Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission



Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire

## Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday, March 28 and Thursday, March 29, 2012



Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday March 28 beginning at 2:00 pm and Thursday March 29, 2012 at the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

M. Binder, President A. Harvey D.D. Tolgyesi M. J. McDill R. Velshi

M. Leblanc, Secretary L. Thiele, General Counsel M. Young, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisors were: F. Rinfret, M. Santini, L. Sigouin, R. Jammal, P. Thompson, B. Lojk, A. Robert, C. Purvis. B. Thériault, P. Elder, R. Stenson, D. Howard, M. Rinker, G. Su, K. Mann, C. Carrier, E. Langlois, B. Carroll, M. Dallaire, C. Moses and K. Lee

Other contributors were:

- Emergency Management Ontario: A. Stuart
- Durham Region Emergency Management Office: G. Cubitt and I. Ciuciura
- Ontario Power Generation: L. Swami
- Bruce Power: F. Saunders and D. Miller
- Ministry of Environment: R. Dorscht
- Rio Algom: K. Black and D. Berthelot
- AECL: R. Lesco, C. Taylor and A. White

## **Constitution**

- 1. With the notice of meeting, CMD 12-M11, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.
- Since the meeting of the Commission held February 16, 2012, Commission Member Documents CMD 12-M11 to CMD 12-M19 were distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

## Adoption of the Agenda

3. Technical issues in the Public Hearing Room delayed the start of the meeting. As a result, the revised agenda, CMD 12-M12.A, was amended to allow the presentation of the Update on the Public Alerting System for the City of Pickering and the Durham Region prior to the Status Report on Power Reactors. The agenda was adopted as amended.

## Chair and Secretary

4. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. Leblanc, Secretary and M. Young, Recording Secretary.

## Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held February 16, 2012

5. The Commission Members approved the minutes of the February 16, 2012 Commission Meeting as presented in CMD 12-M13.

### Update on item from previous Commission proceeding

# *Update on the Public Alerting System for the City of Pickering and the Durham Region*

- 6. With reference to CMDs 12-M17, 12-M17.1 and 12-M17.2 regarding an update to an item from a previous Commission proceeding, CNSC staff, Emergency Management Ontario (EMO), and the Durham Emergency Management Office (DEMO) for the Regional Municipality of Durham presented information regarding the public alerting system for the City of Pickering and the Durham Region.
- 7. The representative from EMO explained that, following the Fukushima nuclear accident, EMO undertook a review of municipal nuclear emergency response plans in Ontario. The EMO representative stated that EMO communicated the results of this review to the applicable municipalities in February 2012, and noted that while none of the municipalities are fully compliant with all of the requirements of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP), there is an effort underway to be compliant by the end of 2012.

- 8. The representative from DEMO provided information regarding the three-kilometre public alerting aspect of the emergency response plan for the Durham Region, which includes the Darlington and Pickering nuclear generating stations (NGS), operated by Ontario Power Generation (OPG). For the Darlington NGS, the DEMO representative stated that it meets the indoor and outdoor public alerting requirements for the three-kilometre zone around the facility. For the Pickering NGS, the DEMO representative stated that, while it does not meet either requirement for the three-kilometre zone, a plan is in place to improve the public alerting systems, which includes sirens and an enhancement of the telephone autodialer. The DEMO representative stated that full compliance is expected by October 2012.
- 9. The Commission asked a representative from OPG to comment on the matter. The OPG representative stated that OPG is pleased with the progress made to date and that OPG would continue to provide financial support, as required, to meet the October timeline.
- 10. The Commission sought further information regarding the expected date for compliance with the requirements for public alerting in the ten-kilometre zones in the Durham Region. The EMO representative responded that EMO is working with the municipalities in the ten-kilometre zones to develop a plan to meet all requirements, and noted that the plan is expected to be completed by the end of 2012. The EMO representative noted that many public alerting measures are already in place in the ten-kilometre zones. CNSC staff stated that the focus in the short-term would be on meeting requirements for the three-kilometre zones, and noted that the municipalities would be developing a strategy for the ten-kilometre zones. CNSC staff stated that the measures currently in place for the ten-kilometre zones are acceptable until the more robust strategy is implemented.
- 11. The Commission asked for information regarding the requirements of the PNERP. The EMO representative responded that the PNERP was updated in 2009 and again following the Fukushima nuclear accident. The EMO representative explained that emergency plans are updated to ensure that they are consistent with the best available information. CNSC staff stated that there are no internationally agreed-upon standards for emergency response and noted that the decision to set the requirements rests with provincial authorities. The Commission noted that the May 2012 Commission meeting would include a discussion on recommendations for emergency response plans, as applicable to sites across Canada, as a result of the Fukushima nuclear accident.

- 12. The Commission expressed a concern that none of the applicable municipalities were fully compliant with the PNERP and enquired about the means to ensure that municipalities would comply with the PNERP. The representative from EMO responded that although there are no means to enforce compliance, EMO would work with the municipalities to ensure that they meet requirements. The representative from DEMO noted that, in its case, it welcomed the opportunity to work with the CNSC, and noted that it has had strong public support for implementing the public alerting system.
- 13. The Commission asked when EMO and DEMO would be able to provide a future update on the implementation of the public alerting systems. The representatives from EMO and DEMO agreed that they could provide an update in late October.

## STATUS REPORTS

#### Status Report on Power Reactors

- 14. With reference to CMD 12-M15, which includes the Status Report on Power Reactors, CNSC staff presented updates on the following:
  - Bruce A, Unit 2: Bruce Power removed the reactor shutdown guarantees on March 23 and achieved criticality on March 24. Unit 2 is operating under control for a low-power physics test;
  - Darlington: received an excellent safety and performance evaluation from the World Association of Nuclear Operators;
  - Pickering A, Unit 1: was shutdown on March 19 for the replacement of sump pumps and is expected to return to service on April 6, 2012;
  - Pickering A, Unit 4: CNSC staff inspectors investigated the emergency response regarding the pressurizing pump event and determined that OPG responded in an appropriate manner;
  - Pickering B, Unit 7: CNSC staff is satisfied with OPG's investigation to-date of the cause of the spurious trip of all three Shutdown System 2 channels and will follow-up on the finalization of the investigation;
  - Pickering B, Unit 8: the expected return to service is early May 2012; and
  - Point Lepreau: New Brunswick Power Nuclear (NBPN) has loaded 30 percent of the fuel for the reactor. CNSC staff also reported that the follow-up to the November 2011 hydrazine leak is complete and the event is closed.

- 15. Regarding Bruce A, Unit 2, the Commission enquired about the cause of the moderator leak. A representative from Bruce Power responded that the cause had been determined to be a gasket failure. The Bruce Power representative noted that although the leak happened shortly after Bruce Power had been granted permission to remove reactor shutdown guarantees, the moderator system had been running prior to the leak and that it was not associated with the removal. The Bruce Power representative noted that there were no safety concerns as a result of the leak and that it would continue to monitor systems during the restart of the reactor.
- 16. Regarding Darlington, the Commission sought clarification concerning a lost-time injury to a worker. CNSC staff responded that the worker had broken an arm as a result of a fall.
- 17. Regarding Pickering A, Unit 4, the Commission asked about the safety implications of the pressurizing pump event and what the timeframe would be to correct the issue. CNSC staff stated that the pump would be repaired during the next planned outage. CNSC staff explained that since there are redundant, backup pumps in place, it is not necessary to repair the pump immediately. CNSC staff noted, however, that should the backup pumps fail, the unit would be shut down to address the issue. CNSC staff stated that there were no safety issues associated with the event.
- 18. Regarding Pickering B, Unit 7, the Commission enquired about the safety significance of the spurious trip of all three Shutdown System 2 channels. The Commission noted that the cause had not yet been determined, and questioned whether the unit would be restarted if the event recurred. CNSC staff responded that there is no safety concern because the reactor would safely shut down if the system trips. CNSC staff noted that it is important that OPG determine the cause of the event and its effect on the system, and that CNSC staff would continue to follow-up with OPG in this regard.
- 19. Regarding Point Lepreau, the Commission asked for more information concerning the Seismic Hazard Assessment that was requested as part of the licence renewal for the facility. A NBPN representative responded that work is underway to begin the study, which might take two years to complete. CNSC staff responded that it would review the scope of the study to ensure that it is appropriate and that the study would be timely. CNSC staff noted that the seismic robustness of the Point Lepreau facility was confirmed during the licence renewal.

#### Updates on items from previous Commission proceedings

Bruce Power Inc. (Bruce Power): Alpha Contamination Event at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station A - Event Closure

- 20. With reference to CMD 12-M16 regarding the updates to items from previous Commission proceedings, CNSC staff and Bruce Power presented information regarding the alpha contamination event that occurred in 2009 during the refurbishment of the Bruce A NGS. CNSC staff provided information regarding the doses assigned to workers as a result of the event and reported that no regulatory dose limits were exceeded. CNSC staff also provided information regarding the measures implemented by all nuclear power plant operators to address alpha radiation monitoring and control as a result of this event, including long-term radiation protection program enhancements. CNSC staff stated that it is satisfied that the measures currently in place in each nuclear power plant are sufficient to protect workers from alpha hazards. Bruce Power confirmed that it had made improvements to its radiation protection program.
- 21. CNSC staff recommended that the event be closed, noting that it would follow up on the long-term radiation protection program enhancements through normal compliance verification.
- 22. The Commission asked for more information regarding the analysis of the doses to workers. A Bruce Power representative responded that over the course of the analysis, the dose modelling was refined and the number of workers who received doses in ranges of less than 1 milliSievert (mSv), between 2 and 5 mSv, and between 5 and 10 mSv, was determined. Bruce Power's representative noted that no workers received a dose greater than 10 mSv, which is well below the regulatory limit of 50 mSv per year. Bruce Power's representative explained that this included all workers who may have been affected by the event, as well as any workers who requested to be tested.
- 23. The Commission enquired about the dosimetry services that were required for the event. The Bruce Power representative stated that, due to the large number of workers affected by the event, Bruce Power used the services of several dosimetry organizations, including Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), to process samples and analyze the doses. The Bruce Power representative noted that, going forward, Bruce Power would continue to use several companies for dosimetry services, including AECL.

- 24. The Commission sought confirmation that while the event would be closed, the CNSC's on-going compliance verification would ensure that the long-term radiation protection program enhancements would be implemented by all power reactor operators. CNSC staff responded that this would be the case.
- 25. The Commission asked for more information regarding the retrospective assessment of exposures aspect of the radiation protection program enhancements. A Bruce Power representative responded that, in the past, there was a potential for some workers to have been exposed to low levels of alpha radiation that were not detected. Bruce Power's representative explained that it would assess employees' historical work patterns and dose measurements to determine what the dose from these potential exposures may have been. Bruce Power's representative noted that the workers would have been wearing protective equipment at the time of their work. CNSC staff noted that there would be accuracy limitations to the retrospective assessment but it would provide an idea of historical exposures.
- 26. The Commission asked how the improvements made to the radiation protection programs compared to international practice. CNSC staff responded that it used guidance from the United States in the development of its regulatory expectations for the alpha monitoring and control programs. CNSC staff noted that it would be benchmarking and exchanging operating experience with other regulators to ensure that regulatory expectations remain in line with international experience. The Bruce Power representative commented that Bruce Power's current practices are in line with the programs used by operators in the United States.
- 27. The Commission asked about the possibility of a future recurrence of this type of event. The Bruce Power representative responded that, due to the implementation of the enhancements to the radiation protection program and detection equipment, similar exposures are not likely to occur in the future.
- 28. The Commission accepts CNSC staff's recommendation to close the event and is satisfied that CNSC staff will follow-up on the long-term radiation protection program enhancements through normal compliance verification activities.

## *Rio Algom Limited: Interim Status Report on Rio Algom Limited Elliot Lake Historic Mine and Tailings Management Sites*

- 29. With reference to CMD 12-M14, CNSC staff presented a status report on Rio Algom Limited (Rio Algom) Elliot Lake Historic Mine and Tailings Management Sites. Rio Algom is the owner and licensee of the Stanleigh, Quirke, Panel, Spanish-American, Milliken, Lacnor, Buckles and Pronto decommissioned mine/mill/tailings sites. Rio Algom was issued an indefinite Waste Facility Operating Licence for the Elliot Lake sites in December 2005<sup>1</sup>. These sites have all been decommissioned and the associated tailings are being managed by Rio Algom under the CNSC licence. When Rio Algom was issued the licence for the Elliot Lake sites, the Commission directed CNSC staff to provide reports on the performance of the licensee approximately every five years, in conjunction with the release of the State of the Environment reports on these sites.
- 30. CNSC staff presented its assessment of Rio Algom's performance and compliance with respect to the CNSC's regulatory requirements and the licensee's previously approved safety programs in each of the D Safety and Control Areas. CNSC staff stated that Rio Algom's performance in all safety and control areas was satisfactory and that Rio Algom has continued to make adequate provision for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has agreed. CNSC staff further stated that the next status report would be provided before December 2017.
- The Commission also received written submissions, CMD 12-M14.1 and CMD 12-14.2, from Northwatch and the Serpent River Fist Nation, respectively.
- 32. The Commission asked for information concerning the number of workers at the Elliot Lake sites and their performance with respect to health and safety. The Rio Algom representative responded that Rio Algom has nine full-time equivalent workers and noted that it has not had any accidents since the sites closed in 2000.

ACTION by December 2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Refer to the *Record of Proceedings, Including Reasons for Decision In the Matter of Rio Algom Limited. Application for the Renewal of the Operating Licence for Rio Algom Limited's Radioactive Waste Management Facilities at Elliot Lake, Ontario, Hearing, December 9, 2005.* 

- 33. The Commission enquired about the maintenance work performed by Rio Algom. The Rio Algom representative responded that the physical works at the sites were completed in 2000 and since then they have conducted monthly inspections. The Rio Algom representative noted that they also monitor the unmanned effluent treatment plants.
- 34. The Commission asked if there were any issues regarding vegetation for any of the sites. The Rio Algom representative responded that they have been through a 10-year process for the revegetation following decommissioning and noted that the vegetation on the sites is now stable and sustainable.
- 35. The Commission sought further information regarding the security of and controlled access to the sites. The Rio Algom representative responded that the sites are not fenced due to the large area, but noted that there are controlled access points with gates, barricades and signs. Rio Algom's representative further noted that Rio Algom undertakes outreach with the community to ensure that the public is aware of the property boundaries.
- 36. The Commission also enquired about the control of beavers near the sites. The Rio Algom representative responded that Rio Algom has mapped and inspected areas for potential beaver activity and entered agreements with local hunters and trappers to address the issue.
- 37. The Commission, noting a comment from Northwatch, enquired about the levels of gamma radiation at the sites. CNSC staff responded that the gamma dose rates at the sites are at nearbackground levels. CNSC staff explained that workers wear dosimeters to measure doses while onsite and there have been no recordable doses attributed to gamma radiation over the past few years. A Rio Algom representative concurred with CNSC staff.
- 38. The Commission asked about the radiation risk to the public from the sites. The Rio Algom representative responded that members of the public are estimated to receive 0.0016 mSv/y from the sites, which is well below the public dose limit of 1 mSv/y. The Rio Algom representative noted that the dose estimates assume that members of the public have 200 hours per year of casual access to the sites.
- 39. The Commission asked for more information concerning the doses to workers over the past five years. The Rio Algom representative responded that the doses were well below the regulatory limits for nuclear energy workers. The Rio Algom representative explained

that the reported doses were primarily due to exposure to radon, which is a decay product of uranium. The Rio Algom representative noted that improved ventilation measures were implemented in 2007 that led to a decrease in doses in subsequent years. CNSC staff expressed its satisfaction with the actions taken by Rio Algom to address the ventilation issues and noted that the overall radon levels would decrease very slowly due to the long half-life of uranium.

- 40. The Commission asked for clarification regarding the financial guarantee for the sites. CNSC staff responded that financial guarantee information on some of the mine sites was not provided because these sites are under the control of another licensee, Denison. CNSC staff noted that future reports to the Commission on the Elliot Lake sites would include information on all of the sites. CNSC staff further noted that financial guarantees are reviewed every five years.
- 41. The Commission asked for more information concerning the bioaccumulation of radium and polonium-210 in plants and fish. A Rio Algom representative responded that the radium release rates are within the range of what was anticipated during the environmental assessment for the decommissioning, and that Rio Algom would continue to evaluate radium release rates to confirm that this remains the case. Rio Algom's representative further stated that polonium-210 levels in sport fish have been measured to be ten times lower than the thresholds established to protect human health and that there has been no bioaccumulation of polonium-210.
- 42. The Commission asked about an issue raised by Northwatch, which alleged that there had been major, unanticipated tailings releases. A Rio Algom representative responded that there have been no releases of tailings from the decommissioned facilities.
- 43. The Commission asked for information regarding the effectiveness of the Joint Review Group for the sites, which is a multi-stakeholder committee comprised of representatives from several federal and provincial regulatory bodies. A representative from the Ontario Ministry of the Environment commented that the group is effective for the representatives to review reports, such as the State of the Environment report, and conduct inspections. The Ontario Ministry of the Environment representative noted that while there are no formal minutes of the Joint Review Group meetings, it does provide comments on the reports.

- 44. The Commission sought further information about the ongoing monitoring of the sites. CNSC staff responded that there are measures in place to prevent the contamination from spreading and that ongoing maintenance and monitoring are required to ensure that this remains the case. CNSC staff noted that the monitoring requirements for the sites could change over time based on the ongoing assessments of environmental risk. The Rio Algom representative noted that the flooded areas are expected to require 10 to 50 years of treatment and that the vegetated sites are expected to require treatment for 75 to 125 years.
- 45. The Commission asked for more information regarding the dams, dikes, spillways and other structures. The Rio Algom representative responded that the sites include a total of 58 dams, dikes and other structures at the eight tailings management areas, and that each of those structures is inspected regularly. The Rio Algom representative noted that the sizes of the structures vary, and that Rio Algom follows the management requirements for those structures in accordance with the Canadian Dam Safety Association. The Rio Algom representative further noted that a formal dam safety review is conducted every seven years.
- 46. The Commission enquired about the effects of earthquakes on the sites and the emergency planning for such events. The Rio Algom representative provided information regarding the design objectives established for the site structures. The Rio Algom representative explained that there would be no loss of containment for an earthquake with a probability of occurring once every 10,000 years. The Rio Algom representative emergency planning measures for the sites. The Rio Algom representative noted that Rio Algom confirmed, through an analysis of the floodplain in a dam break scenario, that no residents live downstream of the key structures at each of the sites.
- 47. The Commission asked for more information concerning Rio Algom's public information program. The Rio Algom representative provided an overview of Rio Algom's program, including newsletters for the community, semi-annual presentations to local governments and the Serpent River First Nation, and a bus tour of the sites as part of the Uranium Heritage Festival. The Rio Algom representative also noted the outreach to hunters, trappers, naturalists and hikers in the region.

- 48. The Commission noted the submissions from Northwatch and Serpent River First Nation and suggested that future updates to the Commission on the Elliot Lake sites should include a summary of all of the different reviews that are periodically performed at the sites, including dam inspections. The Commission also encouraged Rio Algom and CNSC staff to make more information available on the Internet.
- 49. The Commission, noting a comment from the Serpent River First Nation, enquired about Rio Algom's engagement with Aboriginal peoples. A representative from Rio Algom responded that Rio Algom has been actively engaged with the Serpent River First Nation. The Rio Algom representative explained that Rio Algom provides copies of its annual newsletter to each member of the Serpent River First Nation and has worked with its Lands and Resources Committee on a fish and waterfowl consumption study.
- 50. The Commission asked CNSC staff to explain its approach with respect to the CNSC duty to consult aboriginal groups, in the context of the Serpent River First Nation. CNSC staff responded that the duty to consult is triggered when the Commission has to make a licensing decision that could have an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights, which is not the case for Rio Algom's licence. CNSC staff noted that it would continue to engage and build relationships with the Aboriginal community on an ongoing basis.
- 51. The Commission noted a concern from the Serpent River First Nation regarding iron levels in fish and asked for more information in this regard. CNSC staff responded that iron levels exceed the provincial water quality objective, but noted that there is no risk to human health from iron. CNSC staff further noted that the local environment has improved over time. The Rio Algom representative noted that iron levels are naturally elevated in the watershed.
- 52. The Commission asked the Ontario Ministry of the Environment if it conducts its own monitoring. The representative of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment responded that it does and noted that there are no concerns at this time.
- 53. The Commission asked CNSC staff to explain the CNSC staff comment that it has no immediate environmental concerns. CNSC staff responded that while they do not have any concerns regarding the sites at present, there is a need for ongoing monitoring because the environmental conditions at the sites could potentially change as they evolve.

54. The Commission is satisfied with the performance of Rio Algom regarding the Elliot Lake historic mine and tailings management sites.

#### Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: Update on the National Research Universal Reactor Vessel Inspections

- 55. With reference to CMD 12-M19 and 12-M19.1, CNSC staff and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) presented an update on the National Research Universal (NRU) Reactor vessel inspections. At the October 2011 Public Hearing of the Commission for the renewal of the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) operating licence, CNSC staff reported that AECL had not yet completed all of the inspections of the NRU reactor vessel which were required to be completed within 9 months of the August 2010 reactor restart. The key outstanding activity was the volumetric inspection of the lower Heat-Affected Zone (HAZ) of the weld repair areas. AECL provided an update on the status of the inspections and stated that, due to delays, AECL had not completed all of the required inspections. AECL committed to complete the five remaining lower HAZ inspections during the extended outage between April and May 2012, and noted that the inspections to date have confirmed that the NRU vessel remains fit for service.
- 56. CNSC staff stated that, while the delays in inspection do not pose a short-term safety risk, a well-executed and timely inspection program of the NRU vessel is essential to ensure continued operational reliability of the vessel. CNSC staff recommended that, if AECL is unable to complete the inspections by the end of the extended outage, AECL should complete the work in a later, planned outage that would have a minimal disruption on worldwide medical isotope production.
- 57. The Commission expressed concerns regarding the delays in completing the required inspections and asked AECL to explain the reasons for the delay. The representative from AECL responded that the delays were caused by the need to develop specialized tools to complete the lower HAZ inspections, and then by a heat exchanger leak in October 2011 that required that the reactor be closed and prevented an inspection at that time. CNSC staff concurred that the inspections could not be completed in October 2011 due to the leak, and expressed a concern that the extended outage may not be sufficient to complete the inspections if other issues arise.

- 58. The Commission enquired about AECL's ability to complete the inspections during the extended outage. The AECL representative responded that AECL was confident that it could complete the inspections since it had developed the proper tools and a planned schedule for the inspections. AECL's representative noted that, as long as there were no unforeseen technical issues, there would be no reason not to complete the inspections.
- 59. The Commission asked for more information regarding the safety significance of the delays. CNSC staff responded that the delay would not affect the safety systems of the reactor, but it would affect reliability and fitness for service in the long-term. CNSC staff explained that baseline inspections are required for comparison with future inspections to identify any degradation in wall thickness. CNSC staff noted that there is a tolerance for flaws in the NRU vessel, but any reductions in wall thickness would reduce the tolerance. The AECL representative concurred and noted that there is a leak detection system in place.
- 60. The Commission enquired about an area that was found to have an 'indication' that was identified in one of the inspections, but was not considered to be a concern. The AECL representative responded that the indication was not a defect, but did show roughness on the surface of the vessel. The AECL representative noted that they would continue to monitor this area. CNSC staff noted that the indication was not a result of the weld repairs and stated that it was satisfied with the ongoing monitoring of this area.
- 61. The Commission asked if AECL agreed with CNSC staff's proposal to complete the inspections in a future extended outage should they not be completed as planned. The AECL representative responded that AECL would do so and committed to presenting an update at a future Commission meeting if that were the case. The AECL representative committed to AECL completing the work in a later, planned outage in 2012, if it were unable to complete the inspections during the extended outage from April to May, barring any technical problems.
- 62. The Commission stressed the importance of completing the inspections and establishing the baseline for the fitness for service of the reactor. The Commission concurs with the recommendation from CNSC staff that AECL should complete the work in a later, planned outage if it is unable to complete the inspections in the extended outage from April to May. The Commission expects the inspections to be completed as soon as possible.

ACTION By the

end of June 2012, if necessary

#### **INFORMATION ITEMS**

#### Regulatory Framework Program - 2011-12 Annual Report

- 63. With reference to CMD 12-M18, CNSC staff presented its annual regulatory framework report. CNSC staff described its regulatory framework structure and highlighted the 14 projects it completed over the fiscal year 2011-12, as well as the two discussion papers that provided the public opportunities for early input to CNSC regulatory initiatives.
- 64. CNSC staff also presented its five-year regulatory plan extending to 2017-18. CNSC staff explained that its five-year plan captures documents and regulations in development, as well as early policy analysis. CNSC staff noted that the plan also introduces a five-year review cycle for all CNSC regulations and regulatory documents. CNSC staff stated that the focus of the plan was to modernize the CNSC regulatory framework and clarify regulatory expectations for all industry sectors regulated by the CNSC.
- 65. The Commission enquired about the feedback received from stakeholders. CNSC staff responded that they have received positive comments due to the clarified regulatory expectations and availability of information regarding the regulatory plan. CNSC staff noted that, due to the five-year review cycle for regulations, there is a formal process in place that includes consultation following the implementation of regulations.
- 66. The Commission asked for information regarding CNSC staff's future plans and prioritization of projects. CNSC staff responded that there are established criteria for selecting priorities for the program and that a process is in place for the allocation of staff and resources for the projects. CNSC staff noted that they have an ambitious plan and that they completed more projects in the past two years than at any previous time in the organization's recent experience.
- 67. The Commission asked for clarification regarding a statement in CNSC staff's submission regarding the CNSC's regulatory oversight in areas where it has never exercised its authority. CNSC staff responded that there are areas where the Commission has not exercised regulatory authority in the past, such as financial guarantees for Class II licenses and expanded cost recovery from licensees, and that they would use discussion papers as an opportunity to receive input from stakeholders before proceeding with the development of regulatory documents in these areas.

- 68. The Commission asked CNSC staff to advise on whether the CNSC is required to report to the Federal Government regarding the implementation of streamlined regulations. CNSC staff responded that while the government has issued a Cabinet directive to streamline regulations, there is no requirement to report to the government specifically on the implementation of streamlined regulations.
- 69. The Commission asked about the CNSC's expectations regarding future government initiatives for regulatory reform. CNSC staff responded that the CNSC would continue to follow the policy direction from the Treasury Board Secretariat, which is responsible for regulatory affairs.
- 70. The Commission enquired about the CNSC's work with other nuclear regulators in developing regulatory documents. CNSC staff responded that it references and incorporates domestic and international standards where possible. CNSC staff noted that it also follows guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- 71. The Commission asked how many documents the CNSC has in its regulatory framework. CNSC staff responded that it presently has 82 published documents and noted that one of the goals of the regulatory framework plan is to consolidate documents and minimise the growth of the regulatory framework.
- 72. The Commission, noting the large number of documents and expected changes in the future, asked if CNSC staff foresaw any issues regarding the nuclear industry's comprehension and implementation of regulations. CNSC staff responded that clarified regulatory expectations are expected to prevent such issues.
- 73. The Commission is looking forward to receiving the regulatory framework program report on an annual basis.

ACTION Recurring

## Closure of the Public Meeting

74. The meeting closed at 1:57 p.m. on Thursday, March 29.

**Recording Secretary** 

Date

Secretary

Date

#### APPENDIX A

CMD DATE File No

12-M11 2012-03-02 Edocs # 3890270 Opening Remarks

12-M12.A 2012-03-22 Edocs # 3901778 Adoption of Agenda

12-M13 2012-03-26 Edocs #3902741 Approval of Minutes of Commission Meeting held February 16, 2012

12-M152012-03-22Edocs # 3901629Status Reports - Status Report on Power Reactors

12-M17.1 2012-03-21 Edocs # 3901093 Emergency Management Ontario: Undate on the Public Alert

Emergency Management Ontario: Update on the Public Alerting System for the City of Pickering and the Durham Region - Oral presentation by Emergency Management Ontario

12-M17.2 2012-03-21 Edocs # 3901203 Emergency Management Ontario: Update on the Public Alerting System for the City of Pickering and the Durham Region - Oral presentation by the Durham Region Emergency Management Office

12-M172012-03-14Edocs # 3897349Emergency Management Ontario: Update on the Public Alerting System for the City of<br/>Pickering and the Durham Region - Written submission from CNSC Staff

12-M16 2012-03-28 Edocs # 3890757 Bruce Power: Alpha Contamination Event at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station A – Event Closure - Oral presentation by CNSC Staff

12-M16.1 2012-03-21 Edocs # 3901495 Bruce Power: Alpha Contamination Event at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station A – Event Closure - Oral presentation by Bruce Power

12-M142012-02-10Edocs # 3876940Rio Algom Limited: Interim Status Report on Rio Algom Limited Elliot Lake HistoricMine and Tailings Management Sites - Oral presentation by CNSC Staff

12-M14.1 2012-03-13 Edocs # 3897937

Rio Algom Limited: Interim Status Report on Rio Algom Limited Elliot Lake Historic Mine and Tailings Management Sites - Written submission from Northwatch 12-M14.2 2012-03-21 Edocs # 3901619

Rio Algom Limited: Interim Status Report on Rio Algom Limited Elliot Lake Historic Mine and Tailings Management Sites – Written submission from Serpent River First Nation

12-M19.1 2012-02-29 Edocs # 3895101

Atomic energy of Canada Limited: Update on the National Research Universal Reactor Vessel Inspections – Oral presentation by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

12-M19.1A 2012-03-21 Edocs # 3901487 Atomic energy of Canada Limited: Update on the National Research Universal Reactor Vessel Inspections – Oral presentation by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

12-M19 2012-03-14 Edocs # 3894711 Atomic energy of Canada Limited: Update on the National Research Universal Reactor Vessel Inspections – Oral presentation by CNSC Staff

12-M18 2012-03-13 Edocs # 3896512 Regulatory Framework Program –2011-12 Annual Report– Oral presentation by CNSC Staff