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SUPPLEMENTAL/COMPLÉMENTAIRE

CMD: 23-M36.B

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Commission Request for Information

Demande d'information de la  
Commission

***Regulatory Oversight  
Report for Canadian  
Nuclear Power  
Generating Sites: 2022***

***Rapport de surveillance  
réglementaire des sites  
de centrales nucléaires  
au Canada : 2022***

Public Meeting

Réunion publique

Scheduled for:

13 December 2023

Prévue pour :

13 décembre 2023

Submitted by:

CNSC Staff

Soumise par :

Le personnel de la CCSN

**Summary**

The purpose of this supplemental Commission Member Document (CMD) is to provide additional information to what is presented in CMD 23-M36, including:

- CNSC staff responses to key themes from interventions
- Updates on topics requested by the Commission and CNSC staff recommendations to close the requests
- Errata to CMD 23-M36

There are no decisions requested of the Commission. This CMD is for information only.

**Résumé**

L'objectif de ce CMD supplémentaire est d'apporter des informations supplémentaires à ce qui est présente dans le CMD 23-M36, comprenant:

- Les réponses du personnel de la CCSN aux commentaires reçus à travers les interventions
- Les mises à jour demandées par la Commission et les recommandations du personnel de la CCSN pour clore les demandes
- Les errata au CMD 23-M36

Aucune mesure n'est requise de la Commission. Ce CMD est fourni à titre d'information seulement.

**Signed/signé le**

[06 12 2023]

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CMD 23-M36.B is a supplemental CMD to the *Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2022* (hereafter referred to as the 2022 NPGS ROR). This CMD provides CNSC staff responses to key themes identified from interventions received on the 2022 NPGS ROR. It also provides information requested by the Commission during previous Commission Proceedings. CNSC staff recommend that the Commission close five of the action items described in Section 3. Finally, section 4 of this CMD provides the errata that were identified during review of the 2022 NPGS ROR that will be corrected prior to its posting. Referenced documents in this CMD are available on the external CNSC website.

## 1 OVERVIEW

The main purpose of this supplemental CMD is to:

- address key themes from interventions on the 2022 NPGS ROR
- describe how requests from the Commission for specific information have been addressed, and propose closing five of those requests
- identify errors in the 2022 NPGS ROR to be corrected before its posting

Documents referenced in this CMD are listed at the end and are available on the external CNSC website.

Note that the 2022 NPGS ROR is meant to be read in tandem with an online document containing information deemed static in nature. This document is called *General Description of Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Generating Sites* [2].

## 2 RESPONSES TO INTERVENTIONS ON 2022 NPGS ROR

The CNSC received 18 interventions from the public, Indigenous Nations and communities, and civil society organizations concerning the 2022 NPGS ROR, with 6 of those interventions on the mid-term update for Pickering NGS. CNSC staff reviewed all of the interventions carefully. Clarifications and responses for key themes identified in the interventions, and within the scope of the 2022 NPGS ROR, are provided in the following table. A separate table was included for the interventions related to the mid-term update for Pickering NGS.

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
<p>Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) [CMD 23-M36.4] Theme: Climate change impacts</p>	<p>CELA highlighted the impacts of climate change on nuclear reactors and pointed out that climate-related hazards such as heat waves, floods, droughts, storms, lightning events, and wildfires can pose challenges to nuclear safety. CELA emphasized that rising temperatures could threaten nuclear reactors as they often rely on large external sources of water for cooling. CELA stressed the need for more localized studies and analyses to accurately assess the impact of climate change on nuclear reactors in Canada. CELA also noted a gap in addressing the increased risks to Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operations due to climate change impacts such as wildfires, lightning events, or extreme heat events.</p> <p>The CNSC regulatory framework requires licensees and proponents to consider climate change primarily through requirements related to frequent environmental and safety assessments. These assessments take place throughout the licensing lifecycle as part of the licence application, licence renewal and periodic safety review process. Thus, climate change considerations are considered at a regular frequency throughout the licence lifecycle, regardless of the licence duration.</p> <p>The need for considering climate change is fully recognized and addressed through periodic assessments using various regulatory mechanisms, including Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs). Every 10 years, per REGDOC-2.3.3, <i>Periodic Safety Reviews</i>, licensees of nuclear power plants are required to conduct PSRs in order to evaluate the design, condition, and operation of the facility.</p> <p>Every 5 years, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is updated and includes analysis of external hazards, such as flooding, and their impact on a facility. CNSC staff verify that up-to-date hazard information is included.</p> <p>Also, every 5 years, licensees are required to update their environmental risk assessment (ERA), in accordance with</p>



Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<p>CSA N288.6, <i>Environmental risk assessments at Class I nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills</i> and REGDOC 2.9.1, <i>Environmental Protection: Environmental Principles, Assessments and Protection Measures</i>. The ERA evaluates the facility's impact on the environment under normal operating conditions. With each sequential update, it also factors in any changing environmental conditions that could be attributed to climate change and whether there has been any change to the environmental risk profile of the facility as a result, with built-in conservatism.</p> <p>CNSC staff are currently undertaking a pilot project with the Pickering Nuclear Site Environmental Protection Review Report (EPRR) to incorporate a new section dedicated to climate change. This initiative is in response to the growing interest and concern about climate change among intervenors. Furthermore, CNSC staff are open to and welcome any feedback on this new section, as it will help us improve and refine future EPRRs, which are reviewed and revised every five years or earlier. The Pickering EPRR is expected to be published on the CNSC external website in early 2024.</p>
<p>Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) [CMD 23-M36.4] Theme: KI pills pre-distribution and updates from the working group</p>	<p>CELA commented on the adequacy of potassium iodide (KI) pill distribution and highlight the ongoing discussions within the KI Pill Working Group. CELA calls for an expansion of the KI pill pre-distribution area from 10 km to 50 km, especially for vulnerable populations like children. CELA also recommends discussing KI pill distribution requirements and updates from the KI Pill Working Group.</p> <p>Following the June 25-29, 2018, public hearing for licence renewal of Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, the KI Pill Working Group and Advisory Committee were established by the CNSC. The work of the KI Pill Working Group was divided into two (2) phases:</p> <p>Phase I of the project was completed on January 26, 2023, when CNSC staff presented the <a href="#">Phase I report</a> to the Commission at a public meeting [CMD 22-M6]. The objectives of Phase I included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identifying current provincial and federal requirements for the distribution of KI pills</li> <li>• Describing existing considerations and education concerning KI pill emergency distribution in the Ingestion Planning Zone (IPZ)</li> <li>• Describing the means of KI pill distribution in relation to other factors associated with a nuclear emergency response</li> </ul>

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reviewing the availability and scope of public emergency preparedness information related to KI pills</li> </ul> <p>In August 2022, Emergency Management Ontario (EMO), in conjunction with the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, proposed a revised approach to Phase II outlined in CMD 22-M25, where EMO would lead Phase II instead of CNSC and consider the associated objectives while drafting the update to the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP). The objectives of Phase II include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determine the feasibility of pre-distribution of KI pills to all schools within the IPZ</li> <li>• Establish clear and detailed plans for the distribution of KI pills throughout the IPZ, if necessary, following the completion of Phase I</li> </ul> <p>The PNERP update will undergo a public review period led by EMO, at which time the CNSC will coordinate meetings with the KI Pill Working Group and the Advisory Committee to discuss the update and potential comments from the public review. At this time, the CNSC understands the PNERP update is expected by the end of 2024.</p>
<p>Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) [CMD 23-M36.4] Theme: Emergency management</p>	<p>CELA commented on the transparency of, and safety measures in, the Pickering NGS emergency management program. The intervenor highlighted inconsistencies between pre-fire plans and on-site conditions at the plant. CELA requested more information about a specific fire event on February 22, 2022, and updates on planned drills for offsite emergency centers.</p> <p>Pre-fire plans identify hazards and equipment locations for fire response. CNSC staff conducted two field inspections on Units 1 &amp; 4 and Units 5 &amp; 6 and found discrepancies in equipment locations. OPG updated the plans, which were verified by CNSC staff. As part of the compliance verification program, CNSC staff continue to verify that these plans and the fire response equipment are adequately maintained.</p> <p>On February 22, 2022, a fire incident occurred due to a screen wash pump issue. OPG identified the cause as poor quality in motor rewinding by a vendor in 2014. Corrective actions were taken, including investigating vendor quality assurance programs, and initiating preventative maintenance on screen wash pump motors, which CNSC staff found satisfactory.</p> <p>OPG maintains the monitoring and decontamination unit at seven (7) offsite support centers (OSCs). As part of CNSC compliance program, these OSCs are inspected to ensure that</p>

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<p>equipment is maintained adequately to ensure response readiness. CNSC staff inspected the Delpark Homes OSC in 2022 and found that this and several other OSCs hadn't undergone required testing over a five-year period. CNSC staff also identified contradictory statements in OPG's documentation about testing frequencies. As a result, an action item was raised and to track the three notices of non-compliance issued. OPG has committed to address these issues, including proposing plans for testing at specific OSCs and closing the gap in testing all OSCs within a five-year period, by December 1, 2023.</p>
<p>Gordon Dalzell [CMD 23-M36.11] Theme: Random alcohol and drug testing ruling</p>	<p>The intervenor expressed support for the implementation of REGDOC-2.2.4, <i>Fitness for Duty, Volume II: Managing Alcohol and Drug Use, Version 3</i>, and showed interest in the latest information on the <i>Power Workers' Union et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et al.</i> case, in which four nuclear energy workers unions and some affected individuals (the Applicants) are challenging the constitutionality of the REGDOC and its implementation.</p> <p>As mentioned in Section 2.2 of the 2022 NPGS ROR, on January 21, 2022, the Federal Court granted an injunction putting on hold the implementation of pre-placement and random alcohol and drug testing pending the disposition of the Federal Court's judicial review. On June 6, 2023, the Federal Court released its decision dismissing the judicial review and upholding the validity of the REGDOC. The Applicants are appealing this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal.</p> <p>On October 27, 2023, the Federal Court of Appeal granted the Applicants' motion to stay the implementation of the pre-placement and random testing provisions of the REGDOC pending the determination of the appeal. As such, CNSC staff have withdrawn the actions on all applicable licensees to implement random and pre-placement testing by December 1, 2023, and will revisit the implementation timelines once a decision from the Federal Court of Appeal is received.</p>
<p>Nuclear Transparency Project (NTP) [CMD 23-M36.12] Theme: Licensees' environmental data</p>	<p>NTP requested that CNSC staff preparing the NPGS ROR look into the feasibility and desirability of providing summaries of environmental data in its ROR similar to what is done in RORs for uranium and nuclear substance processing facilities and uranium mines and mills.</p> <p>CNSC staff acknowledge the request and will consider its application for future RORs.</p>

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
<p>Nuclear Transparency Project (NTP)</p> <p>[CMD 23-M36.12]</p> <p>Theme: Standardization of licensees' environmental data</p>	<p>NTP is advocating for greater transparency and standardization in the way the licensees share environmental data with the public through online applications. They express concerns about the clarity and completeness of the data presented in these online applications (apps) that share environmental data and emphasize the need for the CNSC to ensure that these apps do not confuse or mislead the public.</p> <p>CNSC will collaborate with the licensees and members of the public to facilitate the optimized presentation of environmental data that is made publicly available by licensees. However, CNSC does not plan to regulate the information shared by the licensees in their online applications that share environmental data.</p>
<p>Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc. (PRGI)</p> <p>[CMD 23-M36.13]</p> <p>Theme: Ongoing Discussion of Concerns</p>	<p>PRGI reiterated concerns from their 2021 NPGS ROR intervention and indicated that PRGI's view is that some of the responses from CNSC staff were concerning, not fully addressed and/or that PRGI did not agree with the responses provided. PRGI highlights new observations, requests for information and additional concerns from their review of the 2022 NPGS ROR. PRGI also raises concerns with CNSC staff's recommendation that certain topics could be discussed further at future meetings, with no specific deadline to have those discussions.</p> <p>CNSC staff developed an issue tracking table which captures all issues and concerns raised by PRGI in their 2021 NPGS ROR intervention. The issue tracking table was shared exclusively with PRGI and updates to the format of the table were made based on feedback from PRGI. In 2022, CNSC staff provided responses to all issues raised in PRGI's 2021 NPGS ROR intervention and offered to have a specific meeting to further discuss and address the issues, comments and recommendations. CNSC staff have since been updating the issues tracking table as additional concerns are raised and sharing updated versions of the issues tracking table with PRGI, with responses provided. CNSC staff are committed to continuing to track issues and provide meaningful responses, including for the issues raised in PRGI's 2022 NPGS ROR intervention.</p> <p>As mentioned by PRGI, there are some topics that CNSC staff have recommended for further discussion at future meetings. CNSC staff and PRGI have been having focused meetings on topics of interest and concern raised by PRGI. CNSC staff acknowledge that not all topics have been discussed to date but are of the view that progress on this has been and continues to</p>

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<p>be made. CNSC staff remain committed to fulsome discussions on PRGI's issues and concerns, based on priorities identified by PRGI.</p> <p>CNSC staff acknowledge and respect the different cultural perspectives, worldviews and knowledge systems unique to Indigenous Nations and communities. CNSC staff remain committed to working collaboratively with PRGI to look for solutions where PRGI and CNSC have differing views. However, there are times when CNSC staff and PRGI will have to disagree on particular points, if a common ground cannot be achieved through ongoing dialogue and engagement. CNSC staff have indicated to PRGI that these differing views will be documented in the issues tracking table and that each party has the ability to present their differing views to the Commission who will take into consideration all evidence and information submitted to it as part of a proceeding.</p>
<p>Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc. (PRGI)</p> <p>Gordon Dalzell</p> <p>[CMD 23-M36.13 and CMD 23-M36.11]</p> <p>Theme: Details on the Fisheries Act Authorization (FAA)</p>	<p>PRGI requested more detailed information regarding the Fisheries Act Authorization (FAA) that NB Power received in 2022. They express concern about the limited attention given to this authorization, especially considering that NB Power operated without it prior to 2022. PRGI highlights the significance of this authorization, which directly affects the fish and macroinvertebrates due to impingement and entrainment and includes limits on water withdrawal and the requirement to notify and provide corrective action plans if conditions are not met. PRGI requested to be notified by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) of any non-compliance with the authorization. Additionally, PRGI stresses the need for engagement and meaningful involvement in subsequent Fisheries Act authorizations, particularly in light of proposed new nuclear projects at the Point Lepreau site. PRGI emphasize the importance of early and full engagement before any new licenses are granted at the site.</p> <p>Gordon Dalzell in his intervention pointed out that the 2022 NPGS ROR only briefly acknowledges the granted FAA for Point Lepreau, a departure from more detailed descriptions of the FAA status for the other sites.</p> <p>On August 23, 2022, DFO granted NB Power an FAA to withdraw water from the Bay of Fundy for the operation of the cooling water system of a single unit CANDU reactor. The FAA covers the impacts on fish, through impingement and entrainment, and includes mitigation measures such as volume and velocity limits, and a velocity cap. The manner in which the CNSC takes into account the requirements of the <i>Fisheries</i></p>

Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<p><i>Act</i> is outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding that has been signed between the DFO and the CNSC [3]. NB Power requested an amendment to increase the volume and velocity limits, which was issued on November 7, 2023. DFO notified Indigenous communities of the amendment.</p> <p>NB Power is currently preparing the first annual report in accordance with the FAA, which DFO will review upon receipt. DFO plans to share any non-compliance with the FAA in their annual reports and will continue to consult Indigenous communities on any new FAA related requests.</p>
<p>Hiawatha First Nation [CMD 23-M36.15] Theme: Improving Report Language and Indigenous Engagement Practices</p>	<p>Hiawatha First Nation raised concerns around the lack of consistency between the various RORs in terms of language used, information included and how engagement and consultation with Indigenous Nations and communities is conveyed and characterized. Hiawatha First Nation raised concerns regarding:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The language, terminology and literary styles used in the report that diminish and obscure the distinct rights of Indigenous Peoples and the responsibilities of the Crown, as well as historicize the presence of First Nations</li> <li>• The land acknowledgements included in the ROR</li> <li>• ROR not describing obligations under First Nation and Canadian legislation, Treaty, regulation, and policies to consult and engage with First Nation Rights-holders meaningfully</li> <li>• ROR lacking distinctions between First Nations Rights-holder and Indigenous Interest-holders, as well as between engagement and consultation activities</li> </ul> <p>CNSC staff appreciate the feedback and recommendations from Hiawatha First Nation. CNSC staff have made many updates to the language used, format and information included in the CNSC’s reports based on feedback from Indigenous Nations and communities. Examples of this includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Having a separate “Indigenous consultation and engagement” section.</li> <li>• Removing the term “Indigenous groups”.</li> <li>• Updating land acknowledgements based on feedback from Indigenous Nations and communities.</li> <li>• Providing Indigenous Nations and communities, who have Terms of Reference for Long-Term Engagement with the CNSC, with the opportunity to provide feedback on licensees’ engagement to be considered and included in reports.</li> </ul>



Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing information about the CNSC’s issues tracking and status of work to address issues raised.</li> <li>• Distinguishing between Indigenous Nations and communities who are Rights-holders and interested Indigenous Nations and communities, in Commission Member Documents for projects where the Duty to Consult has been raised.</li> </ul> <p>CNSC staff are committed to the ongoing enhancement and consistency of reports, drawing from the valuable feedback received from Indigenous Nations and communities. CNSC staff concur with many of the points raised by the Hiawatha First Nation, including the use of language that acknowledges “the lands, waters and treaty territories of...” and the concerns about the use of language that historicizes the presence of First Nations.</p> <p>CNSC staff also commit to responding to all comments and concerns put forth by the Hiawatha First Nation, through ongoing engagement, as described in the Terms of Reference for Long-Term Engagement with the Hiawatha First Nation, which was signed in May 2023. Through regularly scheduled meetings, staff aim to gain a deeper understanding of these issues and concerns, explore potential updates based on their feedback, and navigate areas where staff may have differing viewpoints.</p>
<p>W8banaki [CMD 23-M36.16] Theme: Addressing Emission Effects, Health Impacts, and Historical Occupancy Concerns</p>	<p>W8banaki raised concerns regarding the cumulative effects of tritium emissions in the context of emissions from the Société du parc industriel et portuaire de Bécancour (SPIP) and requests that the CNSC provide a report on tritium and other emissions that could be harmful to human health. W8banaki also requested additional information about potential impacts on human health, the four non-compliances, and expressed concern regarding the possibility of Hydro Quebec exploring reactivating Gentilly-2. W8banaki recommended conducting archeology studies and research regarding historical occupancy of the study area prior to the construction of the Gentilly-1 and Gentilly-2. W8banaki requests that the CNSC respond in writing to the questions and concerns raised.</p> <p>As requested by the W8banaki, CNSC staff will follow up in writing to provide responses to the questions, concerns and recommendations raised in their intervention. CNSC staff will actively seek opportunities to meet with W8banaki to further discuss topics of interest and better understand and address their concerns, where possible.</p>

Clarifications and responses for key themes identified in the interventions related to the mid-term update for Pickering NGS, are provided in the following table:

<b>Intervenor/Theme</b>	<b>CNSC Staff Response</b>
<p>Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation (MSIFN) [CMD 23-M36.10]</p> <p>Theme: Mid-term Update for PNGS and two risk assessment reports ERA &amp; PEA</p>	<p>CNSC staff acknowledge the concerns and comments from the MSIFN intervention on OPG’s Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) and Predictive Effects Assessment (PEA). CNSC staff encourage OPG to consider these comments in future ERAs and emphasize the importance of incorporating Indigenous Knowledge and perspectives. CNSC staff completed a detailed technical review of the 2022 site-wide ERA and PEA and concluded that adverse effects to ecological and human health due to releases from the PNGS site were unlikely and found the documents consistent with the CSA N288.6-12 methodology. CNSC staff provided recommendations for improving the ERA, and OPG also made commitments to engage with Indigenous Nations and communities. Future ERAs will include a section discussing feedback from engagement activities. The findings of the 2022 review of the ERA will be summarized in an upcoming Environmental Protection Review Report (EPRR) scheduled for publication in early 2024. ERAs are required to be reviewed and revised every five years, or earlier if there are significant changes in the facility or activity, or in the science on which the ERA is based.</p> <p>CNSC acknowledges the importance of working with and including Indigenous Knowledge alongside western scientific and regulatory information, as appropriate. CNSC staff are committed to continuing to integrate Indigenous Knowledge in its processes and decisions, such as in the Independent Environmental Monitoring Program and licensing at various stages of a project. CNSC staff are also committed to collaborating with Indigenous Nations and communities, including the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation, to continuously improve how Indigenous Knowledge is considered and reflected in CNSC’s processes and reports.</p>
<p>Barry Pettit and Chris Hill [CMD 23-M36.18]</p> <p>Theme: Pickering exclusion zone legal ownership, related to the mid-term update for PNGS</p>	<p>The intervenor submits that Ontario Power Generation’s (OPG) failure to have legal control over the entire Pickering Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) exclusion zone represents a breach of regulatory and licence requirements. The intervenor provided evidence that OPG does not possess legal title to a parcel of land within the exclusion zone and submits that consequently OPG is in breach of its licence condition. The intervention questions whether OPG currently possesses the legal authority to operate the westernmost reactors at the Pickering NGS and raises concerns regarding OPG's</p>



Intervenor/Theme	CNSC Staff Response
	<p>compliance with licence conditions and their failure to inform the Commission of new circumstances during the 2018 licence renewal hearings.</p> <p>Pickering Power Reactor Operating Licence General Licence Condition (LC) G.3 requires that OPG “control the use and occupation of any land within the exclusion zone.” The Compliance Verification Criteria (CVC) in the Licence Conditions Handbook (LCH) sets out that:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“OPG shall ensure that the use and occupancy of land within the exclusion zone does not compromise the safety and control measures in the licensing basis. Specifically, the licensee shall consider emergency preparedness and ALARA when controlling land use within the exclusion zone. This applies to land the licensee occupies as well as to land occupied by others. [emphasis added] OPG shall not permit a permanent dwelling to be built within the exclusion zone. OPG shall notify the CNSC of changes to the use and occupation of any land within the exclusion zone.”</p> <p>Neither the licence condition nor the CVCs in the LCH require specifically that OPG possess legal title to the lands within the exclusion zone, only that they exercise control such that no permanent dwelling is built on those lands. OPG achieves this control primarily through zoning bylaws. OPG’s document NK30-D0A-10200-0001, Building Development Site Plan, is a version-controlled document in the Pickering LCH, which describes the exclusion zone and identifies the parcels of land within the exclusion zone that are controlled but not owned by OPG. As indicated in the Building Development Site Plan, there are no permanent dwellings within the Pickering exclusion zone.</p> <p>CNSC staff acknowledge that the concern raised in the intervention has been raised to CNSC staff in the past. Most recently, on November 8, 2016, CNSC staff received a letter from the City of Pickering requesting a minor variance of the Pickering NGS exclusion zone to accommodate a proposed residential and commercial development. This request was for removal of the subject area from the Pickering NGS exclusion zone. CNSC staff responded to the City of Pickering on July 25, 2017, stating that any changes to the exclusion zone would need to be initiated by OPG for CNSC approval. As of December 1, 2023, OPG has not submitted such a request. The request from OPG would need to be supported by appropriate documentation including a revision of the licensing safety</p>

<b>Intervenor/Theme</b>	<b>CNSC Staff Response</b>
	case.  CNSC staff have no concerns regarding the health and safety of persons or the environment in relation to the present use of the exclusion zone and consider it to be adequately controlled for the purposes of the licence condition and the established CVCs.

### 3 FOLLOW UP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM THE COMMISSION

The Commission requests specific information to be presented in future NPGS ROR's. The following table describes how specific requests for information from the Commission have been addressed. Where appropriate, the table indicates the requests for which CNSC staff find that the action is complete and recommend closure of the request.

Action	CNSC staff response
<p>[RIB 14757]</p> <p>Inform the Commission of updates relating to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Bruce Power's pressure tube fracture toughness model, and</li> <li>(ii) Report on the maximum [Heq] of the pressure tubes as part of the NPP Status Report during each Commission Meeting through the NPP Status Report, as well as in the NPP ROR.</li> </ul>	<p>An update related to Bruce Power's pressure tube fracture toughness model and reporting on the maximum Heq is provided in Appendix I of the 2022 NPGS ROR.</p> <p>(i) CNSC staff recommend that item (i) be closed</p> <p>(ii) is an ongoing issue, and CNSC staff will continue to update the Commission on the new developments on this topic.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 14761]</p> <p>Monitor Bruce Power's continuing efforts to bring internal fire risk to below the safety goal target for the Bruce A Units, and report on Bruce Power's progress regarding internal fire risk improvements at the Bruce A station in the Annual NPGS ROR.</p>	<p>Provided an update related to the efforts to bring internal fire risk to below the safety goal target for the Bruce A Units in section 3.5.4 of the 2022 NPGS ROR.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open at least until the 2024 Fire PSA update is reviewed by CNSC staff.</b></p>

Action	CNSC staff response
<p>[RIB 22116]</p> <p>Provide updates on matters related to emergency management and emergency preparedness at PNGS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) 2017 PNERP</li> <li>(ii) The PNGS implementation plan</li> <li>(iii) Results from the PNERP technical study</li> <li>(iv) The province of Ontario's unified transport management plan</li> <li>(v) OPG's review and revision of the Public Information and Disclosure Program (PIDP) in regard to emergency preparedness and the provision of information to populations beyond the DPZ.</li> </ul>	<p><b>The Commission had previously closed items (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)</b></p> <p>The 2022 NPGS ROR described:</p> <p>(v) OPG's Public Information and Disclosure Program (PIDP) in section 2.16.1.</p> <p>OPG's PIDP includes provisions for directing information disclosure "to individuals and geographic areas outside of near-site operations".</p> <p>OPG's PIDP considers information about health, safety and security of persons and the environment, which includes information on emergency preparedness drills and exercises. Communication during a nuclear emergency is governed by OPG's separate Consolidated Nuclear Emergency Plan.</p> <p>As part of the ongoing compliance reviews conducted by CNSC staff, a fleet-wide desktop inspection of OPG's PIDP was conducted in 2023 to verify OPG's compliance with regulatory requirements. CNSC staff have confirmed that OPG reviewed its PIDP, with respect to emergency preparedness information and audiences beyond the DPZ and determined that no revisions were necessary.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request be closed.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 14753]</p> <p>Following the 2018 Bruce A and B licence renewal hearing, the Commission requested updates from CNSC staff on the status of the major component replacement (MCR) in NPP Status Reports, as well as the NPGS ROR. In addition, the Commission requested to be informed of any significant changes to the plans, schedules, or any other work related to the MCR - should it occur</p>	<p>Status of the MCR is addressed in section 3.5.0 of the 2022 NPGS ROR.</p> <p>As requested, CNSC staff will continue to update the Commission on the status of the MCR.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>

Action	CNSC staff response
before or after October 31, 2019.	
<p>[RIB 25788]</p> <p>Update the Commission on licensees' response to the Heq discovery at Bruce NGS.</p>	<p>An update related to the licensees' response to the Heq discovery at Bruce NGS is provided in Appendix I of the 2022 NPGS ROR.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request remain open.</b></p>
<p>[RIB 26782]</p> <p>Update the Commission on the concerns raised by several intervenors whose comments and recommendations made on previous RORs were not addressed by CNSC staff. The Commission directed CNSC staff to work towards the transparent resolution of intervenor recommendations.</p>	<p>An update related to the concerns raised by several intervenors whose comments and recommendations made on previous RORs were not addressed by CNSC staff is provided in Appendix I of the 2022 NPGS ROR.</p> <p>CNSC staff will continue to update the Commission on the concerns raised by the intervenors, which are not addressed during the proceedings.</p> <p><b>CNSC staff recommend that this request be closed.</b></p>

\* CNSC staff capture such important requests in the Regulatory Information Bank (RIB). The RIB numbers in this supplemental CMD refer to specific entries in this database, which CNSC staff track to closure.

## 4 ERRATA

Some minor errors in the 2022 NPGS ROR were identified through reviews by CNSC staff, licensees, and intervenors. Prior to publication, the following errors will be corrected in the report:

- In section 2.6 the second paragraph in the Fitness for Service section reads: “The number of total missed safety system tests remained very low in 2022. In all, **40,609** tests were performed, and the percentage of missed tests was 0.002%.” Instead, the correct text should state: “The number of total missed safety system tests remained very low in 2022. In all, **38,609** tests were performed, and the percentage of missed tests was 0.002%.”
- In section 3.3.4 the third paragraph reads: “OPG provided corrective action plans for all five notices of non-compliance (NNC) related to the Probabilistic Pressure Tube Evaluations and TUF code, which were discovered during the inspection of the Software QA Program (**PRPD-2020-07065**).” It should read: “OPG provided corrective action plans for all five notices of non-compliance (NNC) related to the Probabilistic Pressure Tube Evaluations and TUF code, which were discovered during the inspection of the Software QA Program (**PRPD-2021-07065**).”
- In Section 3.3.5, Physical design, the fifth paragraph reads: “During the 2021 Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program inspection (PRPD-2021-10881) **three NNCs were** raised related to the conduct of EQ walkdowns by OPG.” It should read: “During the 2021 Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program inspection (PRPD-2021-10881) **one NNC was** raised related to the conduct of EQ walkdowns by OPG.”
- In Section 3.6.0 Introduction, the 9<sup>th</sup> paragraph reads: “The WUFDSF contains 1 DSC processing building and **4** DSC storage buildings (Storage Buildings #1, #2, #3, #4, #5 and #6).” It should read: “The WUFDSF contains 1 DSC processing building and **6** DSC storage buildings (Storage Buildings #1, #2, #3, #4, #5 and #6).”
- In Section 3.6.10 under the heading “Emergency management and fire protection” the statement that reads as “CNSC staff also reviewed **one reportable event report, as well as** four quarterly operations reports, for WWMF, and confirmed that OPG met all the applicable regulatory requirements pertaining to all specific areas”. In 2022, there was no reportable event. It should read: “CNSC staff reviewed four quarterly operations reports, for WWMF, and confirmed that OPG met all the applicable regulatory requirements pertaining to all specific areas”.
- In Section 3.8.0, Table 26, which currently reads:

Domaine de sûreté	Titre du rapport	Date du rapport
Radioprotection	HQ-G2-2022-01: Type II Radioprotection	<b>28 septembre 2022*</b>

Gestion des urgences et protection-incendie	HQ-G2-2021-02: Inspection de chantier - Exercice Incendie – Aide mutuelle entre Hydro-Québec et le service sécurité et incendie de Bécancour (SSIB)	<b>28 juillet 2023*</b>
Gestion des déchets	HQ-G2-2021-01 : Inspection de chantier - Installations de gestion des déchets radioactifs à Gentilly-2	<b>28 juillet 2023*</b>

Should instead read:

<b>Domaine de sûreté</b>	<b>Titre du rapport</b>	<b>Date du rapport</b>
Radioprotection	HQ-G2-2022-01: Type II Radioprotection	<b>27 octobre 2023*</b>
Gestion des urgences et protection-incendie	HQ-G2-2021-02: Inspection de chantier - Exercice Incendie – Aide mutuelle entre Hydro-Québec et le service sécurité et incendie de Bécancour (SSIB)	<b>27 octobre 2023*</b>
Gestion des déchets	HQ-G2-2021-01 : Inspection de chantier - Installations de gestion des déchets radioactifs à Gentilly-2	<b>27 octobre 2023*</b>

\*The reports were not sent to Hydro Quebec by February 27, 2023, and as such will be reflected in the 2023 ROR.

## REFERENCES

1. [\*Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Generating Sites: 2022, CMD 23-M36\*](#)
2. [\*General Description of Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Generating Sites\*](#)
3. [\*Memorandum of Understanding between the CNSC and Fisheries and Oceans Canada - Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission\*](#)



## GLOSSARY

For definitions of terms used in this document, see [REGDOC-3.6, Glossary of CNSC Terminology](#), which includes terms and definitions used in the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act* and the Regulations made under it, and in CNSC regulatory documents and other publications.