



Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) Meeting held on
March 24-26, 2026

Minutes of the hybrid Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) meeting held in person and virtually on March 24–26, 2026, beginning at 9:00 am (ET) / 8:00 am (CT) at the Outaouais Room, 140 Promenade du Portage, Phase IV, Gatineau, Quebec. The meeting was webcast live via the CNSC website, and video archives are available on the [CNSC website](#).

Present:

P. Tremblay, President
T. Berube
A. Hardie
J. Hopwood
M. Lacroix
V. Remenda

C. Salmon, Commission Registrar
L. Thiele, Commission Counsel
A. Mazur, Commission Counsel
H. Forester, Recording Secretary
T. Najem, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisors: A. Viktorov, B. Rzentkowski, B. Vary, N. Kline, B. Carroll, S. Watt, C. Pike, A. O'Connor, M. Hornof, K. Hazelton, L. Hagen, K. Lun, D. Hipson, S. Baskey, A. Bellingham, E. Dagher, A. Levine, J. Stevenson, N. Greencorn, A. Stewart, K. Campbell, M. Fabian Mendoza, Q. Zheng, M. Cherif Gacem, R. Tennant, E. Sacay, M. Jones, K. Owen-Whitred, L. Pozihun, K. Farnworth, L. Shuparski-Miller, S. Faille, N-O. Kwamena, M. Davey, N. Frigault, E. Lemoine, H. Davis, A. McAllister, C. Dodkin, J. McKeown, J. Thelen, D. Kozeluh, W. Islam, A. Ethier, R. Read, J. Lam, B. Duhaime, R. Richardson, E. Kanasewich, B. Ellaschuk, L. Hunter, L. Posada, G. Su, S. Pollex, and K. Gorzkowski.

Other contributors

- Ontario Power Generation: S. Gregoris, K. Carew, S. Irvine, C. Axler, M. Buckham, H. Rambukkana, J. Nash, and L. Corkum
- Bruce Power: K. Thomson, G. Newman, J. Scongack, M. Burton, D. Lacroix, and M. Rinker
- New Brunswick Power: N. Reicker, S. Bagshaw, J. Nouwens, J. Maciejko, and K. Duguay
- Hydro Québec: P. Desbiens
- Candu Energy Inc.: T. Freeman

Other contributors (cont'd)

- Best Theratronics Ltd.: A. Ciresianu and M. Xu
- Orano Canada: C. Braithwaite and P. Dodson
- Cameco Corporation: K. Nagy, B. Balicki and K. Cuddington
- Canadian Nuclear Laboratories: J. Osborne, B. Wilcox, S. Brewer, S. Morris, G. Snell, C. De Waele, P. Kompass, M. MacKay, and K. Schruder
- Nordion (Canada) Inc.: R. Wassenaar
- SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.: J. Macdonald
- BWXT Peterborough and Toronto: M. Duarte
- BWXT Medical Ltd.: D. McDermid
- Saskatchewan Ministry of Environment: T. Moulding
- Fisheries & Oceans Canada: M. Vasseur, B. Hulbert and A. LeBlanc
- Saskatchewan Health Authority: D. Sampson and S. Kapaj

Constitution

1. With the Notice of Meeting, Commission Member Document (CMD) [26-M1](#), being properly given and a quorum of Commission Members present,¹ the meeting was properly constituted.
2. For the meeting, [CMD 26-M3 to CMD 26-M11](#), were distributed to Commission Members. These documents are further detailed in [Appendix A](#).

Adoption of the Agenda

3. The revised agenda, [CMD 26-M2.B](#), was adopted as presented.

Chair and Registrar

4. President Tremblay chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by C. Salmon, Commission Registrar.

Minutes of Previous Commission Meeting

5. The [minutes](#) of the Commission meeting held on February 13, 2026, were approved secretarially in advance of this meeting.

Participant Funding Program

6. In its [Notice of Participation at a Commission Meeting and Participant Funding](#),² the CNSC invited members of the public to intervene, by way of written submission regarding the following 2024 Regulatory Oversight Reports (RORs) from CNSC staff:
 - Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada
 - Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites
 - Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites
 - Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada
 - Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada
7. In the spirit of reconciliation and in recognition of the Indigenous oral tradition for sharing knowledge, Indigenous intervenors were invited to make oral presentations, if interested, regarding any or all of the 2024 RORs. The CNSC announced the availability of funds through the [Participant Funding Program](#) (PFP) to assist in the review of the

¹ Commission Member A. McEwan, who was appointed on February 3, 2026, did not participate in the meeting.

² CNSC Notice of Participation at a Commission Meeting and Participant Funding, July 9, 2025.

RORs. A [Funding Review Committee](#) (FRC), independent of the CNSC, reviewed funding applications and made recommendations for funding to the eligible applicants.

8. With respect to the CNSC's PFP availability for the RORs, the FRC recommended that up to [\\$494,467.11 in participant funding](#) be provided to the following applicants:

- Alderville First Nation (AFN)
- Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation (AOPFN)
- English River First Nation (ERFN)
- Hiawatha First Nation (HFN)
- Kebaowek First Nation (KFN)
- Kineepik Métis Local (KML)
- Métis Nation – Saskatchewan
- Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation (MSIFN)
- Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc. (PRGI)
- Northwatch
- We the Nuclear Free North³
- Nuclear Transparency Project (NTP)
- Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA)
- Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities (CANHC)
- Curve Lake First Nation (CLFN)
- Ya'thi Néné Land and Resource Office (YNLR)
- Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility
- Algonquins of Ontario
- Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation (ACFN)

Details of the funding allocation are included in [Appendix B](#).

³ The Commission Registry did not receive a submission from We the Nuclear Free North.

Status Report on Power Reactors

9. With reference to [CMD 26-M8](#), which included the status of the power reactor facilities as of February 26, 2026, CNSC staff presented the following additional updates:
 - for the [Bruce Nuclear Generating Station \(NGS\) A](#):
 - on March 23, 2026, Unit 1 encountered a turbine trip and was safely shut down
 - the Unit 3 major component replacement (MCR) was complete, and fuel loading had started
 - for the [Darlington NGS](#):
 - Unit 4 was fully operational following removal of the final regulatory hold point
 - for the [Pickering NGS](#):
 - Unit 8 was shut down for maintenance
 - for the [Darlington New Nuclear Project \(DNNP\)](#):
 - excavation of the reactor building shaft was complete and Ontario Power Generation (OPG) was working towards submitting an application for a licence to operate the DNNP to the CNSC
10. Representatives from Bruce Power added that the Unit 1 turbine trip was due to a switchyard fault and that the unit went offline as designed.

Discussion

11. The Commission asked questions on the Bruce Power Unit 1 turbine trip and on the status of the DNNP. Licensee representatives provided the following responses:
 - Bruce Power representatives confirmed that Hydro One is responsible for the switchyard and that the turbine trip did not activate a full shutdown
 - OPG representatives stated that OPG was awaiting a response from CNSC staff on the completion of DNNP Regulatory Hold Point 1 (RHP-1), and that there were no changes to the project as a result of a change in timing for certain regulatory hold point commitments⁴

⁴ Regulatory hold points are established under a licence and require CNSC approval in order for certain licensed activities to proceed. A list of regulatory hold point commitments that were deferred from RHP-1 to RHP-2 is given in page 5 of CMD 26-M8.

12. CNSC staff provided the following responses to the Commission's questions:

- the CNSC has a memorandum of understanding with Hydro One
- any changes to the DNNP regulatory commitments are reviewed and approved by CNSC staff
- there is currently no nuclear material at the DNNP site
- the DNNP design is not complete and CNSC staff will receive more design information once OPG submits an application for a licence to operate

UPDATE ON ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS

Update from CNSC staff on the status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes ([CMD 26-M10](#), [CMD 26-M10.1](#), [CMD 26-M10.2](#), [CMD 26-M10.3](#), [CMD 26-M10.A](#), [CMD 26-M10.B](#))

13. In CMD 26-M10, CNSC staff provided an update on the progress made by OPG and Bruce Power on research and development (R&D) commitments related to elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration ([Heq]) in reactor pressure tubes in extended operation. CNSC staff confirmed that licensees have successfully completed all planned R&D activities and that the licensees have demonstrated that an appropriate analytical toolset is now available to perform flow evaluations.

Interventions

14. In its [Notice of Participation in a Commission Meeting](#),⁵ the CNSC invited members of the public to intervene on this matter, by way of written submission. The Commission received 1 intervention from Dr. F. Greening, [CMD 26-M10.3](#). In [CMD 26-M10.B](#), CNSC staff addressed some of the intervenor's comments and questions.

Discussion

15. The Commission asked questions on the following topics regarding [Heq] in pressure tubes:

- information on compliance verification criteria for applicable power reactor operating licence conditions 6.1 and 6.2, related to fitness for service
- knowledge management and operational experience

⁵ CNSC Notice of Participation in a Commission Meeting, January 21, 2026.

- fracture toughness and [Heq] models and outcomes
 - comments in response to the issues raised by the intervenor
16. Bruce Power representatives provided the following responses to the Commission's questions:
- Bruce Power confirmed that the main source of hydrogen was heavy water (deuterium) from the cooling water, and that hydrogen moves to cold areas on pressure tubes
 - at every outage, Bruce Power performs [Heq] scrape sampling on the entire length of pressure tubes and the data collected is put into the [Heq] models
 - the [Heq] models have led to pressure tube manufacturing improvements, better predictions of [Heq] in pressure tubes, and changes to pressure tube orientation during installation
 - Bruce Power shares [Heq] pressure tube information with industry domestically and through CSA Group standards and Conexus⁶
17. OPG representatives confirmed that the pressure tube orientation was reversed during refurbishment installation to ensure the strategic placement of the end of the pressure tube that absorbs hydrogen more easily as determined through [Heq] R&D.
18. CNSC staff provided the following responses to the Commission's questions:
- concurrence that the licensees' R&D program has led to improvements in pressure tube manufacturing
 - the compliance verification criteria for licence condition 6.2, requiring enhanced fitness for service, will be adjusted over time as the [Heq] models and CSA standards change; CNSC staff also confirmed its participation in reviews of CSA Group standards
 - CNSC staff acknowledged the intervention and noted that the intervenor's equations and model did not consider the solubility limit of hydrogen and the potential precipitation of hydride
19. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff in CMD 26-M10. The Commission is also satisfied that the matter of [Heq] in reactor pressure tubes continues to be appropriately monitored, and that routine updates on this item are no longer
- ACTIONS**
#30968 and
#14757
Closed

⁶ Conexus refers to [Conexus Nuclear Inc.](#), a Canadian not-for-profit organization funded by its member nuclear organizations, which facilitates collaboration related to CANDU and advanced nuclear technologies, including research, operating experience exchange, and joint technical initiatives.

necessary. The Commission remains open to receiving further updates, as warranted.

EVENT INITIAL REPORT

Roof fire at Candu Energy Inc. (Mississauga) ([CMD 26-M11](#))

20. CNSC staff provided information on a roof fire reported by Candu Energy Inc. (Candu Energy) that occurred in February 2026. The fire was caused by a portable lithium-ion battery left on a roofing repair cart. There were no impacts to workers, the public, nuclear material, the facility, or the environment.

Discussion

21. The Commission asked questions on the source of the fire, CNSC inspections, contractor monitoring and lessons learned. Candu Energy representatives stated that the source of the fire was a portable work light used by contractors, and that it was reviewing how Li-ion batteries are managed at the site. CNSC staff noted the industry's focus on fire prevention and protection and added that lessons learned are shared internally as well as internationally.
22. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff and Candu Energy in relation to this item.

INFORMATION ITEMS

Verbal Update from CNSC staff on Best Theratronics Ltd. regarding a redetermination of the Commission's October 22, 2025, Amendment to Designated Officer Order 7396415.

23. On February 23, 2026, the Commission, on its own initiative, [redetermined its October 22, 2025, Amendment to Designated Officer Order 7396415](#).⁷ Among other actions, Best Theratronics Ltd. (BTL) is required to:
 - ship all Category 1 and Category 2 sources in its possession under the Class IB licence by May 31, 2026
 - submit an updated financial guarantee for the Commission's review and acceptance by June 15, 2026

⁷ *Record of Decision in the Matter of Best Theratronics Ltd. Redetermination of the Commission's October 22, 2025 Amendment to Designated Officer Order 7396415*, DEC 26-H109, CNSC, February 23, 2026.

24. In a verbal update, CNSC staff reported on the status of BTL's compliance with respect to requirements outlined in the Commission's redetermination. CNSC staff noted that BTL may not meet the deadline to ship all Category 1 and Category 2 sources, and that BTL had not provided a schedule for the removal of the depleted uranium inventory from its site. A BTL representative stated that BTL remains on schedule to comply with the shipment of the sources, and that BTL is evaluating quotes for the removal of depleted uranium.

Discussion

25. The Commission asked questions on BTL's compliance with the order, and potential risks to meeting the deadlines in the order. CNSC staff noted that it has conducted on-site compliance oversight of BTL's shipments. CNSC staff identified that risks to the compressed schedule include the availability of transport packages necessary for the shipments. BTL reaffirmed that the shipping schedule is achievable.
26. The Commission is satisfied with the information provided by CNSC staff and BTL on this matter, noting that additional work remains to be completed.

REGULATORY OVERSIGHT REPORTS

27. For this public meeting, CNSC staff presented 5 RORs for the 2024 calendar year:
- Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 ([CMD 26-M5](#), [CMD 26-M5.A](#))
 - Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 ([CMD 26-M7](#))
 - Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 ([CMD 26-M3](#))
 - Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 ([CMD 26-M6](#))
 - Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 ([CMD 26-M4](#))
28. The Commission [invited](#) interested persons to file written interventions on any or all RORs. Indigenous Nations and communities were also invited to make oral presentations. The following PFP recipients submitted interventions regarding the RORs:
- AFN ([CMD 26-M5.7](#), [CMD 26-M4.1](#), [CMD 26-M7.1](#), [CMD 26-M6.2](#), [CMD 26-M3.5](#))

- CELA ([CMD 26-M5.10](#), [CMD 26-M4.2](#))
 - CANHC ([CMD 26-M5.11](#), [CMD 26-M4.3](#), [CMD 26-M7.2](#), [CMD 26-M6.3](#))
 - HFN ([CMD 26-M5.12](#), [CMD 26-M4.4](#), [CMD 26-M7.3](#), [CMD 26-M6.4](#), [CMD 26-M3.8](#))
 - CLFN ([CMD 26-M5.13](#), [CMD 26-M4.5](#), [CMD 26-M7.4](#), [CMD 26-M6.5](#), [CMD 26-M3.9](#))
 - MSIFN ([CMD 26-M5.14](#), [CMD 26-M4.6](#), [CMD 26-M7.5](#))
 - KFN ([CMD 26-M5.15](#), [CMD 26-M4.7](#), [CMD 26-M7.6](#), [CMD 26-M6.6](#))
 - Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility ([CMD 26-M5.16](#))
 - NTP ([CMD 26-M5.17](#), [CMD 26-M4.9](#), [CMD 26-M7.9](#), [CMD 26-M6.7](#), [CMD 26-M3.11](#))
 - PRGI ([CMD 26-M5.18](#))
 - ACFN ([CMD 26-M5.19](#), [CMD 26-M7.10](#), [CMD 26-M3.12](#))
 - AOPFN ([CMD 26-M4.8](#), [CMD 26-M7.7](#))
 - Algonquins of Ontario ([CMD 26-M4.11](#))
 - Northwatch ([CMD 26-M7.8](#))
 - ERFN ([CMD 26-M3.4](#))
 - KML ([CMD 26-M3.7](#))
 - Métis Nation – Saskatchewan ([CMD 26-M3.10](#))
 - YNLR ([CMD 26-M3.13](#))
29. In addition to the interventions received from PFP recipients, the Commission also received the following written interventions:
- Nuclear Innovation Institute ([CMD 26-M5.1](#))
 - Canadian Nuclear Association ([CMD 26-M5.2](#), [CMD 26-M3.2](#))
 - Town of Saugeen Shores ([CMD 26-M5.3](#))
 - Council of the Rural Community of Fundy Shores ([CMD 26-M5.4](#))
 - Conexus Nuclear Inc. ([CMD 26-M5.5](#))
 - Bill Boutin ([CMD 26-M5.6](#))
 - Gordon Dalzell ([CMD 26-M5.8](#))
 - Musquash Volunteer Fire-Rescue Department ([CMD 26-M5.9](#))

- Sagkeeng Anicinabe First Nation ([CMD 26-M4.10](#))
 - Canadian Radiation Protection Association ([CMD 26-M6.1](#))
 - Saskatchewan Mining Association ([CMD 26-M3.1](#))
 - North Saskatchewan Environmental Quality Committee ([CMD 26-M3.3](#))
 - Athabasca Joint Engagement and Environmental Subcommittee ([CMD 26-M3.6](#))
30. In addition to written submissions, the following Indigenous Nations and communities presented orally at the Commission Meeting:
- KFN
 - PRGI
 - AOPFN
 - YNLR
 - ACFN
 - KML
 - ERFN
31. Further detail regarding intervenor submissions can be found in Appendix A. The issues/comments raised by intervenors are discussed in the appropriate subject-specific ROR sections of these minutes.

Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 ([CMD 26-M5](#), [CMD 26-M5.A](#))

32. The Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 (NPGS ROR), includes information about CNSC's regulatory oversight activities and the safety performance of nuclear power generating sites in Canada in 2024. These sites include nuclear power plants (NPPs) and their associated waste management facilities (WMFs).⁸
33. CNSC staff's supplemental submission (CMD 26-M5.A) contains additional information, including responses to key themes identified from interventions received regarding the 2024 NPGS ROR.

⁸ Darlington Nuclear Generating Station, Darlington Waste Management Facility, Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, Pickering Waste Management Facility, Bruce Nuclear Generating Stations A and B, Western Waste Management Facility, Radioactive Waste Operations Site-1, Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station, and Gentilly-2 Facilities.

34. CNSC staff reported the following:

- all facilities operated safely in 2024, with an overall finding of satisfactory performance in all Safety and Control Areas (SCAs)⁹ for all NPPs and associated WMFs
- doses, releases, workplace safety indicators, and facility performance remained within acceptable limits
- an update on international safeguards and follow-up with licensees

35. Licensee representatives provided oral updates to the Commission on recent and planned activities, Indigenous engagement, collaboration efforts, improvements, and the ongoing focus on safety.

Discussion on the 2024 NPGS ROR

36. The Commission asked questions on a number of topics regarding the 2024 NPGS ROR, including the following:

- human performance management and fatigue¹⁰
- Darlington Unit 1 reactor trip corrective actions¹¹
- decommissioning knowledge transfer
- medical radionuclide (medical isotope) production
- Gentilly-2 water release and environmental effects¹²
- Darlington public address (P.A.) system repair and interim measures¹³
- transparency and public communication regarding waste management
- cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and safeguards compliance

⁹ The CNSC evaluates how well licensees meet regulatory requirements and CNSC expectations for the performance of programs in [14 SCAs](#) that are grouped according to their functional areas including management, facility and equipment, and core control processes.

¹⁰ In reference to the notices of noncompliance (NNCs) outlined in Section 2.1.2 of the 2024 NPGS ROR (page 28).

¹¹ In reference to Section 2.1.3 of the 2024 NPGS ROR: CNSC staff are conducting a reactive inspection as a result of the actuation of Shut Down Systems 1 and 2 event. This inspection includes a review of the root cause investigation performed by OPG and long-term corrective actions taken by OPG (page 29).

¹² In reference to Section 2.8.9 of the 2024 NPGS ROR: Hydro-Québec requested the release of the large volume of water contained in the main storage pool and auxiliary pools at the Gentilly-2 Facilities (page 129).

¹³ In reference to Section 2.1.10 of the 2024 NPGS ROR (page 36).

- measures to reduce worker radiation dose during refurbishment and MCR
 - knowledge transfer related to refurbishment and MCR
 - Alcohol and Drug Use Program management¹⁴
37. Regarding human performance management and fatigue, representatives from OPG, Bruce Power, New Brunswick Power (NB Power), and CNSC staff provided updates on hours-of-work controls, fatigue management, and related oversight, including corrective actions at the Darlington NGS, ongoing monitoring by licensees, and continued CNSC staff follow-up.
38. Regarding Darlington Unit 1 reactor trip corrective actions, CNSC staff stated that the event was linked to shift turnover, plant configuration awareness, and procedural weaknesses, and that corrective actions had been applied. OPG representatives added that OPG had implemented broader improvements in human performance, leadership, and organizational effectiveness.
39. Regarding decommissioning knowledge transfer, Hydro-Québec and OPG representatives provided the following:
- decommissioning and waste management knowledge-sharing occurs primarily through the Conexus nuclear industry organization
 - Hydro-Québec's decommissioning experience at the Gentilly-2 NGS informed OPG's preliminary and detailed decommissioning plans
40. Regarding medical isotope production, representatives from OPG, Bruce Power, NB Power, and CNSC staff provided updates on the status of isotope production activities, future expansion plans, early project development at the Point Lepreau NGS (PLNGS), and the regulatory oversight measures supporting these activities.
41. Regarding the requested release of water from the Gentilly-2 NGS, a Hydro-Québec representative confirmed that the discharge had been approved and was underway. CNSC staff stated that the release was assessed and expected to have negligible environmental impact, and that this would be verified by environmental monitoring.

¹⁴ In reference to Section 2.3.2 of the 2024 NPGS ROR: three non-compliant findings of low safety significance were identified, related to Continuous Behavior Observations Program (page 52).

42. Regarding the Darlington P.A. system repair, an OPG representative and CNSC staff stated that interim compensatory measures would remain in place while hardware upgrades and improvements progress, with final audibility studies and a closure request still planned. Heightened oversight is expected to continue until Phase Two is completed in December 2026.
43. Regarding transparency and public communication on waste management, CNSC staff and representatives from OPG, Bruce Power, NB Power, and Hydro-Québec provided the following:
- CNSC staff's oversight of waste facilities is risk-informed, findings of low safety significance are generally minor and readily corrected, and concerns from Indigenous Nations and communities and the public are taken seriously
 - the licensees make ongoing efforts to communicate transparently about waste management and waste reduction through public, community, and Indigenous engagement, including meetings, site tours, information-sharing forums, and review of waste-related plans and facilities
 - the licensees emphasized that waste is safely managed under established programs supported by long-term planning, regulatory oversight, and industry collaboration
44. Regarding cooperation with the IAEA and safeguards compliance, an OPG representative and CNSC staff provided the following:
- OPG stated that it had taken corrective actions in response to the issues identified in 2024¹⁵ and that subsequent 2025 IAEA inspections were satisfactory
 - CNSC staff stated that OPG's corrective actions had been effective, and that while the actions are considered closed, ongoing oversight will continue to help prevent recurrence
45. Regarding measures to reduce worker radiation doses during refurbishment and MCR, representatives from Bruce Power, NB Power, and OPG described the following:
- source term reduction, including chemical cleaning
 - As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)-based planning

¹⁵ In reference to Section 2.1.13 of the 2024 NPGS ROR: during an IAEA short notice random inspection (SNRI) on April 29, 2024, the IAEA could not access all fresh fuel designated for Darlington Nuclear Refurbishment Unit 1 (page 38) and Section 2.2.13 of the 2024 NPGS ROR: in January 2024, the results from an IAEA unannounced inspection were found to be unsatisfactory because the IAEA was not able to verify the declared shipment of DSC (page 46).

- use of protective and remote measures
 - innovative refurbishment methods
 - continuous improvement and shared learning
46. Regarding knowledge transfer related to refurbishment and MCR, representatives from OPG, Bruce Power, and NB Power discussed measures including lessons learned, formal programs, mentoring, and industry sharing. CNSC staff added that it verifies that lessons learned are being captured, retained, and transferred, and that the CNSC also maintains knowledge management.
47. Regarding Alcohol and Drug Use Program management, CNSC staff and representatives from OPG, Bruce Power, and NB Power discussed operating experience and measures to strengthen sample collection.
48. Following PRGI's oral presentation, the Commission expressed appreciation for PRGI's perspectives and asked questions on the following topics:
- NB Power's follow-up on CNSC staff recommendations concerning quality assurance and industry practices
 - the non-compliant findings concerning the use of adhesives and duct tape for maintenance
 - fish impingement and entrainment monitoring at the PLNGS
49. NB Power representatives and CNSC staff provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:
- NB Power had incorporated quality assurance lessons learned through its Corrective Action Program
 - the use of duct tape is acceptable as a temporary measure but debris from duct tape can affect reactor systems; NB Power has controls in place to minimize, track, and remove duct tape appropriately
50. Representatives from Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and NB Power discussed fish impingement and entrainment monitoring at the PLNGS and confirmed that there is no need for a new study at this time. The NB Power representative added that NB Power would continue to engage with PRGI on this topic. CNSC staff noted that DFO is the lead authority for *Fisheries Act* authorizations and stated that it would continue working with DFO, NB Power, and PRGI to support coordination, information-sharing, and ongoing engagement on the concerns raised.

51. The Commission is satisfied with the information it received related to the 2024 NPGS ROR. The Commission emphasized the importance of transparency, openness, and timely dialogue with interested parties. The Commission encouraged continued communication between CNSC staff and licensees.

Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories
Sites: 2024 ([CMD 26-M4](#))

52. The Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 (CNL ROR), includes information about the CNSC's regulatory oversight regarding 7 CNL sites¹⁶ licensed to operate in 2024 in Canada. The 7 CNL sites continued to operate safely in 2024.
53. CNSC staff reported the following:
- across the 14 SCAs, all ratings were satisfactory at every site except Whiteshell Laboratories (WL)
 - at WL, Human Performance Management and Emergency Management and Fire Protection were rated below expectations; CNL has implemented measures to address these program areas, and health, safety, security, and the environment were not compromised
 - a summary of CNSC staff's consultation and engagement activities undertaken in 2024 with Indigenous Nations and communities, and the public
 - CNSC staff reviewed CNL's 2024 Annual Compliance Monitoring Report,¹⁷ including the results of the safety culture survey, and had also conducted a 2025 management system inspection that included safety culture; CNL was compliant with REGDOC-2.1.1¹⁸ and REGDOC-2.1.2,¹⁹ and regulatory oversight by CNSC staff would continue as CNL implements further improvements

¹⁶ Chalk River Laboratories (CRL), Whiteshell Laboratories (WL), Port Hope Area Initiative (including Port Hope Project, Port Granby Project, Port Hope Pine Street Extension Temporary Storage Site, Port Hope Radioactive Waste Management Facility), Douglas Point Waste Facility, Gentilly-1 Waste Facility, and the Nuclear Power Demonstration Waste Facility.

¹⁷ In relation to WL and CRL, during the Commission Meeting held on [May 22, 2024](#), the Commission directed CNSC staff to work with CNL to include a review of CNL's safety culture in the 2024 CNL ROR (paragraph 29). CNSC staff also provided an update on this matter in the 2024 CNL ROR (Section 2.1.6, page 16).

¹⁸ [REGDOC-2.1.1, Management System](#). May 2019.

¹⁹ [REGDOC-2.1.2, Safety Culture](#). April 2018.

54. A CNL representative provided remarks on CNL's performance for the 2024 calendar year across its licensed sites, noting that radiation doses and releases remained within applicable limits, and that nuclear safety remained the overriding priority.
55. The CNL representative also provided updates on two requests arising from previous Commission proceedings:
- on performance assurance,²⁰ CNL reported additional staffing, increased use of operating experience, and benchmarking with peer organizations, with further engagement planned through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators and Canadian nuclear operators
 - on safety culture, CNL stated that its 2024 employee engagement survey showed generally stable safety perceptions, with some improvements noted, while also acknowledging the need for further improvement in areas such as the role of management, planning, and procedural adherence
56. The Commission is satisfied with the updates provided regarding CNL's performance assurance and safety culture.

ACTIONS

#36368 and

#33716

Closed

Discussion on the 2024 CNL ROR

57. The Commission asked about CNL's performance at WL. CNL representatives responded that:
- CNL self-identified issues in fire protection and emergency management, did a safety stand-down and root cause analysis, implemented corrective actions, and returned to full operations in Fall 2024
 - CNL was applying lessons learned across its organization
58. CNSC staff provided the following in its responses:
- CNSC staff implemented enhanced oversight at WL, and its compliance oversight was informed by the issues identified
 - CNL's performance improved, with one action remaining open, subject to further inspection

²⁰ During the Commission Meeting held on [November 7, 2024](#), the Commission directed CNL to provide an update on its benchmarking activities to improve compliance and safety, including the management of fire protection, emergency management and performance assurance programs, at the time the next CNL ROR is presented (paragraph 41).

- CNSC staff identified lessons learned regarding its compliance oversight, particularly related to on-site presence, as well as problem identification, issue reporting, and safety culture
59. The Commission asked additional questions on the following topics regarding the 2024 CNL ROR:
- sustainability of compliance improvements
 - conventional health and safety performance
 - potential compounding effects of minor safety issues
 - waste management training non-compliance at CRL²¹
 - reduction in CNSC inspections in 2024 and adequacy of regulatory oversight
 - CNL’s approach to identifying legacy or previously unknown radioactive materials during operations, renovation, and decommissioning²²
 - inadequacy of signage to reflect hazards²³
60. CNL representatives provided the following in response to the Commission’s questions:
- CNL would ensure sustained improvement through external benchmarking with industry peers and a more formal performance assurance function focused on issue reporting, trend analysis, and early risk identification
 - conventional safety events at CRL were higher than usual in 2024, prompting a company-wide safety pause and renewed focus on conventional health and safety; injury trends improved following the safety pause
 - to prevent the compounding of minor hazards, CNL relies on rapid hazard reporting and response measures
 - regarding the waste training non-compliance at CRL, CNL described its corrective measures and noted the importance of communicating with the public
 - CNL explained the methods it uses to characterize and manage legacy hazards at older sites, including the use of robotics

²¹ The Commission referenced an NNC in the CNL ROR, which was issued due to a lack of formal training on waste segregation (Section 2.1.11, page 19).

²² The Commission referenced 2 events in Appendix D of the CNL ROR: Unregistered radioactive source identified in B109 and Package of Natural Uranium chips and granules stored in ZED-2.

²³ A number of NNCs were noted for the CRL in Section 2.1 of the 2024 CNL ROR.

- regarding signage at CRL, CNL explained that it manages the challenge of keeping signage current with changing conditions through inspections, radiation protection checks, and human performance measures
61. In response to the Commission’s questions, CNSC staff described its risk-informed approach to compliance oversight. CNSC staff added that it would continue to verify the adequacy of CNL’s corrective measures.
62. The Commission requested additional information regarding the Port Hope/Port Granby monitoring systems²⁴ and liners. CNL representatives described the systems in place and CNL’s approach to addressing the identified issue with the sensors. CNSC staff described its compliance oversight measures, including design reviews and inspections. A CNL representative added that the Port Granby containment system is performing as intended, with long-term performance verified through groundwater, leachate, and site monitoring.
63. The Commission requested an update concerning the decommissioning of WL and the Nuclear Power Demonstration Waste Facility. CNL representatives stated that both projects were undergoing environmental assessment and regulatory review, and that CNL was engaging with Indigenous Nations and communities as part of these processes. CNSC staff confirmed that the environmental assessment review was ongoing.
64. Following KFN’s presentation, the Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- transparency and accountability in relation to a release of sewage into the Ottawa River from CRL
 - responsibilities of the CNSC and licensees regarding section 82 of the *Impact Assessment Act* (IAA)
 - information on the Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) for CRL

²⁴ The Commission referenced an NNC in the 2024 CNL ROR pertaining to monitoring equipment and sensors at the Port Granby long-term waste management facility that were not functional at the time of the inspection, as well as related maintenance deficiencies (Section 2.3.7, pages 40-41).

65. Regarding the sewage release, representatives from CNL and CNSC staff provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:
- CNL identified the non-radiological sewage release via monitoring, and there was no risk to the public or environment; CNL took corrective actions, including to improve its communications with Indigenous Nations and communities
 - CNSC staff confirmed CNL's reporting to Environment and Climate Change Canada, proactive public disclosure, and information-sharing with interested Indigenous Nations and communities
66. Regarding section 82 of the IAA as it relates to CNL, CNSC staff and CNL representatives provided the following responses to the Commission:
- CNSC staff noted that section 82 assessments may apply to federal lands, with CNSC involvement only where a licence or licence amendment is required
 - where activities fall within an existing CNL licence, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL)/CNL are responsible for the assessment, while the CNSC continues Indigenous engagement and clarifies its regulatory role; AECL is responsible for these section 82 decisions
 - CNL added that it is working with the KFN to improve understanding of the section 82 process and to strengthen early notification and engagement
67. Concerning CNL's ERA for CRL, CNSC staff stated that the updated ERA met REGDOC-2.9.1²⁵ and CSA N288.6²⁶ requirements. CNL stated that the full ERA was posted on its website.
68. Noting a comment by KFN regarding Commission decisions, the Commission clarified that its decisions are not precedent-setting in the same way as court decisions, and that each application is considered on its own scope and circumstances.
69. Following AOPFN's oral presentation, the Commission asked about lessons learned from the AOPFN Guardians Program. Representatives from AOPFN, CNL, and CNSC staff stated that the program has supported trust-building, relationship-building, capacity development, and knowledge-sharing, while also reinforcing the value of integrating

²⁵ [REGDOC-2.9.1, *Environmental Protection: Environmental Principles, Assessments and Protection Measures, Version 1.2*](#). September 2020.

²⁶ CSA N288.6, *Environmental risk assessments at nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills*.

traditional knowledge and Western approaches in monitoring and oversight.

70. The Commission is satisfied with the information it received related to the 2024 CNL ROR. The Commission noted that 2024 was a challenging year for WL, with a number of compliance issues. The Commission acknowledged CNL's corrective actions and investments and emphasized that culture change takes time and effort. The Commission emphasized that it expects sustained progress and continued improvement.

Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 (CMD 26-M7)

71. The Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 (UNSPF ROR) provides information on the safety performance of uranium and nuclear substance processing facilities in Canada.²⁷
72. CNSC staff reported the following:
 - the uranium and nuclear substance processing facilities continued to operate safely in 2024
 - CNSC staff rated licensees for all facilities as satisfactory in all 14 SCAs, except BTL, which received below-expectations ratings for security and emergency management and fire protection
 - CNSC staff continued its engagement with Indigenous Nations, communities, and the public, including a webinar on the 2024 UNSPF ROR
73. Representatives from Cameco Corporation (Cameco), Nordion (Canada) Inc. (Nordion), BWXT NEC, BWXT Medical, BTL, and SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. (SRB Technologies) provided the Commission with verbal remarks, including comments on:
 - safe and compliant operations in 2024
 - ongoing efforts in facility improvements, waste management, community and Indigenous engagement, and continuous improvement
 - the small number of low-risk site-specific issues or events that were reported and addressed

²⁷ Uranium processing facilities include Cameco Corporation Blind River Refinery, Cameco Corporation Port Hope Conversion Facility, Cameco Fuel Manufacturing Inc., and BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. Nuclear substance processing facilities include SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc., Nordion (Canada) Inc., Best Theratronics Ltd., and BWXT Medical Ltd.

Discussion on the 2024 UNSPF ROR

74. The Commission asked questions on the following topics regarding the 2024 UNSPF ROR:
- lessons learned in relation to an exceedance of an action level at SRB Technologies²⁸
 - communication and engagement with local first responders and community stakeholders during emergency management and fire protection changes
 - reportable events concerning damage to transportation packages
 - update concerning a spill at Cameco's Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF)²⁹
 - emergency management and fire protection NNCs³⁰
 - BWXT NEC's update on deficiencies related to fire separation and extinguishers³¹
75. Regarding lessons learned in relation to SRB Technologies, an SRB Technologies' representative described the cause of the action level exceedance and the corrective actions taken. CNSC staff confirmed that SRB Technologies adequately addressed the issue.
76. Regarding communication with local first responders, CNSC staff stated that it follows up with licensees to ensure that appropriate outreach occurs so that response mechanisms remain effective.
77. Regarding reportable events concerning damage to transportation packages, a BWXT Medical representative explained that, in all cases, the packages performed as intended with no safety or environmental impact, reflecting a low reporting threshold rather than a systemic issue. CNSC staff confirmed that BWXT Medical reported the events in accordance with the regulations.³²

²⁸ In reference to the 2024 UNSPF ROR, SRB Technologies became aware of an exceedance of an action level associated with gaseous effluent release of tritium, Section 5.9 (page 19).

²⁹ With reference to the 2024 UNSPF ROR, one NNC was issued in relation to the development and implementation of a cleanup process for visible contamination in processing areas, which was considered to be of medium safety significance, Section 5.5 (pages 11-12).

³⁰ In reference to the 2024 UNSPF ROR, 32 NNCs from inspections related to the emergency management and fire protection SCA were issued to licensees, Section 5.10 (page 21).

³¹ With reference to the 2024 UNSPF ROR, NNCs were issued to BWXT NEC in relation to fire separation and extinguishers, Section 5.10 (page 22).

³² [*Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015.*](#)

78. Regarding the spill of visible contamination at the PHCF, CNSC staff clarified that this was an inspection observation, not an event. A Cameco representative added that Cameco improved its housekeeping practices to address the finding.
79. Regarding emergency management and fire protection NNCs, CNSC staff stated that the identified non-compliances were generally minor but were still followed up because multiple minor issues can contribute to broader concerns. CNSC staff noted that corrective actions by the licensee were implemented and verified, and that the increased verification activities in 2024 reflected a broader review following the issues at WL.
80. Regarding BWXT NEC's update on deficiencies related to fire separation and extinguishers, a BWXT NEC representative stated that a number of low-level fire protection issues had been identified and addressed. The BWXT NEC representative added that BWXT NEC instituted practices to ensure ongoing compliance.
81. Following KFN's oral presentation, the Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- lifecycle of cobalt-60, including its production, use, transport, and storage
 - consequences of a traffic accident during the transportation of nuclear substances
82. Concerning the lifecycle of cobalt-60, representatives from OPG, Nordion, Bruce Power, and CNSC staff explained the production, processing, transport, return, reuse, and interim storage arrangements for cobalt-60, and outlined the transport packaging, security, and regulatory oversight framework supporting these activities. The Commission noted that, given the large number of shipments, communication about every individual shipment may not be practical.
83. Regarding the consequences of a traffic accident during transport, representatives from Nordion and CNSC staff provided the following:
- transportation safety relies on certified package design (e.g., Type B for higher-risk materials), supported by emergency response requirements
 - CNSC staff described the requirements under the CNSC's [*Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015*](#) and Transport Canada's [*Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations*](#) that need to be in place to ensure that the appropriate measures are taken should there be an incident

84. Following AOPFN’s oral presentation, the Commission asked about engagement with AOPFN concerning BTL. Representatives from BTL commented that BTL could not devote financial resources to engagement. CNSC staff indicated its willingness to enhance proactive communication with AOPFN.
85. Further to AOPFN’s oral presentation, the Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- AOPFN’s preference for notification of incidents
 - AOPFN’s engagement experience with the Independent Environmental Monitoring Program (IEMP)
 - the status of the update to REGDOC-3.2.2³³
 - how CNSC staff evaluates whether a licensee’s Indigenous engagement is meaningful
86. CNSC staff provided the following:
- the IEMP has evolved to include stronger Indigenous engagement
 - an updated draft of a new version of REGDOC-3.2.2 is expected to be released for public consultation, with capacity funding provided to support Indigenous participation
 - CNSC staff evaluates licensee engagement through public information and disclosure requirements, annual compliance reporting, follow-up activities, and consideration of Indigenous perspectives; new licence conditions and the update to REGDOC-3.2.2 are intended to support a more consistent lifecycle approach to engagement
87. AOPFN representatives provided the following in response to the Commission’s questions:
- AOPFN prefers early notification of incidents
 - AOPFN finds the IEMP to be a valuable program that builds capacity through community involvement, fieldwork, and integration of Western science and Indigenous knowledge
 - AOPFN emphasized the importance of timely updates to REGDOC-3.2.2 to support more meaningful consultation

³³ [REGDOC-3.2.2, Indigenous Engagement, Version 1.2](#). February 2022.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>88. The Commission is satisfied with the information it received related to the 2024 UNSPF ROR. The Commission notes that the 2024 UNSPF ROR provides an update on an action related to a workplace injury that occurred at Cameco's PHCF.³⁴ The Commission is satisfied with the update.</p> | <p><u>Action</u>
#33715
Closed</p> |
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Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 (CMD 26-M6)

89. The Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 (UNSC ROR), describes the regulatory oversight and safety performance of licensees who use nuclear substances in the medical, industrial, academic and research, and commercial sectors.
90. CNSC staff reported the following:
- risks associated with the use of nuclear substances were of low safety significance and appropriately managed
 - the downward trend in radiation protection performance in the nuclear medicine subsector remained an area of regulatory focus, with early 2025 indicators showing improvement
 - CNSC staff remain committed to stakeholder engagement, accountability, and transparency

Discussion on the 2024 UNSC ROR

91. The Commission asked questions on the following topics regarding the 2024 UNSC ROR:
- benchmarking and comparisons with other countries
 - the downward trend of compliance in the medical sector
 - decline in compliance ratings for the veterinary nuclear medicine subsector³⁵
 - point-in-time nature of inspection ratings and broader program assessment
 - risk-informed regulation of the nuclear substances sector
 - information on CNSC's external complaint process³⁶

³⁴ Section 7.2 of the 2024 UNSPF ROR (page 41).

³⁵ The Commission references the zero-rating in Table 9, Section G1 of the 2024 UNSC ROR (page 63).

³⁶ In reference to Nuclear Transparency Project's written submission, recommendation #3: that next year's ROR include a description of the external complaints process, including how complaints usually come in to the CNSC and what general percentage of complainants are facility employees or community members (page 35).

- reportable events involving malfunctioning gauges³⁷
- the frequency of spills of technetium-99m³⁸
- reportable events involving the loss of an iodine-125 seed during seed implantation³⁹

92. CNSC staff provided the following in response to the Commission's questions:

- differences in regulatory approaches limit direct benchmarking but CNSC staff engage internationally, such as through the IAEA, to share best practices
- declines in compliance ratings in the medical sector partly reflect stricter requirements under the revised *Radiation Protection Regulations*, which came into force in 2020; 2025 data shows improvement
- in veterinary nuclear medicine, limited licensee numbers constrain trends; the non-compliances posed no immediate risk and were corrected
- inspection ratings reflect point-in-time, prescriptive evaluations; broader licensee performance is assessed through reporting, licensing, and follow-up activities
- risk-informed decision-making guides licensing and inspections, focusing effort on higher-risk and lower-performing areas
- external complaints are handled through a formal process and may trigger inspections; they are assessed for safety significance and trends
- gauge incidents are typically linked to operating conditions or equipment age; overall failure rates remain low
- technetium-99m spills reflect routine use and are managed within normal operating procedures
- a lost iodine-125 seed poses very low health and safety risk due to its small size and nature

93. The Commission asked CNSC staff to comment on the persistent compliance challenges in the nuclear medicine sector. CNSC staff stated that licensees are responsible for safety, while it focuses on compliance verification, promotion, and enforcement where needed. CNSC staff noted that it has expanded its outreach to the broader

³⁷ The Commission references reportable events listed in Appendix J of the 2024 UNSC ROR.

³⁸ Reportable events listed in Appendix J of the 2024 UNSC ROR.

³⁹ Reportable events listed in Appendix J of the 2024 UNSC ROR.

medical community and identified Radiation Safety Officer capacity as one of the factors affecting compliance.

94. The Commission requested an update concerning the Mississauga Metals & Alloys, Inc. (MMA) site. CNSC staff responded that Kinectrics had been selected to carry out the MMA site securement work, targeted for completion in the summer of 2026, after which site characterization would begin.
95. The Commission is satisfied with the information it received related to the 2024 UNSC ROR.

Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 (CMD 26-M3)

96. The Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 (UMM ROR) provides information about the CNSC’s regulatory oversight regarding all operating uranium mines and mills in Canada. The 5 operating mines and mills,⁴⁰ located in northern Saskatchewan, continued to operate safely in 2024, and there were no releases that could have harmed human health or the environment.
97. CNSC staff noted an error in the UMM ROR, where one NNC, issued to Cameco, should have been classified as medium safety significance. The correction did not change the conclusions in the ROR.

Discussion on the 2024 UMM ROR

98. The Commission asked for additional information regarding unauthorized releases that occurred in 2024.⁴¹ CNSC staff stated that spills are tracked and typically remain within expected ranges, with most contained onsite and not impacting the environment. Corrective actions and follow-up inspections are used to ensure risks are managed.
99. The Commission asked questions on the following topics regarding the 2024 UMM ROR:
 - licensee perspectives on improved performance in 2024
 - conventional safety in the context of licensee safety performance

⁴⁰ Cigar Lake mine, McArthur River mine, Key Lake mill, McClean Lake mine and mill, and Rabbit Lake mine and mill.

⁴¹ The Commission references the 2024 UMM ROR: “In 2024, 11 unauthorized releases (“spills”) were reported.” Page 3 of CMD 26-M3.

100. Cameco representatives provided the following responses:

- Cameco expressed satisfaction with improved safety performance, and emphasized continuous improvement and mitigation measures
- Cameco's safety performance is strong and comparable to industry peers, with continuous learning and improvement through shared practices and safety metrics

101. Orano Canada (Orano) representatives provided the following responses:

- Orano acknowledged improved performance and emphasized continued focus on strengthening safety measures and preventing incident recurrence
- Orano benchmarks performance against other mining sectors and global operations to continuously assess and improve safety performance

102. CNSC staff provided the following responses:

- improved performance reflects both licensee efforts and enhanced regulatory oversight; continued monitoring and collaboration will sustain safety improvements
- worker safety is a top priority, and there is ongoing collaboration with industry and provincial regulators to share information and maintain strong safety performance

103. The Commission sought additional detail regarding tailings management and liners. Orano representatives provided information on its liner maintenance, and that Orano considers best practices such as double-liner systems with leak detection, when evaluating the replacement of older liners. Orano representatives also provided information on Orano's environmental monitoring. CNSC staff provided information on its oversight of liners and tailings management facilities, confirming that liners are performing as designed.

104. Following YNLR's oral presentation, the Commission asked questions on the following topics:

- perspectives on the CNSC's IEMP
- communication and dissemination of information

105. CNSC staff and YNLR representatives provided the Commission with the following responses:

- a YNLR representative stated that the IEMP is effective and supports trust, and expressed an interest in expanding the IEMP and increasing its frequency, while noting some challenges with language translation
- CNSC staff added that the IEMP is continually evolving and expanding, with a focus on improving monitoring and engagement with communities
- a YNLR representative described using multiple communication channels and governance structures to share information, while noting that communication is ongoing; CNSC staff noted efforts to make information more accessible and improve communication with communities

106. Following ACFN’s oral presentation, the Commission sought additional information regarding worker doses and radiation protection action level exceedances.⁴² Cameco and Orano representatives, CNSC staff, and an ACFN representative provided the following responses:

- a Cameco representative explained that action level exceedances trigger investigations and corrective actions, including reviewing potential underlying and systemic causes and trends
- an Orano representative stated that exceedances are investigated with a focus on root causes, trends, corrective actions, and sharing lessons learned to prevent recurrence
- CNSC staff emphasized that exceedances require investigation and corrective actions, and that it reviews licensee responses and uses the findings to inform ongoing oversight and compliance activities
- an ACFN representative emphasized the importance of closely examining exceedances to understand underlying causes and ensure strong protections, particularly with a view to safeguarding workers and communities

107. Following ACFN’s oral presentation, the Commission asked for an update regarding CNSC staff’s relationship building activities in the context of Terms of Reference (ToR). CNSC staff highlighted ongoing relationship-building with ACFN through structured engagement, including regular meetings, and collaborative work

⁴² The Commission references a concern raised by ACFN: “No NEW1 at any facility exceeded the individual dose limit of 50 mSv in 1 year, or 100 mSv in a 5-year dosimetry period.” Section 2.1, page 7, CMD 26-M3.12.

plans focused on monitoring, traditional knowledge, and areas of concern.

108. The Commission sought perspectives regarding community confidence in traditional food sources. An ACFN representative shared that concerns about contamination have reduced confidence in traditional foods and made harvesting more difficult for the community. CNSC staff described its approach to monitoring and assessing environmental conditions and highlighted ongoing engagement with the community.
109. Following KML’s oral presentation, the Commission asked questions about the following topics:
 - the status of the CNSC establishing ToR with KML
 - Cameco’s road management, and road safety for transporting nuclear substances
 - programs and policies that foster safety and culture within the workplace
 - financial guarantees for decommissioning⁴³
 - perspectives regarding regulatory oversight and the potential for complacency due to longer licence terms⁴⁴
110. Cameco and Orano representatives, a Saskatchewan Ministry of Environment (SMOE) representative, and CNSC staff provided the following responses:
 - CNSC staff highlighted a positive, collaborative relationship with KML, including progress toward formalized engagement, support for community priorities and capacity-building
 - Cameco representatives stated that Cameco maintains operational roads and works with the province to support public road upkeep; Cameco added that transportation is conducted safely and in compliance with regulations
 - CNSC staff stated that the CNSC regulates the safe transport of nuclear materials, whereas road conditions fall under provincial authority; SMOE noted its 24/7 capacity to respond to transport incidents

⁴³ The Commission references a concern raised in the written submission by KML: “Experience in Alberta has shown that reclamation funds set aside by companies may be insufficient when too much time passes between when funds are reserved and when reclamation occurs...” CMD 26-M3.7.

⁴⁴ The Commission references a concern raised in the written submission by KML: “With the issuance of 20-year licenses, we are concerned that companies - while highly engaged and collaborative prior to licensing and licence renewal - become far less accessible once agreements are signed...” CMD 26-M3.7.

- Orano and Cameco representatives noted efforts to foster culturally respectful workplaces and initiatives that integrate cultural awareness and practices into their operations; CNSC staff emphasized building cultural understanding and collaboration with Indigenous communities
 - CNSC staff stated that decommissioning is supported by a robust framework, including regularly updated plans and financial guarantees held in trust to ensure funds are available for cleanup at all stages
 - CNSC staff stated that licence length does not reduce oversight, emphasizing that regulatory monitoring and engagement continue and can adapt as needed; Cameco added that its management systems and ongoing programs ensure oversight and performance are maintained regardless of licence length
111. Saskatchewan Health Authority (SHA) representatives highlighted ongoing collaboration with communities to address public health concerns, emphasizing responsiveness, monitoring of health outcomes, and a growing focus on cumulative impacts and community well-being.
112. Following ERFN's oral presentation, the Commission asked questions about the following topics:
- cumulative effects assessment in ERAs for uranium mining operations
 - follow up on a reported spill at the Key Lake Operation⁴⁵
 - reliability and maintenance of monitoring systems and sensors associated with containment liners
 - follow up on staffing shortages and reliance on overtime⁴⁶
 - community concerns about perceived exposure to carcinogens⁴⁷
 - information on open NNCs related to training⁴⁸

⁴⁵ The Commission references a concern raised in ERFN's written submission: "One spill reported for the Key Lake Operation in late December was described as increased seepage from a reservoir underdrain system..." Page 15 of CMD 26-M3.4.

⁴⁶ The Commission references a concern raised in ERFN's written submission: "In 2024, the maximum individual radiation exposure was 9.06 mSv to a worker at McClean Lake, which is 18.1% of the annual regulatory limit (50 mSv). The maximum total effective dose for this worker is related to having increased overtime hours and working in a higher ambient radiation area, due to qualified staffing shortages..." Page 10 of CMD 26-M3.4.

⁴⁷ The Commission references a concern raised in ERFN's written submission: "Northern Saskatchewan Community Cancer Rate Concern," page 21 of CMD 26-M3.4.

⁴⁸ The Commission references a concern raised in ERFN's written submission, the NNCs related to training qualification records, sufficient number of qualified workers to safely perform duties, clear training instructions, and applying a systematic approach to training. Table on page 9, CMD 26-M3.4.

113. Regarding cumulative effects assessments, CNSC staff stated that approaches to ERAs, including cumulative effects, are evolving. CNSC staff noted that there are differences in how ERA information is publicly disclosed by the licensees.
114. Regarding the reported spill at the Key Lake Operation, a Cameco representative stated that the seepage was contained with no impacts and was addressed through corrective actions and ongoing monitoring. CNSC staff confirmed that it reviewed and accepted Cameco's corrective actions and noted ongoing monitoring requirements to ensure the issue remains effectively managed.
115. Regarding reliability and maintenance of monitoring systems and sensors associated with containment liners, Cameco representatives stated that Cameco maintains liner monitoring systems through established inspection and maintenance programs, including routine checks, third-party inspections, and ongoing monitoring to ensure continued performance.
116. Regarding staffing shortages and reliance on overtime, a Cameco representative stated that staffing remains an ongoing challenge, but emphasized that training, work planning, and additional safety controls are used to manage risks and ensure that doses to workers remain low. An Orano representative stated that staffing shortages – notably post-COVID – contributed to the issue and that staffing levels have since improved. CNSC staff noted that ensuring adequate staffing and training is a regulatory requirement, and that it has been an area of targeted regulatory oversight.
117. Regarding community concerns about perceived exposure to carcinogens, Cameco, Orano, ERFN, and SHA representatives, and CNSC staff provided the following responses:
 - Cameco and Orano representatives stated that monitoring and risk assessments show no increased health risks and that environmental conditions are safe
 - an ERFN representative expressed limited trust in licensee conclusions and highlighted the need for access to data, noting ERFN's use of community-led monitoring
 - an SHA representative noted that there were no elevated cancer rates and emphasized that health outcomes are influenced by various factors, while stressing the importance of communication with communities
 - CNSC staff noted that past risks have been addressed through improved protection protocols and that current evidence shows low exposures and no expected health impacts

118. Regarding open NNCs related to training, CNSC staff explained that a broader review of training programs was initiated following inspection findings, identifying documentation gaps rather than training deficiencies, with corrective actions implemented and currently being verified.
119. Further to open NNCs in the context of training, the Commission asked Cameco and Orano to provide an update on training after COVID-19, specifically how challenges have been addressed and how training programs are progressing. Cameco and Orano representatives stated that training programs have been strengthened post-COVID with focus on workforce competency improvement, consistency, and safety as operations resumed.
120. The Commission is satisfied with the information it received related to the 2024 UMM ROR.

INFORMATION ITEMS

Briefing to the Commission on reinventing regulatory oversight reporting ([CMD 26-M9](#))

121. CNSC staff presented a proposal on reinventing its regulatory oversight reporting. Building on previous initiatives, CNSC staff proposed modernizing reporting by replacing lengthy, resource-intensive annual reports (RORs) with a more timely, concise, and user-focused reporting model that improves efficiency, transparency, and public accessibility.

Discussion

122. A Bruce Power representative, speaking on behalf of the nuclear industry, expressed support for the proposed changes. The Bruce Power representative underscored the importance of an open and transparent reporting process as proposed, predicated on it being informed by the needs of Indigenous peoples.
123. The Commission asked questions on the following topics:
- intended audience and supporting guidance materials
 - engagement with Indigenous Nations and communities
 - data availability and accuracy

124. CNSC staff provided the following responses to the Commission:

- CNSC staff have reviewed target audiences and interests with a focus on plain language; CNSC staff confirmed that data will not be removed from its reporting, only improved in presentation
- CNSC staff's next steps will focus on audience engagement, including Indigenous Nations and communities
- CNSC staff will analyze and update the data annually, with opportunities to leverage other government digital platforms

125. The Commission expressed that it was looking forward to CNSC staff implementing the proposed changes. The Commission endorses the use of technology for clearer public communication through visual tools and more agile reporting. The Commission supports a shift away from traditional reports toward more accessible formats like dashboards and acknowledges that some elements still need to be worked through. The Commission notes that this aligns with a broader, ambitious vision: moving from retrospective reporting to providing timely, ongoing assurance to the public, with further updates expected as the remaining pieces are defined.

Closure of the Public Meeting

126. The public meeting closed at 4:34 pm (ET) / 3:34 pm (CT) on March 26, 2026. These minutes reflect both the public meeting and the Commission's considerations following the meeting.

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Recording Secretary

August 21, 2026

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Recording Secretary

August 21, 2026

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Commission Registrar

August 21, 2026

Date

APPENDIX A – Commission Member Documents

CMD	Date
26-M1	February 19, 2026
Notice of Commission Meeting for March 24-26, 2026	
26-M2	February 19, 2026
Agenda for the March 24-26, 2026 - Commission Meeting	
26-M2.A	March 10, 2026
Revised Agenda for the March 24-26, 2026 - Commission Meeting	
26-M2.B	March 16, 2026
Revised Agenda for the March 24-26, 2026 - Commission Meeting	
N/A	N/A
Approval of the Minutes of the Commission Meetings held on February 13, 2026	
26-M8	March 9, 2026
Status Report Status Report on Power Reactors Written submission from CNSC Staff	
26-M10	January 22, 2026
26-M10.B	March 9, 2026
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding Update from CNSC staff on the Status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes Written submissions from CNSC Staff	
26-M10.A	March 10, 2026
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding Update from CNSC staff on the Status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes Presentation from CNSC Staff	
26-M10.1	January 22, 2026
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding Update from CNSC staff on the Status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes Written submission from Bruce Power	

CMD	Date
26-M10.2	January 23, 2026
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding Update from CNSC staff on the Status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes Written submission from the Darlington and Pickering Nuclear Generating Stations	
26-M10.1A, 26-M10.2A	March 11, 2026
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding Update from CNSC staff on the Status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes Presentation from Bruce Power and Ontario Power Generation Inc.	
26-M11	March 12, 2026
Event Initial Report Roof Fire at Candu Energy Inc. Written submission from CNSC Staff	
N/A	N/A
Information Item Verbal update - Best Theratronics Ltd. - Redetermination of the Commission's October 22, 2025 Amendment to Designated Officer Order 7396415	
26-M5	September 25, 2025
26-M5.A	March 6, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 Written submissions from CNSC Staff	
26-M4	November 28, 2025
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Written submission from CNSC Staff	
26-M7	November 25, 2025
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from CNSC Staff	

CMD	Date
26-M6	November 6, 2025
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Written submission from CNSC Staff	
26-M4.7, 26-M5.15, 26-M6.6, 26-M7.6	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submissions from the Kebaowek First Nation	
26-M4.7A, 26-M5.15A, 26-M6.6A, 26-M7.6A	March 4, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Presentation from the Kebaowek First Nation	
26-M5.18	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 Presentation from the Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc.	
26-M4.8, 26-M7.7	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submissions from the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation	

CMD	Date
26-M4.8A, 26-M7.7A	March 4, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Presentation from the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation	
26-M3	November 28, 2025
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from CNSC Staff	
26-M3.13	February 6, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Ya'thi Néné Lands and Resources Office	
26-M3.13A	March 4, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Presentation from the Ya'thi Néné Lands and Resources Office	
26-M3.12, 26-M5.19, 26-M7.10	January 30, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation	
26-M3.12A, 26-M5.19A, 26-M7.10A	March 4, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Presentation from the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation	

CMD	Date
26-M3.7	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Kineepik Métis Local Inc.	
26-M3.7A	March 6, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Presentation from the Kineepik Métis Local Inc.	
26-M3.4	January 19, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Presentation from the English River First Nation	
26-M9	March 10, 2026
Information Item Reinventing Regulatory Oversight Reporting Presentation from CNSC Staff	
26-M3.1	January 9, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Saskatchewan Mining Association	
26-M3.2, 26-M5.2	January 10, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Canadian Nuclear Association	
26-M3.3	January 15, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Northern Saskatchewan Environmental Quality Committee	

CMD	Date
26-M3.5, 26-M4.1, 26-M5.7, 26-M6.2, 26-M7.1	January 27, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submissions from the Alderville First Nation	
26-M3.6	January 27, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Athabasca Joint Engagement and Environment Subcommittee	
26-M3.8, 26-M4.4, 26-M5.12, 26-M6.4, 26-M7.3	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Hiawatha First Nation	
26-M3.9, 26-M4.5, 26-M5.13, 26-M6.5, 26-M7.4	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Curve Lake First Nation	

CMD	Date
26-M3.11, 26-M4.9, 26-M5.17, 26-M6.7, 26-M7.9	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Nuclear Transparency Project	
26-M4.2, 26-M5.10	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Canadian Environmental Law Association	
26-M4.3, 26-M5.11, 26-M6.3, 26-M7.2	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities	
26-M4.6, 26-M5.14, 26-M7.5	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation	
26-M4.10	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Written submission from the Sagkeeng Anicinabe First Nation	

CMD	Date
26-M4.11	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024 Written submission from the Algonquins of Ontario	
26-M5.1	January 9, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Nuclear Innovation Institute	
26-M5.3	January 13, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Town of Saugeen Shores	
26-M5.4	January 15, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Council of the Rural Community of Fundy Shores	
26-M5.5	January 23, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from Conexus Nuclear Inc.	
26-M5.6	January 27, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from Bill Boutin	
26-M5.8	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from Gordon Dalzell	
26-M5.9	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Musquash Volunteer Fire-Rescue Department	

CMD	Date
26-M5.16	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites for 2024 Written submission from the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility	
26-M6.1	January 20, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Canadian Radiation Protection Association	
26-M7.8	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities in Canada: 2024 Written submission from Northwatch	
26-M3.10	January 28, 2026
Information Item Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024 Written submission from the Métis Nation - Saskatchewan	
26-M10.3	February 23, 2026
Update on an item from a previous Commission proceeding Update from CNSC staff on the Status of licensee research and development commitments on elevated hydrogen equivalent concentration in pressure tubes Written submission from Dr. Frank Greening	

APPENDIX B – Funding Allocation

Note: Funding was awarded through a single participant funding process for the review of all 2024 RORs. Recipients could intervene on one or more RORs and received a single funding award reflecting the scope of their proposed participation. Consequently, the same funding amount may appear in multiple tables. The amounts shown represent each recipient's total funding award and should not be added across tables.

26-M3, Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium Mines and Mills in Canada: 2024**Participant funding recipients:**

Recipient	Amount
English River First Nation	\$39,228.80
Alderville First Nation	\$27,312.50
Kineepik Métis Local	\$20,620
Hiawatha First Nation	\$21,562.50
Curve Lake First Nation	\$27,456.25
Métis Nation – Saskatchewan	\$30,000
Nuclear Transparency Project	\$25,000
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation	\$36,032.72
Ya'thi Néné Land and Resource Office	\$43,930

26-M4, Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites: 2024**Participant funding recipients:**

Recipient	Amount
Alderville First Nation	\$27,312.50
Canadian Environmental Law Association	\$11,500
Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities	\$20,000
Hiawatha First Nation	\$21,562.50
Curve Lake First Nation	\$27,456.25
Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation	\$25,823.25
Kebaowek First Nation	\$45,114.84
Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation	\$47,322.16
Nuclear Transparency Project	\$25,000
Algonquins of Ontario	\$28,750

26-M5, Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2024

Participant funding recipients:

Recipient	Funding Amount
Alderville First Nation	\$27,312.50
Canadian Environmental Law Association	\$11,500
Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities	\$20,000
Hiawatha First Nation	\$21,562.50
Curve Lake First Nation	\$27,456.25
Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation	\$25,823.25
Kebaowek First Nation	\$45,114.84
Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility	\$10,000
Nuclear Transparency Project	\$25,000
Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc.	\$24,064.09
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation	\$36,032.72

26-M6, Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2024

Participant funding recipients:

Recipient	Funding Amount
Alderville First Nation	\$27,312.50
Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities	\$20,000
Hiawatha First Nation	\$21,562.50
Curve Lake First Nation	\$27,456.25
Kebaowek First Nation	\$45,114.84
Nuclear Transparency Project	\$25,000

26-M7, Regulatory Oversight Report for Uranium and Nuclear Substance Processing Facilities, Research Reactors, and Class IB Accelerators in Canada: 2024

Participant funding recipients:

Recipient	Funding Amount
Alderville First Nation	\$27,312.50
Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities	\$20,000
Hiawatha First Nation	\$21,562.50

Curve Lake First Nation	\$27,456.25
Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation	\$25,823.25
Kebaowek First Nation	\$45,114.84
Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation	\$47,322.16
Northwatch	\$5,750
Nuclear Transparency Project	\$25,000
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation	\$36,032.72