Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission | Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire

UNCLASSIFIED/NON CLASSIFIÉ

SUPPLEMENTAL/COMPLÉMENTAIRE

CMD: 25-M9.A

Date signed/Signé le : 17 FEBRUARY 2025

Reference CMD(s)/CMD(s) de référence : 25-M9

Commission Request for Information

Demande d'information de la Commission

Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2023

Rapport de surveillance réglementaire des sites de centrales nucléaires au Canada : 2023

Public Meeting

Réunion publique

Scheduled for:

25 February 2025

Prévue pour :

25 février 2025

Submitted by:

CNSC Staff

Soumise par :

Le personnel de la CCSN

e-Doc 7430222 (WORD)
e-Doc 7465591 (PDF)

Canada

Summary

The purpose of this supplemental Commission Member Document (CMD) is to provide additional information to what is presented in CMD 25-M9, including:

- CNSC staff responses to key themes from interventions
- Updates on topics requested by the Commission and CNSC staff recommendations to close the requests
- Errata to CMD 25-M9

There are no decisions requested of the Commission. This CMD is for information only.

Résumé

L'objectif de ce CMD supplémentaire est d'apporter des informations supplémentaires à ce qui est présente dans le CMD 25-M9, comprenant:

- Les réponses du personnel de la CCSN aux commentaires reçus à travers les interventions
- Les mises à jour demandées par la Commission et les recommandations du personnel de la CCSN pour clore les demandes
- Les errata au CMD 25-M9

Aucune mesure n'est requise de la Commission. Ce CMD est fourni à titre d'information seulement.

Signed/signé le

[17 02 2025]

Digitally signed by Viktorov, Alexandre
DN: C=CA, O=GC, OU=CNSC-CCSN, CN="Viktorov, Alexandre"
Reason: I am approving this document
Location:
Date: 2025.02.17 12:25:07-05'00'
Foxit PDF Editor Version: 13.0.1

Alexandre Viktorov, PhD

Director General

Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation

Directeur général

Direction de la réglementation des centrales nucléaires

Digitally signed by Burton, Patrick
DN: C=CA, O=GC, OU=CNSC-CCSN, CN="Burton, Patrick"
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
Date: 2025.02.17 14:05:44-05'00'
Foxit PDF Editor Version: 13.0.1

Patrick Burton

Acting Director General

Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation

Directeur général par intérim

Direction de la réglementation du cycle et des installations nucléaires

This page was intentionally left blank.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CMD 25-M9.A is a supplemental CMD to the *Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2023 [1]* (hereafter referred to as the 2023 NPGS ROR).

This CMD provides CNSC staff responses to key themes identified from interventions received on the 2023 NPGS ROR. It also provides information requested by the Commission during previous Commission Proceedings. CNSC staff recommend that the four remaining action items outlined in Section 3 remain open.

Finally, section 4 of this CMD provides the errata that were identified during review of the 2023 NPGS ROR that will be corrected prior to its posting. Referenced documents in this CMD are available on the CNSC website.

1 OVERVIEW

The main purpose of this supplemental CMD is to:

- Address key themes from interventions on the 2023 NPGS ROR
- Describe how requests from the Commission for specific information have been addressed
- Identify errors in the 2023 NPGS ROR to be corrected before its posting

Documents referenced in this CMD are listed at the end and are available on the CNSC website.

Note that the 2023 NPGS ROR is meant to be read in tandem with an online document containing information deemed static in nature. This document is called *General Description of Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Generating Sites* [2].

2 RESPONSES TO INTERVENTIONS ON 2023 NPGS ROR

The CNSC received 21 interventions from the public, Indigenous Nations and communities, and civil society organizations concerning the 2023 NPGS ROR. CNSC staff reviewed all the interventions carefully. Clarifications and responses for key themes identified in the interventions, and within the scope of the 2023 NPGS ROR, are provided in the following table.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) [CMD 25-M9.9] Theme: Environmental Protection	CELA highlighted the Action Level exceedance of tritium oxide at Darlington and requested more details. CELA requested information on what caused the release; where the release occurred; how the Action Level exceedance was dealt with; and what is being done to prevent this from happening again in the future. For the week ending September 4, 2023, Darlington station released 6,479 Ci of tritium oxide which exceeded the station Action Limit of 2,670 Ci/week. The primary source of the emissions was from the Tritium Removal Facility (TRF) contributing 6,404 Ci of the total 6,479 Ci. Failed components in the Tritium Immobilization System valve box have been identified, and a repair schedule has been established. OPG formed a Significant Issue Resolution team to limit / cease further tritium loss to the environment, determine the cause(s) of the release and make necessary repairs. Strategies and procedures are now in place to operate key TRF systems, like the Air Clean-Up system, to limit further emissions. CNSC staff, along with OPG Operations, and Chemistry and Environmental staff, conducted a walkdown of the TRF and a field inspection to ensure the radiological effluent monitoring systems were in service, maintained and operating as designed. No issues were found. CNSC specialist staff reviewed the reportable event and identified no issues with the proposed corrective actions or implementation timeline. Action level (AL) is set at approximately 10% of the Derived Release Limit (DRL). This AL exceedance represents 19% of the DNGS operational DRL of 20,300 Ci/week for HTO for this specific week, indicated that the public was protected.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
Gordon W. Dalzell [CMD 25-M9.11] Theme: Update on Regulatory documents	Gordon W. Dalzell has expressed concern about the delay in updating and approving the new regulatory document in 2.12 series, especially given the critical importance of addressing cyber and conventional security threats globally. The existing *Nuclear Security Regulations* (NSR) are set to be repealed and replaced with new regulations, expected to be published in the Canada Gazette Part 2 between March and June 2025. A new regulatory document (REGDOC) for cyber security is being developed to provide guidance on meeting the new NSR requirements. This REGDOC, part of the 2.12 series, will be published after the new regulations are finalized. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is considering extending the review and comment period beyond 60 days. The REGDOCs in the 2.12 series will outline the requirements and guidance for complying with the new NSR provisions. Currently, the CNSC establishes regulatory expectations for cyber security for nuclear power plants (NPPs) through the license conditions handbook (LCH), which requires compliance with the CSA N290.7 standard (2014 version), "Cyber security for nuclear power plants and small reactor facilities". This standard was updated in 2021 and NPP licensees have conducted gap analysis and prepared implementation plans to meet the updated requirements of CSA N290.7:21. Once the NSR is approved and the new REGDOC in the 2.12 series is issued, the LCH will be updated to refer to the new REGDOC. For existing licensees, the new regulations will come into force two years from the date of registration, allowing time for licensees to collaborate with CNSC staff to implement the new requirements.
Three Fires Group, on behalf of the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation [CMD 25-M9.12] Theme: Environmental Protection	The intervenor requested that CNSC provide additional rationale to support the discontinuance of particulate emissions monitoring. OPG conducted a review of its Environmental Risk Assessment and Effluent Monitoring Program following CSA N288.6, Environmental risk assessments at nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills and CSA N288.5, Effluent and emissions monitoring programs at nuclear facilities standards. As part of this review, OPG also considered other relevant environmental assessments, radiation protection practices, and

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	airborne effluent monitoring results. OPG concluded that particulate emission monitoring at Dry Storage Container processing building could be discontinued. CNSC staff reviewed OPG's request and determined that the Maximum Probable Emission Rate (MPER) for the Western Waste Management Facility (WWMF) is below the performance monitoring requirement, indicating negligible risk from stack emissions. CNSC staff concurred with the change but recommended that OPG communicate this change to the Indigenous Nations and communities, and the public. As per CNSC staff recommendation, OPG included this change in the Q1 2023 Environmental Emissions Data report which was posted on OPG's website in 2023 for public and Indigenous Nations and communities' review.
Three Fires Group, on behalf of the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation [CMD 25-M9.12] Theme: Climate change analysis	In relation to the submission of Bruce Power 2023 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) update, the intervenor requested CNSC to confirm that the recent submissions on safety analysis consider future climate scenarios, the impacts of climate change, and the expected increase in extreme weather events. In 2023, Bruce Power submitted their 5-year PSA update. CNSC staff are reviewing it for regulatory compliance and best industry practices. As part of the 5-year update cycle, Bruce Power must reassess external hazards in their hazard screening analysis and PSA, using current climate data. For example, the High Wind PSA update includes recent meteorological data to ensure the analysis reflects current site conditions. CNSC's review will verify that Bruce Power PSA meets the applicable requirements, including the use of recent climate data.
Three Fires Group, on behalf of the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation [CMD 25-M9.12] Theme: Nuclear Waste Storage	The intervenors requested more clarity from the CNSC/OPG regarding the end state for the nuclear waste stored at the WWMF and Radioactive Waste Operations Site-1 (RWOS-1). The intervention suggested that the CNSC should indicate if the waste will be transferred to the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) Deep Geological Repository (DGR) or the Near Surface Disposal Facility at the Chalk River Laboratories.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	CNSC Staff have reviewed OPG's 2022 Preliminary Decommissioning Plans (PDP) for WWMF and RWOS-1 and concluded that they meet the regulatory requirements. In the PDP for RWOS-1, OPG states that much of the operational waste stored at RWOS-1 has been removed and was moved to the WWMF. Any residual stored waste will be retrieved prior to the start of decommissioning. OPG states in the PDP for WWMF: The radioactive waste stored at the WWMF, including Low and Intermediate Level Waste (L&ILW) and/or used fuel as applicable, will be removed from the facility prior to the beginning of the decommissioning. • Low Leve Waste (LLW) from the WWMF will be transferred on a campaign basis to a long-term disposal facility for LLW starting (2045). • Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) from the WWMF will be transferred for emplacement in a long-term disposal facility for ILW starting (2043). • All used fuel will be transferred from the WWMF to the Adaptive Phased Management (APM) DGR prior to decommissioning. Note: The above are OPG's planning assumptions for the PDP and are based on the required long-term disposal facilities for L&ILW and used fuel APM becoming available prior to the shutdown of the WWMF. OPG's next regular submission of PDPs for its facilities is 2027.
Three Fires Group, on behalf of the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation [CMD 25-M9.12] Theme: Cumulative environmental impacts and Indigenous rights in regulatory processes	Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation (CKSPFN) highlighted the following key themes related to Indigenous consultation and engagement in their intervention: • **The cumulative effects** of activities at the Bruce site on the environment and on the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Indigenous Nations. • **Improved Communication and Issues Tracking:** Recommendations for co-developing clear communication procedures between the CNSC, Bruce Power, Ontario Power Generation, and CKSPFN and the establishment of an issues tracking table. **Environmental cumulative effects:** While formalized cumulative effects assessments are not required under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, CNSC staff conduct thorough reviews, including environmental risk assessments every five

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	years and ongoing environmental monitoring, to evaluate cumulative effects and ensure the environment around the facility is protected. CNSC is committed to working with Indigenous Nations and communities to understand, assess and address their concerns with regards to cumulative effects as it relates to CNSC regulated facilities and activities. This can include support for Indigenous Nations in completing their own studies, data gathering and environmental sampling through the CNSC's capacity fund as appropriate. Additionally, CNSC collaborates with Nations on monitoring and oversight activities, including the CNSC's Independent Environmental Monitoring Program (IEMP). **Collaboration on CNSC Oversight and Reporting:** Interest in participating in environmental monitoring, reviewing assessments, and ensuring future climate change impacts are integrated into safety and planning frameworks. CNSC staff note that these themes represent overarching observations of the issues raised in the intervention. CNSC staff commit to responding to each concern within an issue tracking table, as requested, which will be collaboratively developed with CKSPFN. CNSC staff endeavour to share information in a timely and clear fashion. CNSC staff send CKSPFN notifications through email and follow up phone calls regarding nuclear engagement activities, updates for projects of interest and funding opportunities regarding CNSC facilities. In these communications, the CNSC staff offer to hold project-specific meetings with experts available to discuss any topics of interest. CNSC staff met virtually with representatives and members of CKSPFN twice in 2023 and eight times in 2024, as well as an in-person session with interested community members in November 2024 to introduce the CNSC's role and initiate dialogue at the community level. CKSPFN has applied for and received funding through the CNSC's Indigenous and Stakeholder Capacity Fund (ISCF) to support their engagement and information sharing with the CNSC. To date, a formal Terms of Reference agreement or regular meetings have not been established with CKSPFN, but the CNSC remains interested in these activities with CKSPFN.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	CNSC acknowledges the importance of working with and including Indigenous Nations and communities in environmental monitoring, regulatory reviews, and compliance oversight. The CNSC provides several opportunities for collaboration, including: • Collaboratively developing community-specific workplans and relationship arrangements. • Meeting in person and virtually with representatives, communities and/or leadership to listen, learn about issues, share information, seek solutions, and identify collaborative ways of bringing those issues before the Commission. • Inclusion of Indigenous Nations and communities in the CNSC's Independent Environmental Monitoring Program. • The timely sharing of information via collaboratively established channels. • Considering and reflecting Indigenous Knowledge in the CNSC's assessments and processes, which can include collaboration on key sections of reports. • Offering opportunities and support to participate in Commission proceedings and revising proceeding practices to incorporate feedback received from Indigenous Nations and communities. • Participating in and coordinating workshops and open houses, information sessions, and/or webinars. • Discussing issues, concerns and topics of interest and working to track and address them in a mutually agreeable way. • Provision of funding through the CNSC's Participant Funding Program and the ISCF to support participation in CNSC processes. The CNSC is committed to working with CKSPFN to support them in the opportunities CNSC provides, including collaboration on reports of interest. The CNSC is also committed to continuing conversations on how we can improve and expand on these opportunities. CNSC staff commit to further discussions to gain a better understanding of the concerns raised, how the CKSPFN would like to be involved in CNSC processes, and how we may collaborate on a path forward to address them.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc. (PRGI) [CMD 25-M9.13] Theme: Collaborative Relationships and Addressing Concerns through Continuous Engagement	CNSC staff note that the themes raised in the intervention represent overarching observations of the issues. Specific concerns and detailed responses are outlined in the issues tracking table, which is collaboratively developed with PRGI. CNSC staff appreciate PRGI's feedback and are committed to ongoing two-way dialogue to better understand each other's perspectives. As a life-cycle regulator, the CNSC believes in building and maintaining positive long-term relationships with Indigenous Nations and communities based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership. The CNSC is committed to working to address the concerns raised in PRGI's intervention and collaboratively addressing those concerns to the greatest extent possible. CNSC staff have made an effort to engage with PRGI on the concerns through regular meetings and through responses in the issues tracking table that CNSC staff maintain and send to PRGI for their review and input. CNSC staff acknowledge that not all concerns have been addressed to date, but that progress has been and will continue to be made. CNSC staff note that there are times when CNSC staff and PRGI will have to disagree on points if a common ground cannot be achieved through ongoing dialogue and engagement. CNSC staff have indicated to PRGI that these differing views will be documented in the issues tracking table and that each party has the ability to present their differing views to the Commission, who will take into consideration all evidence and information submitted to it as part of a proceeding. The CNSC recognizes that at the time of the original siting and development of the Point Lepreau site, there was not a meaningful consultation process with Indigenous Nations and communities in line with today's standards and requirements. CNSC staff are working to ensure that there is a more positive relationship and collaboration moving forward and encourage New Brunswick Power and PRGI to continue to work together regarding this concern as well. The CNSC is supporting the Government of Canada's implementation of United Nations Declaration Act (UNDA) and UNDA Action Plan and ensures the CNSC's processes are in line with the changing policy, legal and legislative

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	landscape. The CNSC strives to achieve a consensus through consultation approaches that allow for open dialogue and provides opportunities to understand, document, and address the concerns of Indigenous Nations and communities, including measures to minimize or avoid potential impacts to their Rights and interests, to the extent possible. CNSC staff and PRGI have had discussions on the CNSC's approach to consultation and implementation on UNDA during regularly scheduled meetings. CNSC staff are committed to continuing to make efforts to address these concerns, including by: • Having focused policy discussions with PRGI. • Collaborating on the approach to consultation on applications that raise the Duty to Consult within the Passamaquoddy traditional territory, including creating consultation plans. • Continuing to update the PRGI specific issues tracking table and seek solutions to resolve the issues/concerns raised. CNSC staff acknowledge the concerns raised regarding the CNSC's phased to licensing and how it is a barrier to fulsome comprehension from PRGI's perspective. However, regarding the scope of Commission hearings, each specific item in front of the Commission has a specific scope and purpose to provide clarity for the decisions the Commission needs to make as per the CNSC's regulatory framework and regulations. CNSC staff note that our processes will continue to evolve and incorporate feedback; the CNSC staff is revamping the ROR and have made several changes to the NPGS ROR over the years based on feedback we have received from interveners including Indigenous Nations and communities. CNSC staff have responded to all PRGIs recommendations and comments made in relation to the 2022 and 2023 ROR and, as part of incorporating feedback received, CNSC staff added an appendix which summarizes the issues and concerns (as PRGI noted in their intervention). CNSC staff look forward to continuing discussions with PRGI on this topic and incorporating feedback received into subsequent RORs where appropriate.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	CNSC staff look forward to continuing to consult, engage and build a relationship with PRGI.

Note: the intervention from the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation was received after the intervention deadline and therefore CNSC staff did not have the opportunity to provide a response to their comments in this CMD but will be able to do so as part of the Commission meeting for the ROR should the Commission have questions.

3 FOLLOW UP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM THE COMMISSION

The Commission requests specific information to be presented in future NPGS ROR's. The following table describes how specific requests for information from the Commission have been addressed*. Where appropriate, the table indicates the requests for which CNSC staff find that the action is complete and recommend closure of the request.

Action	CNSC staff response
[RIB 14757] Inform the Commission of updates relating to: (i) Bruce Power's pressure tube fracture toughness model, and (ii) Report on the maximum [Heq] of the pressure tubes as part of the NPP ROR.	An update related to Bruce Power's pressure tube fracture toughness model and reporting on the maximum High Equivalent Quality (Heq) is provided in Appendix G of the 2023 NPGS ROR. Item (i) was closed in 2023. Regular updates on the status of industry's research and development program on elevated [Heq] are provided to the Commission through the Status Report on Power Reactors. (ii) remains open, CNSC staff will continue to update the Commission on the maximum [Heq] of the pressure tubes as part of the NPP ROR.
[RIB 14761] Monitor Bruce Power's continuing efforts to bring internal fire risk to below the safety goal target for the Bruce A Units, and report on Bruce Power's progress regarding internal fire risk improvements at the Bruce A station in the Annual NPGS ROR.	An update related to the efforts to bring internal fire risk to below the safety goal target for the Bruce A Units is provided in section 2.5.4 of the 2023 NPGS ROR. Bruce Power submitted their updated 2024 Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in April 2024. This submission is currently under review by CNSC staff. The review is expected to be completed by mid-2025, following the receipt of additional requested information from OPG. **CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open at least until the 2024 Fire PSA update is reviewed by CNSC staff.**
[RIB 14753] Following the 2018 Bruce A and B licence renewal hearing, the Commission requested updates from CNSC staff on the status of the major component replacement (MCR) in	Status of the MCR is addressed in section 2.5 of the 2023 NPGS ROR. As requested, CNSC staff will continue to update the Commission on the status of the MCR.

Action	CNSC staff response
NPP Status Reports, as well as the NPGS ROR. In addition, the Commission requested to be informed of any significant changes to the plans, schedules, or any other work related to the MCR - should it occur before or after October 31, 2019.	**CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.**
[RIB 25788] Update the Commission on licensees' response to the Heq discovery at Bruce NGS.	An update related to the licensees' response to the Heq discovery at Bruce NGS is provided in Appendix G of the 2023 NPGS ROR. **CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.**

* CNSC staff capture such important requests in the Regulatory Information Bank (RIB). The RIB numbers in this supplemental CMD refer to specific entries in this database, which CNSC staff track to closure.

4 ERRATA

Some minor errors in the 2023 NPGS ROR were identified through reviews by CNSC staff, licensees, and intervenors. Prior to publication, the following errors will be corrected in the report:

- In section 1.7 in table 2 and 3 there were a couple of incorrect numbers. The correct updated numbers are in bold in the tables below

Table 2: Total Number of Each Type of Inspection and Findings per NPP in 2023

Site	# of Type I inspections	# of Type II Inspections	# of Desktop Inspections	# of Field Inspections	# of Findings[1]
Darlington	0	13	**5**	86	**313**
DWMF	0	2	1	0	46
Pickering	0	**21**	**5**	44	**429**
PWMF	0	1	1	0	34
Bruce	1	**24**	2	47	**337**
WWMF	0	4	1	0	109
RWOS-1	0	0	0	0	0
Point Lepreau	0	**12**	**4**	48	284
Gentilly-2	0	4	0	0	54
Total	**1**	**81**	19	**225**	**1606**

Tables 5, 10, 15 and 20 will also be updated in the 2023 NPGS ROR before publication to reflect the correct information from Table 2 above.

Table 3: Total number of events reported to CNSC staff in the last three years per site

Site	# of Events in 2023	# of Events in 2022	# of Events in 2021
Darlington NGS	29	40	60
Darlington WMF	4	1	2
Pickering NGS	44	38	48
Pickering WMF	1	1	2
Bruce NGS A and B	87	67	92
Western WMF	3	0	5
Point Lepreau NGS	22	44	29
Gentilly-2	11	0	2
RWOS-1	0	0	0
Total	**201**	191	**240**

- In section 2.1.1, under the third bullet, the following statement was incorrect: "CNSC staff note that corrective actions to address non-compliances for the Management System SCA could be improved."

The statement was incomplete and was in reference to a specific finding from a Type II inspection finding (Problem and Event Cause and Resolution Effectiveness Investigation and Trend Analysis program), which identified areas where OPG's processes could be improved to meet the compliance requirements outlined in its internal procedures. In response, OPG addressed these issues by updating its procedures and processes to improve the clarity and accountability of its corrective action plans. CNSC staff reviewed and accepted these corrective actions, formally closing out the inspection in February 2024.

- In section 2.1.6 Fitness for Service for Darlington NPP it is mentioned that: "In 2023, the critical corrective maintenance backlog, deficient maintenance backlog and the number of critical preventive maintenance deferrals were zero." Instead, the text should state: "In 2023, the critical corrective maintenance backlog, deficient maintenance backlog and the number of critical preventive maintenance deferrals were very low."
- In section 2.5.1 Management System for Bruce Power the correct number of findings is indicated below:



- In section 2.4, Pickering Waste Management Facility, the date that the licence was last issued or amended is April 2018, not July 2020.
- In section 2.6 Western Waste Management Facility, Table 18, one non-compliant finding was mistakenly identified as compliant. The correct updated numbers are in bold in the table below:

Table 18: Summary of the number of inspections performed for WWMF (Full inspection list found in Appendix A: List of Inspections reports at each NPP and WMF)

Type 1	Type 2	Desktop	Field	Number of findings
0	4	1	0	Compliant: 9**5** Non-Compliant: **14** Total: 109

- In Section 2.6.2, Human Performance Management for Western Waste Management Facility, the correct number of compliant findings was two, not three.

- In Section 2.6.3, Operating Performance for Western Waste Management Facility, the correct number of compliant findings was seven, not six. The corrected version of the chart is shown below:



- In Section 2.6.7, Radiation Protection for Western Waste Management Facility, the correct number of compliant findings was six, not seven, and the correct number of low safety significance findings was two, not one. The corrected version of the chart is shown below:



- In Section 2.6.10, Emergency Management and Fire Protection for Western Waste Management Facility, review of one reportable event was mistakenly referenced. There was no reportable event under this SCA for the Western Waste Management Facility in 2023.
- In section 2.7 Point Lepreau Overview, table 21, the number of inspection with primary focus on the SCA are incorrect. The correct numbers are provided below in **bold**.

Table 21: 2023 Rating and number of inspections for PLNGS per SCA: total inspections covering an SCA and inspections with a primary focus on the SCA (primary focus figures in parentheses)

SCA	Rating	Number of Type 1 inspections	Number of Type 2 inspections	Number of Desktop inspections
Management System	Satisfactory	0	12 **(0)**	4**(0)**
Human Performance	Satisfactory	0	12 **(0)**	4 **(3)**

Operating Performance	Satisfactory	0	10 **(4)**	2
Safety Analysis	Satisfactory	0	2	0
Physical Design	Satisfactory	0	5 **(1)**	1
Fitness for Service	Satisfactory	0	10 **(3)**	0
Radiation Protection	Satisfactory	0	5 **(1)**	0
Conventional Health and Safety	Satisfactory	0	5 **(0)**	0
Environmental Protection	Satisfactory	0	4 **(2)**	0
Emergency Preparedness and Fire Protection	Satisfactory	0	3	1 **(1)**
Waste Management	Satisfactory	0	1 **(1)**	0
Security	Satisfactory	0	3	0

- Inspection DRPD-2023-18338 REACTIVE Public Address System Field Inspection Report, was incorrectly reported in Appendix A3 under Pickering NGS Inspections, where it should have been reported as Emergency Management SCA, as a Darlington NGS inspection in Appendix A1.

- The totals in Table 31 of the 2023 NPGS ROR were incorrect, the correct numbers are highlighted in bold in the table below:

Table 31: Number of unplanned transients in 2023

NPPs	Number of operating reactors[3]	Number of hours of operation	Un-planned reactor trips[1]	Step-backs	Set-backs	Total unplanned transients	Number of trips per 7,000 operating hours
DNGS	4	19,885	2	0	3	5	0.35
PNGS 1, 4	2	15,488	0	0	1	1	0.00
PNGS 5–8	4	28,763	1	0	4	5	0.24
BNGS A	4	26,518	0	2	4	6	0.00
BNGS B	4	26,472	0	2	4	6	0.00
PLNGS	1	7,429	0	0	0	0	0.00
Industry total	**19**	**124,555**	**3**	**4**	**16**	**23**	**0.17**

- The table in Appendix G had some incorrect values for PNGS site. The correct values are included **in bold** in the below:

Unit	Status as of January 1st 2024			Future situation			
	EFPH	Predicted maximum [H]eq, ppm[1]	Existing fracture toughness model valid?[2,3]	Key date	Anticipated Target EFPH	Predicted maximum [H]eq, ppm[1]	Existing fracture toughness model valid?[2,3]
DNGS Unit 1	Undergoing refurbishment			Undergoing refurbishment			
DNGS Unit 2	29,118	No measurements since refurbished		Unit has been refurbished	210,000[4]	No measurements since refurbished	
DNGS Unit 3	4,252	No measurements since refurbished		Unit has been refurbished	250,000[4]	No measurements since refurbished	
DNGS Unit 4	Undergoing refurbishment			Undergoing refurbishment			
PNGS Unit 1	177,943	96[5]	Yes	Sep 2024	185,000	**99[5]**	Yes
PNGS Unit 4	151,221	**73[5]**	Yes	Dec 2024	161,500	**78[5]**	Yes
PNGS Unit 5	271,159	**115[5]**	Yes	Sep 2026[6]	297,500	**127[5]**	Yes[7]
PNGS Unit 6	278,429	**108[5]**	Yes	Sep 2026[6]	305,000	**119[5]**	Yes[7]
PNGS Unit 7	272,484	**110[5]**	Yes	Sep 2026[6]	298,000	**121[5]**	Yes[7]
PNGS Unit 8	255,284	**102[5]**	Yes	Sep 2026[6]	283,000	**112[5]**	Yes[7]
BNGS Unit 1	79,822	53.8	Yes	2044 (End of Service)	234,000	89.3	Yes

BNGS Unit 2	79,304	53.9	Yes	2044 (End of Service)	234,000	90.4	Yes
BNGS Unit 3	242,326	N/A	Yes	Unit undergoing refurbishment		N/A	N/A
BNGS Unit 4	242,669	106.9	Yes	2025 (Refurbishment)	251,000	110.4	Yes
BNGS Unit 5	275,368	99.1	Yes	2026 (Refurbishment)	300,000	107.4	Yes
BNGS Unit 6	2,526	N/A	Yes	Unit has been refurbished		N/A	N/A
BNGS Unit 7	268,467	98.5	Yes	2028 (Refurbishment)	300,000	108.3	Yes
BNGS Unit 8	252,555	91.9	Yes	2030 (Refurbishment)	300,000	117.0	Yes
PLNGS	77, 750	64	Yes	Unit has been refurbished			Yes

- Other minor editorial changes will be made to the 2023 NPGS ROR prior to their publication on the Open Government website.

REFERENCES

1. *Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2023*, CMD 25-M9
2. *General Description of Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Generating Sites*

GLOSSARY

For definitions of terms used in this document, see *REGDOC-3.6, Glossary of CNSC Terminology*, which includes terms and definitions used in the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act* and the Regulations made under it, and in CNSC regulatory documents and other publications.