18. Referencing OPG's deferral of a DNNP deliverable from Regulatory Hold Point (RHP) 1 to RHP 2,[7] the Commission asked whether this deferral would lead to late changes to the design of the pressure vessel. In response, an OPG representative stated the following:

    - no risk is anticipated to the manufacturing of the vessel
    - OPG is confident that it can satisfy the CNSC's requirements on this deliverable
    - RHP 1 pertains to the base mat installation, and therefore the deliverable should be addressed in RHP 2

19. CNSC staff explained to the Commission that the change to RHP 2 was because one required analysis was a duplicate of an existing RHP 1 commitment, and the other, related to updated shutdown reliability, was determined unnecessary for the base mat installation; the deliverable is required under RHP 2 for the reactor vessel installation.

20. The Commission asked about the difference in project timelines between OPG's and Bruce Power's refurbishment projects.

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[6] Condenser cooling water is one of the main cooling systems used in CANDU reactors and is used to cool the steam from the steam generator and convert it back to water (to be converted back to steam again).

[7] A regulatory hold point (RHP) is part of a staged compliance oversight strategy. The removal of a RHP requires the licensee to submit evidence that all commitments related to the RHP have been completed. OPG's construction licence for the DNNP includes 3 RHPs. The removal of RHP-1 would authorize OPG to place the foundation for the reactor building and commence civil construction of the reactor building structure, internal civil structures, and internal reactor building systems and components. The removal of RHP-2 would authorize OPG to install the reactor pressure vessel and associated structures and components, as well as complete the appropriate installations of critical components, and conduct limited component testing.

Representatives from Bruce Power and OPG, and CNSC staff provided the following in their responses:

- Bruce Power's longer timeline is due to differences in project scope, including steam generator replacement, and scheduling
- Bruce Power is undergoing its first major refurbishment cycle, compared to it being the fourth unit at the Darlington NGS
- there are differences in factors such as reactor configuration, containment logistics, access, material flow, and overall scope
- both OPG and Bruce Power have benefitted from collaboration and lessons learned
- CNSC staff clarified that, as the nuclear safety regulator, its focus is not on project timelines but on ensuring that all activities are conducted safely

21. The Commission asked for clarification concerning the long duration of the Point Lepreau NGS's outage. In response, an NB Power representative informed the Commission that the duration of the outage was driven by the major component replacement of the generator, specifically the full rewind of the stator bars, and not due to any project-related challenges. CNSC staff reported that it has conducted inspections during the outage and that no safety concerns were identified as a result of these inspections.

22. The Commission asked Bruce Power about the following topics:

- in light of recent unexpected shutdowns, how Bruce Power plans to review its asset management program,[8] including any changes to its scope, and how these adjustments will enhance the plant's long-term viability
- clarification regarding the incident related to an open feeder cabinet insulation panel[9]
- how findings from recent supervisory visit observations are used to improve safety

23. Bruce Power representatives provided the following in their response to the Commission's questions:

- out of the 3 recent forced outages, one – related to the Main Output Transformer – was tied to the asset management program; Bruce Power's representative provided additional information

[8] Asset Management includes the ongoing inspection, maintenance, replacement and refurbishment activities, not included in MCR, that are necessary to extend the life of components.
[9] On July 9, 2025, Unit 8 was taken offline to repair an open feeder cabinet insulation panel which was causing a localized, elevated temperature level in the vault. Bruce Power repaired the feeder cabinet insulation panel, restored a normal vault temperature and returned the unit to service on July 11, 2025.

concerning the program and how it is used to manage early or unexpected equipment failures
- Bruce Power's investigation of a feeder cabinet panel that did not remain closed during operation was ongoing
- Bruce Power has implemented a feeder panel verification program and will introduce a new locking mechanism for panels in the refurbished units
- recent supervisory oversight and field observations improved workforce compliance with safety procedures and work plans by reinforcing proper behaviours
- identified gaps will be addressed through a Corrective Action Plan to identify long-term solutions, as sustaining enhanced supervisory oversight would be challenging

24. Referencing the event related to an incorrect fuse being pulled at the Pickering NGS,[10] the Commission asked OPG about lessons learned from this event to prevent recurrence. An OPG representative provided background about the incident, and outlined the corrective response undertaken, including the installation of an external panel mimic to help workers visualize components before opening a control panel. The OPG representative added that the corrective actions were reviewed with industry peers to improve human performance. CNSC staff informed the Commission of its regulatory response to the incident and commented that it found OPG's response to the event appropriate. CNSC staff stated that it was reviewing OPG's detailed investigation, causal analysis, and additional corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

25. Asked about the scope of the current outage at the Point Lepreau NGS and future outage plans, NB Power representatives included the following in their response:

- the current outage includes a full replacement of all stator bars as part of the generator rewind
- work from the planned 2025 outage was advanced into the current one to reduce equipment risk
- the spring 2026 outage will still proceed as planned

26. The Commission directs NB Power to provide an update on the root cause of the generator fault, which would include the history of the generator rewind and lessons learned. The Commission expects this information to be presented at a future Commission meeting. **ACTION** by March 2026

[10] On July 19, 2025, while performing routine maintenance activities on Unit 6, OPG staff removed an incorrect fuse that removed power to the quadrant 2 boiler level controller causing the associated boiler control level valves to fail resulting in an automatic reactor trip.

27. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff and licensees regarding this item.

EVENT INITIAL REPORTS

Workplace injuries at Ontario Power Generation's Darlington New Nuclear Project Site (CMD 25-M36)

28. CNSC staff provided information on two separate incidents at the DNNP construction site that resulted in injuries to workers:

- On July 14, 2025, a worker sustained injuries to both heels near the excavation site for the DNNP Tunnel Boring Machine after losing balance and jumping off an I-beam to the surface below; first aid was provided on-site before the worker was transported to a hospital, and the worker was released the next morning.
- On July 24, 2025, a worker sustained an injury to their humerus bone after a lift device attachment fell from a telehandler during pipe installation, striking the worker's shoulder; the worker was hospitalized.

29. The Commission requested comments about this item from CNSC staff and OPG. The following responses were provided:

- CNSC staff stated that the two serious workplace injuries at the DNNP site were deemed significant breaches of worker safety procedures, prompting enforcement actions and ongoing follow-up on corrective actions
- for the first event, an OPG representative stated that the worker had a non-lost-time accident and, being below two meters, did not require a tie-off; for the second event, the worker had a lost-time accident
- the OPG representative said that, in both cases, OPG notified the CNSC, and that OPG would provide CNSC staff with a summary of investigations, common causes, and corrective actions by October 31, 2025

30. The Commission sought additional information from OPG and CNSC staff, including on the following:

- OPG's corrective actions and contractor oversight
- the root cause behind the reported injuries
- whether OPG and CNSC staff incorporate international experience into their oversight

- whether OPG and CNSC staff compare safety and accident statistics with those from other recent international nuclear new-build projects
- CNSC staff's response and next steps

31. OPG representatives and CNSC staff provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:

- an OPG representative stated that the incident was influenced by inadequate lighting conditions at night; immediate corrective actions were taken to improve lighting and modify work practices on the platform to prevent recurrence
- an OPG representative stated that OPG aims to establish a cohesive safety culture among all workers and contractors
- an OPG representative stated that OPG has strengthened oversight by engaging a specialized third-party firm, secured access to Aecon Kiewit Nuclear Partners' training programs to evaluate worker preparedness, and was actively reviewing their safety action plans and common cause investigations to promote consistent safety practices throughout the site
- an OPG representative stated that OPG will take the necessary time to ensure that workers are competent and qualified to do activities
- an OPG representative explained that there was a standdown of 18 days that involved verifying the credentials of supervisors, workers, and management; the representative added that field management was restructured by integrating experienced nuclear managers from the refurbishment program to reinforce consistent safety practices
- CNSC staff stated that it recognized that safety culture challenges were mainly within the contractor's organization but observed encouraging progress
- CNSC staff acknowledged OPG's corrective measures and affirmed that ongoing inspections will be conducted to support continued improvements in safety culture
- an OPG representative explained that OPG was actively engaging with other major nuclear and industrial projects, such as Southern Nuclear and Électricité de France's Hinkley Point C, to share lessons learned and adopt best safety practices; these insights were being incorporated into Aecon Kiewit Nuclear Partners' programs and action plans to strengthen safety performance
- CNSC staff stated that it was actively engaging different regulators and industries at local and international levels to share lessons learned pertaining to safety and conventional safety
- an OPG representative and CNSC staff clarified that safety leaders and managers that are experienced in similar civil work

were brought from AECON's refurbishment project to the DNNP site to strengthen safety culture and oversee construction activities
- an OPG representative confirmed that a Detailed Event Report is scheduled for submission by the end of October 2025; it was also noted that the contractor, in collaboration with a third-party firm, is performing a common cause analysis of all incidents to uncover root causes and enhance the overall safety culture
- CNSC staff informed the Commission of its event reports review process, which varies by event significance and may involve follow-up questions or field inspections to verify corrective actions
- an OPG representative stated that OPG's performance is tracked using the Total Recordable Injury Rate,[11] which is currently at 0.87, below the target of 1 and better than other projects
- CNSC staff stated that there was no formal plan to compare safety statistics across sites due to limited data availability, and explained how it monitors and manages health and safety performance at nuclear construction sites
- CNSC staff noted that it would review the event reports to determine whether broader safety improvements are needed across construction activities

32. Further to the reported incidents, an OPG representative informed the Commission that job safety analyses were completed for all incidents, but that operator competency was not adequately assessed. In both incidents, operators did not fully understand the equipment or attachments they were using. The OPG representative added that the contractor is focused on ensuring operators are properly trained and competent before resuming work.

33. The Commission expects OPG to provide an update on its common cause analysis regarding the incidents reported in the EIR (CMD 25-M36). The Commission also expects CNSC staff to provide an update on its oversight of OPG's corrective actions, including whether OPG's measures have adequately addressed any common causes. Both updates are to be presented at a future Commission meeting. **ACTION** by June 2026

UPDATE ON ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS

CNSC staff Review of OPG's Commissioning Results of Processing and Storing Dry Storage Containers Containing 6-Year Cooled Fuel at the Pickering Waste Management Facility (Action Item #34279) **ACTION** # 34279 Closed

[11] The Total Recordable Injury Rate is a safety metric that measures the frequency of recordable workplace incidents.

34. With reference to CMD 25-M35, the Commission noted that it was satisfied with the information presented and had no questions.

INFORMATION ITEMS

Overview of the 8th Review Cycle of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

35. With reference to CMD 25-M33, CNSC staff presented information on the 8th Review Cyle of the Joint Convention (JC).[12] CNSC staff provided information on Canada's role in the 8th Review Meeting of the JC, and noted that it showcased its commitment to nuclear safety, transparency, and regulatory excellence.

Discussion

36. The Commission sought additional information on the following topics:

- the functioning of the JC and Canada's role including its IAEA administration, country selection for reviews, Canada's leadership, Indigenous input, report handling, agenda setting, and external peer-reviews
- specific items highlighted in the presentation, including closed items and good practices
- in the context of the peer-review process, whether a country is obligated to implement changes when an area for improvement has been identified, and whether there is any mechanism to ensure that contracting parties follow up on challenges or suggestions from the JC

37. Concerning the functioning of the JC and Canada's role, CNSC staff included the following in its responses to the Commission's questions:

- the JC is administered by the IAEA, and it is an incentive-based treaty where participating countries are motivated to meet their obligations; any shortcomings are documented in the JC's summary report
- Canada reviews reports from its assigned country group and voluntarily reviews reports from other countries relevant to its

[12] The Joint Convention is the only global, legally binding treaty on the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. Canada's Eighth National Report demonstrates how Canada continued to meet its obligations under the articles of the *Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management* during the reporting period, from April 1, 2020, to March 31, 2024.

interests (e.g. CANDU reactors, waste disposal); delegation members select reports, share insights, and engage through presentations and questions
- the JC's guidelines require the regulatory body to lead and facilitate the process; in Canada, the CNSC fulfills this role as designated by the Government of Canada
- following the 7th JC meeting, Canada aimed to better reflect Indigenous and public perspectives in its report, engaging communities and incorporating feedback
- CNSC staff briefed the Commission on JC guidelines for national report content
- though the national report does not reach Parliament, it is made public via Open Government; while the specific report is not directly tabled before Parliament, the CNSC reports annually to Parliament, including on its international activities, through the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources
- the JC President, independent of any national delegation, sets the agenda and process in line with JC procedures, following an organizational meeting held during the year
about 20 contracting parties reviewed Canada's report and submitted questions, which are publicly available on Open Government

38. Referencing a closed challenge related to the decommissioning and remediation of an Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) site,[13] the Commission asked how it was determined that this item had been adequately addressed. CNSC staff responded that the challenge was closed based on demonstrated and measurable progress; CNSC staff and a representative from AECL described the decommissioning and remediation work undertaken by AECL.

39. Referencing Canada's Good Practices, the Commission asked for clarification about the collaborative approach to waste-led design in nuclear technologies.[14] Representatives from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), OPG, Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), and CNSC staff provided the following in their response:

- CNSC staff explained Canada's holistic approach to long-term waste management involving collaboration between the regulator, government, waste owners, and generators; CNSC staff added that it reviewed its regulatory framework to plan its future management from the outset
- an NRCan representative described the organization's contribution to the waste-led design approach through the

[13] CMD 25-M33, page 22.
[14] CMD 25-M33, page 23.

Enabling Small Modular Reactors Program; the representative informed the Commission of the program's goal to fund research projects that address SMR waste management and supply chains, while promoting diversity and Indigenous participation
- an OPG representative discussed how OPG incorporates waste-led design principles in its nuclear projects, considering management, handling, and storage of all types of waste from the very start of technology selection and project planning to ensure safety, efficiency, and reduced future waste
- an NWMO representative detailed how the NWMO works with nuclear project proponents from the very beginning to ensure long-term waste management compatibility with the deep geological repository (DGR)

40. The Commission asked for additional information about the closed challenge related to the integrated radioactive waste management strategy for low- and intermediate-level waste from a safety point of view. Representatives from NRCan, OPG, NWMO, AECL, and CNSC staff provided the following in their response:

- CNSC staff explained that some JC "challenges" are not true challenges for Canada, but rather planned steps in its normal progression; while the wording comes from other contracting parties, Canada often interprets them as next steps rather than demanding undertakings
- an NWMO representative explained that the challenge had been closed following Canada's development of an Integrated Strategy for Radioactive Waste, and noted a new challenge concerning the disposal of intermediate-level waste was raised
- an AECL representative explained that since Canada's 2023 radioactive waste policy update, waste owners must maintain and revise the integrated strategy; all producers have formed the Radioactive Waste Collaboration Committee (RWCC) to implement and update it, overseen by NRCan
- an OPG representative stated that OPG participates in the RWCC to develop shared long-term waste solutions, while remaining responsible for disposing of its low-level waste; OPG plans to follow an NWMO-style approach, emphasizing early engagement and securing a willing host community
- an NRCan representative added that Canada's radioactive waste policy requires the strategy to be updated every five years, with the next revision due in 2028; the RWCC provides annual progress updates to NRCan on its implementation

41. Concerning the peer-review process and a country's obligation to implement changes, CNSC staff responded that there is no obligation; at each review meeting, countries report progress, and the country

group decides whether an issue remains a challenge or becomes a suggestion.

42. The Commission recognized the quality of the work associated with the JC and expressed its appreciation for the information provided by the respondents during the question period.

Closure of the Public Meeting

43. The public meeting closed at 12:04 p.m. EST on October 7, 2025. These minutes reflect both the public meeting itself and the Commission's considerations following the meeting.

Najem, Tarek
Digitally signed by Najem, Tarek
Date: 2025.12.01 08:51:30 -05'00'

Recording Secretary _____ Date _____

Samson, Jude
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DN: C=CA, O=GC, OU=CNSC-CCSN, CN="Samson, Jude"
Reason: I have reviewed this document
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Deputy Commission Registrar _____ Date _____

APPENDIX A – Commission Member Documents

CMD	Date	Doc ID No.
25-M31	2025-09-24	166150894-7972 - English 166150894-7946 - French
Agenda of the Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to be held on October 7, 2025 at 140 Promenade du Portage, Gatineau, Quebec		
25-M32	2025-09-19	166150894-7950 - English 166150894-8037 - French
Status Report Status Report on Power Reactors Written submission from CNSC Staff		
25-M36	2025-08-25	166150894-7952 - English 166150894-7951 - French
Event Initial Report Ontario Power Generation – Workplace injuries at Darlington New Nuclear Project Site Written submission from CNSC Staff		
25-M35	2025-08-19	166150894-7731 - English 166150894-7732 - French
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding CNSC Staff Review of OPG's Commissioning Results of Processing and Storing Dry Storage Containers Containing 6-Year Cooled Fuel at the Pickering Waste Management Facility Written submission from CNSC Staff		
25-M33	2025-10-07	166150894-7968 - English 166150894-7969 - French
Information Item Canada's Participation at the 8th Review Meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Presentation from CNSC Staff		