



Record of Decision

DEC 26-H104

In the Matter of

Applicant Bruce Power Inc.

Subject Application to Amend the Licensing Basis for
Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations to
Increase Reactor Power to Intermediate Power
Levels

Date of Decision August 18, 2026

RECORD OF DECISION — DEC 26-H104

Applicant: Bruce Power Inc.

Address/Location: 177 Tie Road
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Purpose: Application to Amend the Licensing Basis for Bruce A
and B Nuclear Generating Stations to Increase Reactor
Power to Intermediate Power Levels

Application received: August 19, 2025

Hearing: *Notice of Hearing in Writing and Participant Funding*
published on November 10, 2025

Date of decision: August 18, 2026

Panel of Commission: Dr. Berube, Commission Member

Licensing Basis: Amended

Table of Contents

1.0	Introduction.....	1
2.0	Decision	4
3.0	Commission findings and analysis.....	5
3.1	Applicability of the <i>Impact Assessment Act</i>	5
3.2	Views of intervenors	5
3.3	Bruce Power’s safety and control measures with respect to the safety and control areas 6	
3.4	Indigenous engagement and consultation	19
3.5	Other matters of regulatory importance	23
3.6	Licensing basis amendment	24
4.0	Conclusion	26
	Appendix A — Intervenors.....	27

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1. On [August 19, 2025](#), Bruce Power Inc. (Bruce Power) applied to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission¹ (CNSC) to amend the licensing basis² of power reactor operating licence PROL 18.04/2028 for its Bruce A and Bruce B Nuclear Generating Stations (Bruce A and B). [Bruce A and B](#) are in the Municipality of Kincardine, on the eastern shore of Lake Huron, on the traditional and treaty territory of the Saugeen Ojibway Nation, and the traditional harvesting territories of the Métis Nation of Ontario Region 7 and the Historic Saugeen Métis peoples.
2. Bruce Power is seeking to increase reactor power limits to intermediate power levels (IPLs) of 95.5% full power (FP) for Bruce A and 96.0% FP for Bruce B. Under the current licensing basis, Bruce Power is authorized to operate Bruce A up to 92.5% FP and Bruce B up to 93.0% FP.

Matters for Decision

3. Licence condition G.1 of PROL 18.04/2028 defines the licensing basis as:
 - (i) *the regulatory requirements set out in the applicable laws and regulations;*
 - (ii) *the conditions and safety control measures described in the facilities' licence and the documents directly referenced in that licence;*
 - (iii) *the safety and control measures described in the licence applications and the documents needed to support those licence applications;**unless otherwise approved in writing by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC, hereinafter "the Commission").*
4. Bruce Power's application does not call for a licensing decision under section 24 of the [Nuclear Safety and Control Act](#)³ (NSCA or Act), as a change to the licensing basis does not necessarily amend the terms of a licence and would not in this case. What is requested would not change the licensed activities authorized in the current licence. The Commission must determine:
 - is Bruce Power qualified to carry on the activity that the licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis, would authorize?
 - will, in carrying on that activity in the changed manner contemplated, Bruce Power make adequate provision for the protection of the

¹ The *Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission* is referred to as the "CNSC" when referring to the organization and its staff in general, and as the "Commission" when referring to the tribunal component.

² The licensing basis is the set of regulatory requirements, licence conditions, and supporting licensing documents that define the safety and control measures governing a licensed activity and establish the basis for CNSC compliance oversight.

³ S.C.1997, c. 9.

environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national security and measures required to implement international obligation to which Canada has agreed?

5. In considering Bruce Power's application, the Commission must also determine whether any requirements of the [*Impact Assessment Act*](#)⁴ (IAA) apply to the application such that an impact assessment is triggered. Satisfying any such requirements can be a prerequisite to a licensing decision.
6. As an agent of the Crown, the Commission recognizes its role in fulfilling the Crown's constitutional obligations, along with advancing reconciliation with Canada's Indigenous peoples. The Commission's responsibilities include the duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous interests where the Crown contemplates conduct which may adversely impact asserted or established Aboriginal⁵ or treaty rights.⁶ As such, the Commission must identify the engagement and consultation steps, and accommodation measures needed to address Indigenous interests.

Public Hearing in Writing

7. On November 10, 2025, the Commission published a [Notice of Hearing in Writing and Participant Funding](#)⁷ for this matter, which invited requests to intervene by May 6, 2026.
8. The President of the Commission established Commission member Dr. Timothy Berube as a panel of the Commission to consider the application.⁸ The Commission, in conducting a public hearing based on written materials, considered written submissions from Bruce Power ([Application, CMD 26-H104.1](#)) and CNSC staff ([CMD 26-H104](#)). The Commission also considered written submissions from 13 intervenors,⁹ as set out in [Appendix A](#).
9. In determining whether a public hearing will be an oral hearing or a hearing in writing, the Commission is guided by the direction in subsection 20(3) of the NSCA that "all proceedings before the Commission must be dealt with as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness permit." On this issue, the Commission considered such things as whether the

⁴ S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1.

⁵ "Aboriginal" is the term used in this document when referring to the Crown's duty to consult as that is the term used in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In all other cases, "Indigenous" is the preferred terminology and used accordingly.

⁶ *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, [2004 SCC 73](#) [*Haida Nation*]; *Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director)*, [2004 SCC 74](#).

⁷ *Notice of Hearing in Writing and Participant Funding*, CNSC, November 10, 2025.

⁸ NSCA, section 22.

⁹ Pursuant to rule 19 of the [Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure](#), individuals or organizations with relevant expertise, a direct interest in this matter, or information that may be useful to the Commission in its decision-making were invited to submit written comments on Bruce Power's application.

proposed licensing basis amendment would authorize new or different activities or take novel or controversial approaches, the complexity of the matter under consideration, the proposed timing and steps in the lifecycle of the facility or operation, and the level and degree of likely or anticipated participation from intervenors. After weighing these factors, the Commission determined that a hearing in writing would be appropriate because the application is not requesting new or different activities and the anticipated level of public participation was low.

10. The Commission acknowledges the Canadian Environmental Law Association's concern that a hearing in writing is inappropriate for this matter and contrary to public interest. The Commission affirms that a hearing in writing provided the public with a fair and meaningful opportunity to participate in this proceeding. The Commission has applied rule 21(1) of [*Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure*](#)¹⁰ (the Rules) to permit hearing participants to present their information and submissions to the Commission in writing only. The Commission highlights that:
 - a [Notice of Hearing in Writing and Participant Funding](#) was published for this matter, which invited requests to intervene
 - Bruce Power's application and other materials, including supplemental materials from Bruce Power, materials from CNSC staff, and intervenors were all published on the [CNSC website](#)
 - up to \$50,000 of [participant funding](#) was made available to facilitate the public's participation in this proceeding
 - if the Commission does not have enough information to render a decision, it can ask its questions to hearing participants in writing and all the questions and answers will also be published on the CNSC website

Confidentiality Request

11. On [March 31, 2026](#),¹¹ Bruce Power submitted a request for confidentiality¹² seeking confidentiality measures over certain information on the record. On [May 6, 2026](#),¹³ the Commission issued its decision on Bruce Power's request for confidentiality, setting out the measures it would take to protect information under subrule 12(3) of *the Rules*.

¹⁰ SOR/2000-211.

¹¹ *Bruce Power – Request for Confidentiality in relation to application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B NGS to increase reactor power limits*, Bruce Power, March 31, 2026.

¹² Under rule 12 of the *Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure*, SOR/2000-211.

¹³ *Record of Decision – Commission Ruling on Request to Protect Confidential Information*, CNSC, May 6, 2026.

2.0 DECISION

12. The Commission amends the licensing basis of power reactor operating licence PROL 18.04/2028, authorizing an increase in reactor power limits to IPLs of 95.5% full power for Bruce A and 96.0% full power for Bruce B, subject to verification by CNSC staff as required by the regulatory hold point (RHP) outlined below.
13. Based on its consideration of this matter, and as described in more detail below, the Commission concludes the following:
 - the licensing basis amendment does not present novel adverse or potential impacts on any asserted or established Aboriginal claim or rights
 - the Commission's responsibility to uphold the honour of the Crown and its constitutional obligations regarding engagement and consultation respecting Indigenous interests has been satisfied
 - this matter does not trigger any requirements under the IAA
 - Bruce Power is qualified to carry on the activity authorized by its licence PROL 18.04/2028, including the proposed change to its licensing basis
 - Bruce Power, in carrying out that activity, will make adequate provision for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has agreed
14. The Commission establishes a new RHP under licence condition 15.5 to ensure Bruce Power's operational readiness for increasing reactor power for Bruce A and B up to IPLs. The RHP is as proposed by CNSC staff in CMD 26-H104, section 3.15, and in the draft licence conditions handbook (LCH): *Operation Beyond 92.5% FP for Bruce A and 93% FP for Bruce B*. Removal of this RHP would allow Bruce Power to operate Bruce A and B up to the following IPLs: Bruce A to 95.5% FP and Bruce B to 96.0% FP.
15. The Commission delegates its authority for the administration of the new RHP under licence condition 15.5 to the following CNSC staff:
 - Vice-President, Power Reactor and Nuclear Substance Regulation
 - Vice-President, Advanced Reactor Technology and Nuclear Facility Regulation
16. With this decision, the Commission directs CNSC staff to update the LCH for Bruce A and B as described in CMD 26-H104, Appendix C.6.

3.0 COMMISSION FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

17. In making its decision, the Commission considered all the relevant submissions relating to Bruce Power's application. The Commission's analysis is set out within the following subsections of this *Record of Decision*:
- Section 3.1 Applicability of the *Impact Assessment Act*
 - Section 3.2 Views of intervenors
 - Section 3.3 Bruce Power's safety and control measures with respect to the safety and control areas
 - Section 3.4 Indigenous engagement and consultation
 - Section 3.5 Other matters of regulatory importance
 - Section 3.6 Licensing basis amendment

3.1 Applicability of the *Impact Assessment Act*

18. This application does not trigger any of the requirements under the IAA for an impact assessment.
19. Pursuant to the IAA and the [*Physical Activities Regulations*](#)¹⁴ made under it, impact assessments are to be conducted in respect of projects identified as having the greatest potential for adverse environmental effects in areas of federal jurisdiction.
20. The proposed licensing basis amendment does not include any new activities listed in the *Physical Activities Regulations* that require an impact assessment, or new activities that meet the definition of a project on federal lands. As a result, an impact assessment under the IAA is not required.

3.2 Views of intervenors

21. Intervenors expressed views with respect to:
- Indigenous Nations' rights under section 35 of the [*Constitution Act, 1982*](#)¹⁵
 - environmental impacts including increased thermal discharge to Lake Huron affecting fish habitat, and impingement and entrainment
 - increased accumulation of nuclear waste from higher reactor power levels

¹⁴ SOR/2019-285.

¹⁵ Schedule B to the *Canada Act, 1982* (UK), 1982, c 11.

- incomplete verification of design and operational changes given the refurbishments for Bruce A and B are incomplete
22. Issues raised by intervenors, and their bearing on the Commission's analysis, are discussed in the appropriate subject-specific sections below. Issues raised by Indigenous Nations and communities are detailed in the Indigenous engagement and consultation section of this *Record of Decision*.

3.3 Bruce Power's safety and control measures with respect to the safety and control areas

23. The Commission finds that Bruce Power will continue to meet CNSC regulatory requirements for Bruce A and B, and Bruce Power will ensure that the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment will be protected.
24. The Commission assessed Bruce Power's safety and control measures in relation to the [CNSC's safety and control areas](#)¹⁶ (SCAs). The Commission's assessment focused on the following 5 SCAs, which CNSC staff identified as being impacted by Bruce Power's licensing basis amendment application:
- Operating Performance
 - Safety Analysis
 - Physical Design
 - Environmental Protection
 - Waste Management
25. The Commission notes that CNSC staff found that the proposed licensing basis amendment would have a negligible impact on the remaining SCAs. The Commission's assessment of the relevant SCAs is set out below.

3.3.1 Operating Performance

26. The Commission concludes that Bruce Power has an adequate operating performance program in place to carry on the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis.
27. The operating performance SCA requires that the licensee implement and maintain an operating performance program for the conduct of licensed activities. For Bruce Power's current licence, this includes:

¹⁶ SCAs are the technical topics that CNSC staff use to assess, review, verify and report on regulatory requirements and performance across all regulated facilities and activities.

- implementing and maintaining an operations program, including a set of operating limits
 - not restarting a reactor after a serious process failure without prior written approval of the Commission, or a person authorized by the Commission
 - notifying and reporting following CNSC regulatory document (REGDOC) [REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants](#)¹⁷
28. The following regulatory documents provide requirements and guidance on the operating performance SCA:
- [Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations](#)¹⁸
 - [CSA N290.15, Requirements for the safe operating envelope for nuclear power plants](#)¹⁹
 - [REGDOC-2.3.2, Accident Management, Version 2](#)²⁰
 - [REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, Version 3](#)²¹
29. In section 3.3 of its application, Bruce Power attested that it would provide the CNSC with written notification of changes to the Safe Operating Envelope (SOE) documents affected by the proposed licensing basis amendment.
30. Bruce Power also confirmed that changes to the current power limits requires updates to the Operating Policies and Principles, Operational Safety Requirements, and other documents supporting the SOE.²²
31. Bruce Power reported that there would not be any impacts to the remaining licence conditions under the operating performance SCA. If the proposed licensing basis amendment is approved, the quarterly Safety Performance Indicators report submitted to the CNSC would account for changes in the Power Limits table.²³

¹⁷ REGDOC-3.1.1, *Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, Version 3*, CNSC, May 2024.

¹⁸ SOR/2000-204.

¹⁹ CSA N290.15, *Requirements for the Safe operating envelope for nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2019.

²⁰ REGDOC-2.3.2, *Accident Management, Version 2*, CNSC, September 2015.

²¹ REGDOC-3.1.1, *Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, version 3*, CNSC, May 2024.

²² *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, section 3.3.

²³ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, pages 18–19.

32. In CMD 26-H104, section 3.3, CNSC staff reported that Bruce Power maintains a SOE program that meets regulatory requirements and is adequate for operation of Bruce A and B at IPLs.
33. The proposed licensing basis amendment would require updates to the SOE, and CNSC staff confirmed that updates to SOE documents would be completed prior to implementing the proposed IPLs for Bruce A and B.²⁴ CNSC staff would verify that updates to SOE documents meet regulatory requirements through the proposed RHP, as outlined in CMD 26-H104, and in section 3.6.1 of this *Record of Decision*.²⁵
34. The Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power has an adequate operating performance program in place to carry out the activities that would be authorized by the proposed licensing basis amendment. The Commission bases its conclusion on the following:
 - Bruce Power has implemented and maintained an adequate operating performance program that meets regulatory requirements
 - Bruce Power's operating performance program is adequate for operation of Bruce A and B at IPLs
35. The Commission also notes that the proposed licensing basis amendment requires changes to the SOE documents and that CNSC staff will verify updates to Bruce Power's SOE documents through the proposed RHP. The Commission is satisfied with Bruce Power's commitments to update the SOE documents.

3.3.2 Safety Analysis

36. The Commission concludes that Bruce Power has an adequate safety analysis program in place to carry on the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis.
37. The safety analysis SCA involves maintaining the analyses that support the facility's overall safety case. It systematically evaluates potential hazards associated with activities or operations and assesses the effectiveness of preventive and mitigative measures. Under its current licence, Bruce Power is required to implement and maintain a safety analysis program.
38. The following regulatory documents provide requirements and guidance on the safety analysis SCA:

²⁴ CMD 26-H104, section 3.3.

²⁵ CMD 26-H104, page 31.

- [CSA N286.7, Quality assurance of analytical, scientific, and design computer programs](#)²⁶
 - [REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis](#)²⁷
 - [REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment \(PSA\) for Nuclear Power Plants, Version 2](#)²⁸
39. Bruce Power submitted to the CNSC the following deterministic and probabilistic analyses and assessments to confirm safety margins for operation of Bruce A up to 95.5% FP and Bruce B up to 96.0% FP:
- Bruce A Integrated Summary Report for P2030 Safety Analysis up to 95.5% FP²⁹
 - Bruce B Integrated Summary Report for P2030 Safety Analysis up to 96.0% FP³⁰
40. As part of the deterministic and probabilistic analyses and assessments for Bruce A and B, Bruce Power assessed a range of postulated initiating events including fuel handling, electrical failures, loss of coolant accidents, and common mode accidents. Bruce Power reported that for Bruce A and B:³¹
- safety system effectiveness is maintained for both anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents
 - all safety acceptance criteria are met including dose limits and prevention of radionuclide release
 - there is no expected impact on the probabilistic safety assessments from the proposed IPLs at Bruce A and B
 - analyses support safe operation at the proposed IPLs at Bruce A and B
41. Bruce Power also identified that the management of safety analyses are included in other SCAs through procedures, including operational performance and design.³²

²⁶ CSA N286.7, *Quality assurance of analytical, scientific, and design computer programs*, CSA Group, 2016.

²⁷ REGDOC-2.4.1, *Deterministic Safety Analysis*, CNSC, May 2014.

²⁸ REGDOC-2.4.2, *Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants, Version 2*, CNSC, May 2022.

²⁹ On [May 6, 2026](#), the Commission ruled *Bruce A Integrated Summary Report for P2030 Safety Analysis up to 95.5% FP*, be confidential under rule 12 of the *Rules*.

³⁰ On [May 6, 2026](#), the Commission ruled *Bruce B Integrated Summary Report for P2030 Safety Analysis up to 96.0% FP*, be confidential under rule 12 of the *Rules*.

³¹ *Request for confidentiality of Material Submitted in Relation to Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B NGS to increase reactor power limits CMD: 26-H104*, Bruce Power, March 31, 2026, pages 5–17.

³² CMD 26-H104.1, pages 80 and 86.

42. CNSC staff assessed Bruce Power's deterministic safety analysis (DSA) and probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) against regulatory requirements and determined that there are no fundamental barriers to operation at the proposed IPLs. CNSC staff confirmed that Bruce Power's analyses predict adequate safety margins for normal, transient, and accident conditions.³³
43. For the DSA, CNSC staff identified the following key event categories that Bruce Power analyzed or assessed to support operation of Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs:
- loss of coolant accidents
 - electrical system failures
 - control failures
 - feedwater and steam supply failures
 - shutdown cooling failures
 - common mode events
44. CNSC staff found that the DSA analyses and assessments were sufficient to support operation of Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs, and that Bruce Power's safety systems will continue to meet performance requirements at the proposed IPLs.³⁴
45. Regarding neutron overpower protection (NOP), CNSC staff concurred with Bruce Power's assessment that confirmatory analysis of the NOP trip setpoint was not required because the major component replacement work on Bruce A and B restores conditions that are aligned with the existing NOP trip setpoint.³⁵
46. For the PSA, CNSC staff reviewed the risk impacts of core damage frequency and large release frequency at the proposed IPLs and found that:³⁶
- reactor power at the proposed IPLs does not impact availability of trip parameters for shutting down the reactors
 - there is no change in loss of heat sink accident sequences
 - the MAAP-CANDU³⁷ analysis demonstrated no increase in large release frequency

³³ CMD 26-H104, pages 32–36.

³⁴ CMD 26-H104, page 33.

³⁵ CMD 26-H104, page 34.

³⁶ CMD 26-H104, page 36.

³⁷ Modular Accident Analysis Program for Canada Deuterium Uranium (MAAP-CANDU).

47. CNSC staff reported that reactor power at the proposed IPLs would not increase the core damage frequency or the large release frequency. The regulatory quantitative safety goals will be met at the proposed IPLs.³⁸
48. CNSC staff added that there are no fundamental barriers to operation at the proposed IPLs and, through compliance verification activities, CNSC staff will ensure that Bruce Power's safety analysis program continues to meet regulatory requirements.³⁹
49. CNSC staff reviewed Bruce Power's technical basis documents, assessments, and analysis reports as part of Project 2023 and identified short- and long-term actions⁴⁰ of low safety significance.⁴¹ Short-term actions must be completed before any power uprate, while long-term actions would support sustained operation at the proposed IPLs.⁴² CNSC staff proposed a RHP to verify Bruce Power's completion of all outstanding short-term actions before any reactor uprate to the proposed IPLs. CNSC staff also noted that any reactor uprates above the proposed IPLs would require re-evaluation of the safety analysis.⁴³
50. The Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power has an adequate safety analysis program in place to carry on the activities that would be authorized by the proposed licensing basis amendment. The Commission bases its conclusion on the following:
 - Bruce Power's safety analysis program meets regulatory requirements and is adequate to support the proposed licensing basis amendment to operate Bruce A and B at IPLs
 - the Commission is satisfied with the safety analyses provided by Bruce Power and CNSC staff to demonstrate safe operation of Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs
 - the Commission is satisfied with the short- and long-term actions identified by CNSC staff in CMD 26-104, Appendix A.5, and that CNSC staff will verify that short-term actions are completed before Bruce Power operates Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs

³⁸ CMD 26-H104, page 36.

³⁹ CMD 26-H104, page 36.

⁴⁰ CNSC staff defined short-term actions as having the potential to impact CNSC staff's conclusions, and long-term actions to address complex feedback from CNSC staff's reviews.

⁴¹ CMD 26-H104, Appendix A.5.

⁴² CMD 26-H104, page 37.

⁴³ CMD 26-H104, page 37.

3.3.3 Physical Design

51. The Commission concludes that Bruce Power has an adequate physical design program in place to carry on the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis.
52. The physical design SCA relates to activities that affect the ability of structures, systems, and components to meet and maintain their design basis, given new information arising over time and take changes in the external environment into account. Under its current licence, Bruce Power is required to implement and maintain:
 - a design program
 - a pressure boundary program and have in place a formal agreement with an authorized inspection agency
 - an equipment and structure qualification program
53. The following CSA standards provide requirements and guidance on the physical design SCA:
 - [CSA N290.12, Human factors in design for nuclear power plants](#)⁴⁴
 - [CSA N290.14, Qualification of digital hardware and software for use in instrumentation and control applications for nuclear power plants](#)⁴⁵
 - [CSA N291-15, Requirements for safety-related structures for nuclear power plants](#)⁴⁶
 - [CSA N285.0, General requirements for pressure-retaining systems and components in CANDU nuclear power plants](#)⁴⁷
 - [CSA N289.1, General requirements for seismic design and qualification of CANDU nuclear power plants](#)⁴⁸
 - [CSA N289.2, Ground motion determination for seismic qualification of CANDU nuclear power plants](#)⁴⁹

⁴⁴ CSA N290.12, *Human factors in design for nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2014.

⁴⁵ CSA N290.14, *Qualification of digital hardware and software for use in instrumentation and control applications for nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2015

⁴⁶ CSA N291, *Requirements for safety-related structures for nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2015.

⁴⁷ CSA N285.0, *General requirements for pressure-retaining systems and components in CANDU nuclear power plants/Material Standards for reactor components for CANDU nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2023.

⁴⁸ CSA N289.1, *General requirements for seismic design and qualification of nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2023.

⁴⁹ CSA N289.2, *Ground motion determination for seismic qualification of nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2021.

- [CSA N289.3, Design procedures for seismic qualification of CANDU nuclear power plants](#)⁵⁰
 - [CSA N289.4, Testing procedures for seismic qualification of nuclear power plant, structures, systems, and components](#)⁵¹
 - [CSA N289.5, Seismic instrumentation requirements for nuclear power plants and nuclear facilities](#)⁵²
 - [CSA N290.13, Environmental qualification of equipment for CANDU nuclear power plants](#)⁵³
54. In its application, Bruce Power submitted that there will not be any changes to its physical design program. Bruce Power intends to implement the design changes made to support the proposed licensing basis amendment following its engineering change control process.⁵⁴
55. Bruce Power also submitted that there will not be any changes to the pressure boundary program or the equipment and structure qualification program from the proposed licensing basis amendment.⁵⁵
56. In its application, section 2.1, Bruce Power identified the following physical design modifications for Bruce A and B that may be required for the proposed licensing basis amendment:
- reactor, moderator, turbine, and heat transport system improvements
 - condenser, cooling water, and circulating water system upgrades
 - safety and shutdown system optimization
 - outage interval and operational performance enhancements
 - full-power operation assessments and flow studies
 - hydrogen production opportunities using excess generation capacity
57. In CMD 26-H104, section 3.5, CNSC staff found that the proposed licensing basis amendment to increase reactor power for Bruce A and B to IPLs is within

⁵⁰ CSA N289.3, *Design procedures for seismic qualification of nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2020.

⁵¹ CSA N289.4, *Testing procedures for seismic qualification of nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components*, CSA Group, 2022.

⁵² CSA N289.5, *Seismic instrumentation requirements for nuclear power plants and nuclear facilities*, CSA Group, 2012.

⁵³ CSA N290.13, *Environmental qualification of equipment for nuclear power plants*, CSA Group, 2025.

⁵⁴ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, page 6.

⁵⁵ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, pages 20–21.

the original design basis of Bruce A and B, and any design changes will be implemented following Bruce Power's engineering change control process.

58. CNSC staff determined that Bruce Power maintains environmental qualification, seismic qualification, and pressure boundary programs that meet the applicable regulatory requirements. Also, CNSC staff noted that Bruce Power's engineering change control process is adequate to ensure all structures, systems, and components will function safely at the proposed IPLs.⁵⁶
59. In CMD 26-H104, section 3.5.3, CNSC staff noted that engineering changes are in the preliminary design phase, and proposed a RHP, detailed in section 3.6.1 of this *Record of Decision*, to verify that the required design changes are completed and verified before Bruce A and B move to the proposed IPLs. Prior to release of the RHP, CNSC staff will verify that:
 - modifications required for operation at the proposed IPLs are installed and that systems, structures, and components will continue to operate safely within their design limits
 - appropriate measures are taken to address impacts on the environmental qualification program
 - pressure boundary, electrical power systems, and instrumentation and control systems requirements will be met at the proposed IPLs
60. The Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power has an adequate physical design program in place to carry on the activities that would be authorized by the proposed licensing basis amendment. The Commission bases its conclusion on the following:
 - the original design of Bruce A and B supports operation up to 100% full power
 - Bruce Power's physical design program meets regulatory requirements and is adequate to support the proposed licensing basis amendment to operate Bruce A and B at IPLs

3.3.4 *Environmental Protection*

61. The Commission concludes that Bruce Power has implemented an adequate environmental protection program to carry on the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis.
62. The environmental protection SCA covers programs that identify, control, and monitor all releases of radioactive and hazardous substances and effects on the

⁵⁶ CMD 26-H104, page 40.

environment from facilities or as the result of licensed activities. For its current licence, Bruce Power must implement and maintain an environmental protection program, which includes a set of action levels.

63. Under the NSCA, Bruce Power is required to make adequate provision for the protection of the environment and the health and safety of persons. Following the [*General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*](#) (GNSCR),⁵⁷ Bruce Power shall take all reasonable precautions to protect the environment, the health and safety of persons, and control the release of radioactive nuclear or hazardous substances within the site of the licensed activity and into the environment.⁵⁸
64. The CNSC's [*REGDOC-2.9 Environmental protection series*](#) and the following CSA standards provide guidance for licensees in meeting requirements for the environmental protection SCA:
- [*CSA N288.1, Guidelines for modelling radionuclide environmental transport, fate, and exposure associated with the normal operation of nuclear facilities*](#)⁵⁹
 - [*CSA N288.4, Environmental monitoring programs at nuclear facilities*](#)⁶⁰
 - [*CSA N288.5, Effluent and emissions monitoring programs at nuclear facilities*](#)⁶¹
 - [*CSA N288.6, Environmental risk assessments at nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills*](#)⁶²
 - [*CSA N288.7, Groundwater protection and monitoring programs for nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills*](#)⁶³
 - [*CSA N288.8, Establishing and implementing action levels for releases to the environment from nuclear facilities*](#)⁶⁴
65. In its application, Bruce Power identified impacts on emissions and effluent management from the proposed licensing basis amendment and submitted a

⁵⁷ SOR/2000-202.

⁵⁸ GNSCR, paragraphs 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f).

⁵⁹ CSA N288.1, *Guidelines for modelling radionuclide environmental transport, fate, and exposure associated with the normal operation of nuclear facilities*, CSA Group, 2020.

⁶⁰ CSA N288.4, *Environmental monitoring programs at nuclear facilities*, CSA Group, 2025.

⁶¹ CSA N288.5, *Effluent and emissions monitoring programs at nuclear facilities*, CSA Group, 2022.

⁶² CSA N288.6, *Environmental risk assessments at nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills*, CSA Group, 2022.

⁶³ CSA N288.7, *Groundwater protection and monitoring programs for nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills*, CSA Group, 2023.

⁶⁴ CSA N288.8, *Establishing and implementing action levels for releases to the environment from nuclear facilities*, CSA Group, 2017.

predictive environmental risk assessment (PERA), which detailed the effects of operating Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs.⁶⁵

66. Bruce Power's PERA included an environmental protection gap analysis on Project 2030 covering activities completed or planned from 2021–2026.⁶⁶ In the PERA, Bruce Power identified the following:

- radiological air and water – operation at higher reactor powers can increase tritium production, ion exchange (IX) resin use, and spent resin processing; to mitigate emissions and effluents, Bruce Power proposed completing an assessment of IX resins and spent resin processing before uprates⁶⁷
- surface water and thermal effects – efficiency improvements can reduce thermal releases per unit output, but total thermal energy discharged to Lake Huron is expected to increase with higher reactor power; thermal modelling for uprate scenarios supports continued assessment, and restoring flows and efficiency improvements can increase dilution and reduce thermal effluent⁶⁸
- fish impingement and entrainment – Bruce Power is not expecting an increase in entrainment losses from the proposed licensing basis amendment; an entrainment pilot began in 2025 and will run for 12 months, using new methods from the previous 2013–2014 study⁶⁹
- chemicals and noise – increased steam and feedwater flow may increase total loading of corrosion-inhibiting chemicals; Bruce Power recommended assessing chemical dosing/loading prior to steam-cycle changes in the 2027 Environmental Risk Assessment; noise is not expected to measurably increase for 2021–2026 but should be assessed if steam reject system changes occur⁷⁰

67. CNSC staff reported that Bruce Power has implemented and maintained an effective environmental protection program that meets regulatory requirements. CNSC staff assessed Bruce Power's PERA and found that the risks to the environment or human health for the proposed licensing basis amendment are low to negligible.⁷¹

⁶⁵ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, page 6.

⁶⁶ Outcomes of 2021–2026 activities will be reported in the 2027 Environmental Risk Assessment; activities planned after 2026 will be addressed at the next full ERA update in 2027.

⁶⁷ CMD 26-H104.1, pages 23, 26–27.

⁶⁸ CMD 26-H104.1, pages 25–27.

⁶⁹ CMD 26-H104.1, pages 25–26, 31.

⁷⁰ CMD 26-H104.1, pages 22–23, 25, 30, 37, 43.

⁷¹ CMD 26-H104, page 50.

68. In its intervention, the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) identified the following potential environmental impacts and radiological risks from the proposed licensing basis amendment:⁷²
- thermal discharge to Lake Huron impacting fish habitat
 - gaps in environmental monitoring data
 - risk of increased tritium releases
69. In its intervention, the Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON) identified that increasing thermal discharge to Lake Huron will affect fish habitat and SON fishery. The SON also expressed concerns about fish impingement and entrainment from the proposed licensing basis amendment.⁷³
70. The Commission recognizes the environmental concerns raised by CELA and the SON regarding the proposed licensing basis amendment. With respect to these issues, the Commission takes note of the following:
- the increase in thermal discharge to Lake Huron from the proposed Bruce A and B IPLs is negligible and Bruce Power's environmental protection program remains adequate⁷⁴
 - effects on fish impingement and entrainment from the proposed Bruce A and B IPLs are negligible and Bruce Power's environmental protection program remains adequate⁷⁵
 - the potential increase in tritium releases from the proposed Bruce A and B IPLs is negligible and Bruce Power's environmental protection program is adequate to ensure that tritium releases remain below regulatory limits⁷⁶
71. The Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power has an adequate environmental protection program to carry on the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis. The Commission bases its conclusion on the following:
- Bruce Power's environmental protection program meets regulatory requirements
 - the Commission is satisfied that the environmental effects from operating Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs are negligible and Bruce Power's environmental protection program is adequate to support the proposed licensing basis amendment to operate Bruce A and B at IPLs

⁷² [CMD 26-H104.13](#), pages 22–25.

⁷³ [CMD 26-H104.14](#), pages 6–7.

⁷⁴ CMD 26-H104, page 50.

⁷⁵ CMD 26-H014, page 50.

⁷⁶ CMD 26-H104, page 47.

3.3.5 Waste Management

72. The Commission concludes that Bruce Power has an adequate waste management program in place to carry on the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis.
73. The waste management SCA covers waste-related programs that form part of a facility's operations up to the point where the waste is removed from the facility to a separate waste management facility. This SCA also covers planning for decommissioning. For Bruce Power this includes implementing and managing a waste management program and notifying the Commission of any changes regarding the obligations of decommissioning and financial guarantees under the Lease Agreement with Ontario Power Generation (OPG).
74. The CNSC's [REGDOC-2.11 Waste management series](#) and [CSA N292.3, *Management of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste*](#),⁷⁷ provides licensees with guidance on meeting the waste management SCA.
75. In section 3.11 of its application, Bruce Power submitted that the proposed licensing basis amendment would result in:
- a 3% increase in spent nuclear fuel that would be managed with existing procedures
 - an increase in fuel stockpiling and used fuel onsite with no changes to its waste management framework
 - reduced operating lives of Bruce A and B, so that the total long-term amount of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site would not increase
76. In CMD 26-H104, section 3.11, CNSC staff confirmed that Bruce Power's waste management program meets regulatory requirements and is adequate to support the proposed licensing basis amendment.⁷⁸ CNSC staff determined that the proposed licensing basis amendment would have:
- a negligible impact on long-term spent fuel storage because Bruce A and B would have proportionally shortened unit lifetimes
 - no expected increase in routine low-level waste
 - a slight increase in routine intermediate-level waste
77. The Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power has an adequate waste management program in place to carry on the activities authorized by its licence,

⁷⁷ CSA N292.3, *Management of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste*, CSA Group, 2014.

⁷⁸ CMD 26-H104, page 53.

including the proposed changes to the licensing basis. The Commission bases its conclusion on the following:

- Bruce Power's waste management program meets regulatory requirements
- Bruce Power's waste management program is adequate to manage the slight radioactive waste increase that the proposed licensing basis amendment would authorize

3.3.6 Conclusion on Bruce Power's safety and control measures

78. The Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power has adequate safety and control measures in place with respect to the relevant SCAs to ensure that the health and safety of people and the environment will be protected. Therefore, the Commission finds that Bruce Power:
- is qualified to carry on the activity authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis
 - in carrying out that activity, will make adequate provision for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has agreed

3.4 Indigenous engagement and consultation

79. As an agent of the Crown, the Commission must uphold the honour of the Crown and ensure that the duty to consult and accommodate is discharged when engaged. If the duty is engaged, the Commission must be satisfied that it has been discharged before making the relevant licensing decision.
80. The duty to consult is triggered when the Commission considers actions that may adversely impact asserted or established Aboriginal or treaty rights.⁷⁹ In those cases, the Commission has a legal duty to consult with the relevant Indigenous Nations and communities and, where appropriate, accommodate their rights. The duty stems from section 35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982* and is grounded in the principle of the honour of the Crown and the goal of reconciliation, which requires that the Crown act with integrity and in good faith in its dealings with Indigenous Peoples.
81. The scope and content of the duty to consult and accommodate varies with the circumstances: it depends on the strength of the claim and the seriousness of the

⁷⁹ *Haida Nation* at para 35.

potential adverse impact.⁸⁰ Adjustments may be required as new information comes to light. In some cases, consultations will reveal that a duty to accommodate also arises, especially when there is a strong claim to an Aboriginal or treaty right and the impacts of the Commission's decision could cause significant negative impacts.⁸¹ In other words, the duty to accommodate adverse impacts on potential or established Aboriginal or treaty rights is not an independent duty. Rather, it arises at the higher end of the duty to consult spectrum.

82. The duty to consult is not triggered by historical impacts and is not meant to address past grievances. Instead, it is designed to address potential impacts flowing from a current application.⁸²
83. The Commission's determination of what the duty to consult requires in a particular case can also be informed by the [*United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*](#)⁸³ (UNDRIP), which has been adopted into Canadian law via the [*United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act*](#)⁸⁴ (UNDA).
84. The Federal Court in *Kebaowek First Nation v. Canadian Nuclear Laboratories*⁸⁵ confirmed that UNDRIP does not create new law or statutory obligations. Rather, it is an interpretive lens to be applied to determine if the Crown has fulfilled its legal obligations and an added contextual layer that informs the scope and content of the duty to consult and accommodate.⁸⁶

3.4.1 Indigenous Engagement by CNSC Staff

85. In CMD 26-H104, section 4, CNSC staff identified the SON, comprised of the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation and the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, as having Aboriginal and/or treaty rights within the area encompassing the Bruce A and B sites. CNSC staff also identified the following Indigenous Nations and communities that expressed interest in the Bruce A and B site:
 - Métis Nation of Ontario (Region 7) (MNO)
 - Historic Saugeen Métis (HSM)

⁸⁰ *Haida Nation* at para 39.

⁸¹ *Haida Nation* at para 47.

⁸² *Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council*, 2010 SCC 43 [*Rio Tinto*] at para 49; *Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc.*, 2017 SCC 41 [*Chippewas of the Thames First Nation*] at para. 41.

⁸³ United Nations, "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples", (September 2007), PDF: <un.org> [https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2019/01/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf].

⁸⁴ *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act*, SC 2021, c 14.

⁸⁵ *Kebaowek First Nation v. Canadian Nuclear Laboratories*, 2025 FC 319. [*Kebaowek First Nation*].

⁸⁶ *Kebaowek First Nation* at para 76 and 183.

- Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation
86. CNSC staff have terms of reference with the SON, HSM, and MNO. In CMD 26-H104, section 4.1, CNSC staff detail its engagement with these Indigenous Nations.
87. In CMD 26-H104, section 4.1.2, CNSC staff note that through regular meetings with the SON, the SON expressed concerns regarding the added heat to Lake Huron. The SON requested more information on how the CNSC conducts and makes safety analysis determinations, and CNSC staff provided this information. On March 9, 2026, CNSC staff conducted a workshop for the SON Environment Office explaining the CNSC safety analysis determinations and deterministic analysis methods related to the proposed licensing basis amendment. The SON were awarded \$37,720 to participate in this proceeding.⁸⁷
88. In November 2025, CNSC staff informed MNO and HSM of the proposed licensing basis amendment through their regular meetings. CNSC staff encouraged MNO and HSM to participate in the regulatory review process and the Commission hearing through written interventions, to express any concerns in relation to the proposed licensing basis amendment.⁸⁸
89. In CMD 26-H104, section 4.1.2, CNSC staff note that the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point did not respond to CNSC staff's offer to meet and discuss the proposed licensing basis amendment.

3.4.2 Indigenous Engagement by Bruce Power

90. Regarding the proposed licensing basis amendment, Bruce Power conducted the following engagement activities with Indigenous nations and communities:⁸⁹
- in December 2024, Bruce Power shared general information with the SON as part of the annual Regulatory Look Ahead package, and in 2025 provided detailed information on Project 2030 and engaged in discussion
 - in January 2025, Bruce Power held meetings with the HSM
 - Bruce Power shared copies of associated presentations and technical documentation with MNO

⁸⁷ Participant funding decision – Bruce Power's application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B nuclear generating stations, CNSC, May 7, 2026.

⁸⁸ CMD 26-H104, section 4.1.2.

⁸⁹ Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, page 12.

91. As part of engagement discussions, Bruce Power provided documentation in response to enquiries regarding thermal output, water intake, and impacts on fisheries.⁹⁰

3.4.3 Submissions by Indigenous Nations and Communities

Saugeen Ojibway Nation

92. In its submission, [CMD 26-H104.14](#), the SON emphasized its Aboriginal and treaty rights to a commercial fishery in the Georgian Bay and Lake Huron, which is within SON territory. The SON highlighted that “members of the SON and their ancestors have fished these waters for sustenance and as the basis of trade and commerce for hundreds of generations.”⁹¹
93. The SON did not oppose the proposed licensing basis amendment. The SON suggested conditions that, if the amendment were authorized, would require Bruce Power to “quantify, monitor, validate, mitigate, and adaptively manage the aquatic-related consequences” with the SON.⁹²
94. The SON also raised concerns about the accumulation of nuclear waste in its territory, noting that increasing reactor power would generate more spent nuclear fuel.⁹³

3.4.4 Conclusion on Indigenous engagement consultation

95. The Commission concludes that the duty to consult is not triggered by this licensing basis amendment application. Amending the licensing basis will not result in new adverse impacts to asserted or established Aboriginal or treaty rights.⁹⁴ The licensing basis amendment proposes to increase Bruce A and B power levels to IPLs that are within the existing reactor design of Bruce A and B.⁹⁵ The continued operation of Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs does not give rise to any new or novel potential adverse impacts that would trigger a duty to consult. The Commission is satisfied that the honour of the Crown has been upheld in this matter.
96. The Commission acknowledges that operation of Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs is anticipated to increase thermal discharges to Lake Huron, tritium releases,

⁹⁰ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, page 12.

⁹¹ CMD 26-H104.14, pages 5–6.

⁹² CMD 26-H104.14, page 10.

⁹³ CMD 26-H104.14, pages 8–9.

⁹⁴ *Rio Tinto Alcan v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council*, [2010 SCC 43](#), at paras 45 and 49; *Fond du Lac Denesuline First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2012 FCA 73.

⁹⁵ CMD 26-H104, page 16.

and onsite inventories of fresh and used nuclear fuel compared to the current operations. As previously discussed, the Commission finds that these increases are negligible and will be managed through Bruce Power's ongoing operations at Bruce A and B under CNSC regulatory oversight.

97. The Commission acknowledges SON's concerns regarding the potential increase in radioactive waste. The Commission concurs with Bruce Power's⁹⁶ and CNSC staff's⁹⁷ assessments that operating Bruce A and Bruce B at the proposed IPLs would shorten the units' operating lives and that, as a result, the total volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site would not increase.
98. The Commission has considered all the engagement activities undertaken by CNSC staff and Bruce Power, along with this public hearing process. Indigenous Nations and communities have been provided opportunities for exchanging information about their concerns and both CNSC staff and Bruce Power have shown that they are responsive to those concerns. The Commission also notes that the SON was awarded funding to participate in this proceeding and have established terms of reference with the CNSC.
99. The Commission is satisfied with CNSC staff's efforts to engage with Indigenous Nations and communities who may have an interest in Bruce Power's application before the Commission, and that intervenors had an opportunity to participate in this hearing. The Commission recognizes Canada's commitment to UNDRIP and the framework for reconciliation and implementation of UNDRIP set out within UNDA. The Commission has assessed the applicability of the duty to consult and accommodate regarding the proposed licensing basis amendment within the context of and with acknowledgement of UNDA.
100. The Commission is satisfied that Indigenous engagement activities undertaken by CNSC staff, engagement activities undertaken by Bruce Power, and this public hearing process all provided opportunities for learning about views of Indigenous Nations and communities regarding the impacts that the proposed licensing basis amendment may have on their established or asserted rights.

3.5 Other matters of regulatory importance

3.5.1 Decommissioning plans and financial guarantee

101. The Commission is satisfied that the current financial guarantee for Bruce A and B is acceptable for the activities authorized by its licence, including the proposed changes to the licensing basis amendment.

⁹⁶ ⁹⁶ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, section 3.11.

⁹⁷ CMD 26-H104, page 52.

102. The NSCA and its associated regulations require licensees to ensure safe decommissioning and long-term waste management. Accordingly, the Commission imposes a licence condition requiring a licensee to maintain a financial guarantee, in a form acceptable to the Commission, to ensure that sufficient resources are available for the safe and secure future decommissioning of a facility.
103. [REGDOC-3.3.1, Financial Guarantees for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and Termination of Licensed Activities](#),⁹⁸ provides guidance and requirements to licensees for establishing and maintaining acceptable financial guarantees. The Commission notes that in the case of Bruce A and B, OPG is responsible for decommissioning and that it is OPG that provides the financial guarantee. The Commission accepted the current financial guarantee for Bruce A and B in its [2022 Record of Decision](#).⁹⁹ The accepted revised financial guarantee remains in effect.
104. Under licence condition 11.2 of PROL 18.04/2028, Bruce Power is required to notify the Commission of any changes regarding the obligations of decommissioning and financial guarantees under the Lease Agreement with OPG, as described in licence condition 15.1.
105. In its application, Bruce Power noted there will be increased fuel stockpiling onsite and a 3% increase of used nuclear fuel resulting from the proposed licensing basis amendment. Operating Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs would shorten the units' operating lifetimes and, as a result, would not increase the total volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site. Impacts to decommissioning and financial guarantees would be routinely communicated to OPG.¹⁰⁰
106. The Commission is satisfied that the current financial guarantee for Bruce A and B remains acceptable for the activities authorized by its licence, including that the proposed changes to the licensing basis because the impacts are negligible. The proposed licensing basis amendment does not trigger changes beyond ongoing operations at Bruce A and B.

3.6 Licensing basis amendment

107. As described above, the Commission is satisfied that Bruce Power is qualified and has adequate programs in place to safely manage the licensing basis

⁹⁸ REGDOC-3.3.1, *Financial Guarantees for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and Termination of Licensed Activities*, CNSC, January 2021.

⁹⁹ Record of Decision, DEC 22-H104, *Application for Acceptance of Ontario Power Generation's Revised Consolidated Financial Guarantee*, CNSC, December 6, 2022.

¹⁰⁰ *Application to amend the licensing basis for Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Stations*, Bruce Power, August 19, 2025, pages 27–28.

amendment to increase reactor power at Bruce A and B up to IPLs. Therefore, the Commission amends the licensing basis for Bruce Power's Bruce A and B, authorizing an increase in reactor power of Bruce A and B to IPLs of up to 95.5% FP for Bruce A and up to 96.0% FP for Bruce B, subject to verification by CNSC staff as required by the RHP outlined below. The terms and conditions of PROL 18.04/2028 remain unchanged.

108. With this licensing basis amendment, the Commission expects CNSC staff to provide updates to the Commission on the status of each unit's power increase in its regular reporting to the Commission at public meetings through the status report on power reactors, when available.

3.6.1 Regulatory hold point

109. CNSC staff proposed a RHP as part of the licensing basis amendment to ensure operational readiness for the proposed Bruce A and B IPLs. In CMD 26-H104, section 3.15.3 and in the attached draft LCH,¹⁰¹ CNSC staff proposed a new¹⁰² RHP under licence condition 15.5,¹⁰³ that would confirm Bruce Power's readiness to operate Bruce A and B at the proposed IPLs: *Operation Beyond 92.5% Full Power for Bruce A and 93% Full Power for Bruce B*. Removal of this RHP would allow Bruce Power to operate Bruce A and B up to the proposed IPLs.
110. The proposed RHP includes the following compliance verifications pre-requisites to confirm operational readiness of Bruce A and B safety systems at the proposed IPLs:¹⁰⁴
- all safety analysis items completed
 - all online and outage design modifications installed
 - all documentation updated to support operation at IPLs
 - all training completed to support operation at IPLs
111. As described in CMD 26-H104, section 3.15.3, prior to release of the RHP, CNSC staff would verify Bruce Power's compliance with the pre-requisites for release of the RHP and provide a report to the Commission or person authorized by the Commission to remove the hold point.

¹⁰¹ CMD 26-H104, pages 389-390.

¹⁰² Bruce Power's PROL 18.04/2028, LCH 15.5 has 4 RHPs for the return to service of each unit undergoing Major Component Replacement.

¹⁰³ Licence condition 15.5, *Bruce Power shall obtain the approval of the Commission, or consent of a person authorized by the Commission, prior to the removal of established regulatory hold points.*

¹⁰⁴ CMD 26-H104, section 3.15.3.

3.6.2 Delegation of authority

112. The Commission delegates its authority for the administration of the new RHP under licence condition 15.5 to the following CNSC staff:

- Vice-President, Power Reactor and Nuclear Substance Regulation
- Vice-President, Advanced Reactor Technology and Nuclear Facility Regulation

113. The Commission notes that the delegation of authority is for the purpose of the administration of the licence condition. The Commission is satisfied that this approach is reasonable and notes that CNSC staff can bring any matter to the Commission as required.

4.0 CONCLUSION

114. The Commission has considered Bruce Power's application for amending the licensing basis to increase reactor power of Bruce A and B up to IPLs. The Commission has also considered the submissions from CNSC staff, Bruce Power and the written interventions received as part of this public hearing in writing. Based on its consideration of the evidence on the record, as set out above, the Commission amends the licensing basis for Bruce Power's power reactor operating licence, PROL 18.04/2028, to authorize an increase in reactor power of Bruce A and B up to IPLs: Bruce A to 95.5% FP; Bruce B to 96.0% FP, subject to the RHP imposed under licence condition 15.5, for which the administration has been delegated to CNSC staff as outlined above.

Dr. Timothy Berube
Commission Member
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Date

Appendix A — Intervenors

Intervenors	Document Number
Conexus Nuclear Inc.	<u>CMD 26-H104.2</u>
Ontario Power Generation Inc.	<u>CMD 26-H104.3</u>
Society of United Professionals	<u>CMD 26-H104.4</u>
Power Workers' Union	<u>CMD 26-H104.5</u>
Canadian Nuclear Isotope Council	<u>CMD 26-H104.6</u>
Candu Energy Inc.	<u>CMD 26-H104.7</u>
BWXT Canada Ltd.	<u>CMD 26-H104.8</u>
Canadian Nuclear Workers' Council	<u>CMD 26-H104.9</u>
Pollution Probe	<u>CMD 26-H104.10</u>
Kinectrics	<u>CMD 26-H104.11</u>
Women in Nuclear (WiN) Canada	<u>CMD 26-H104.12</u>
Canadian Environmental Law Association	<u>CMD 26-H104.13</u>
Saugeen Ojibway Nation	<u>CMD 26-H104.14</u>