

Record of Proceedings, Including Reasons for Decision

In the Matter of

Proponent Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Subject Screening Environmental Assessment for the
Construction and Operation of the Fuel
Packaging and Storage Facility at Chalk River
Laboratories

Date of
Hearing May 15, 2008

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Proponent: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Address/Location: Chalk River Laboratories, Chalk River, Ontario, K0J 1J0

Purpose: Screening Environmental Assessment for the Construction and Operation of the Fuel Packaging and Storage facility

Application received: November 12, 2004

Date(s) of hearing: May 15, 2008

Location: Ajax Convention Centre, 550 Beck Crescent, Ajax, Ontario

Members present: M. Binder, Chair B.J. Barriault
C.R. Barnes A. Harvey
A.R. Graham M.J. McDill

Secretary: M. Leblanc
Recording Secretary: P. Reinhardt
General Counsel: J. Lavoie

Proponent Represented By	Document Number
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Date of Release of Decision: June 25, 2008

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Introduction

1. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has applied for an authorization to construct and operate a Fuel Packaging and Storage (FPS) facility at Chalk River Laboratories (CRL). The FPS facility would house two fuel packaging and drying systems and a monitored storage structure. No new waste arising from ongoing operations at the CRL site will be added to the new storage structure.
2. Before the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission¹ (CNSC) can make a licensing decision pursuant to the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*² (NSCA) with respect to the proposed project, it must, in accordance with the requirements of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*³ (CEAA), make a decision on the Environmental Assessment (EA) screening of the proposal.
3. Under the CEAA, there are two Responsible Authorities⁴ (RAs) for this EA: CNSC and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan). NRCan is a RA as it will be providing funding for this project under the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP). NRCan will use the Screening Report prepared by CNSC staff to meet its CEAA obligation and make its own decision on the Screening Report.
4. Pursuant to sections 15 and 16 of the CEAA, the EA Guidelines, including statements of the scope of the project and scope of the assessment were reviewed and approved by a Designated Officer on December 31, 2004. The conduct of the technical studies for the screening of this project was delegated to AECL in accordance with subsection 17(1) of the CEAA. The following federal authorities (FAs) were notified of the project, pursuant to the CEAA Regulations respecting the Coordination by Federal Authorities of Environmental Assessment Procedures and Requirements: NRCan, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Environment Canada, Health Canada, Treasury Board and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. They were also invited to participate in the preparation of the Draft EA Guidelines and the Draft EA Study Report.
5. AECL submitted in 2006 a draft EA Study Report (EASR) with supporting technical studies and documentation for review by the RAs (CNSC and NRCan), the FAs and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (OMOE). Comments from the reviewers resulted in the preparation of a revised EASR which was then used by CNSC staff for the preparation of the draft EA Screening Report (Screening Report). Stakeholders, including the FAs, members of the public and First Nations, were provided an opportunity to review the draft Screening Report prior to its finalization and submission to the Commission for this hearing and decision.
6. This *Record of Proceedings* describes the Commission's consideration of the Screening Report and its reasons for decisions on the results. The Screening Report is attached as an appendix to CMD 08-H8 with corrections made in CMD 08-H8.A.

¹ The *Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission* is referred to as the "CNSC" when referring to the organization and its staff in general, and as the "Commission" when referring to the tribunal component.

² S.C. 1997, c. 9.

³ S.C. 1992, c.37.

⁴ Responsible Authority in relation to an EA is determined in accordance with subsection 11(1) of the CEAA.

Issues

7. In considering the Screening Report, the Commission was required to decide:
 - a) whether the Screening Report is complete; that is, whether all of the factors and instructions set out in the approved EA Guidelines and subsection 16(1) of the CEEA were adequately addressed;
 - b) whether the project, taking into account the mitigation measures identified in the Screening Report, is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects;
 - c) whether the project must be referred to the federal Minister of the Environment for referral to a review panel or mediator, pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(c) of the CEEA; and
 - d) whether the Commission may proceed with its consideration of an application for a licence under the NSCA, consistent with paragraph 20(1)(a) of the CEEA.

Hearing

8. Pursuant to section 22 of the NSCA, the President of the Commission established a panel of the Commission to hear this matter.
9. The panel of the Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission), in making its decision, considered information presented in a public hearing held on May 15, 2008 in Ajax, Ontario. During the hearing, the Commission received written submissions from AECL (CMD 08-H8.1 and CMD 08-H8.1A) and from CNSC staff (CMD 08-H8 and CMD 08-H8.A). The public was invited to participate but no interventions were submitted for this hearing.

Decision

10. Based on its consideration of the matter, as described in more detail in this *Record of Proceedings*, the Commission decided that:

- a) the Environmental Assessment Screening Report appended to CMD 08-H8 is complete; the scope of the project and assessment were appropriately determined in accordance with sections 15 and 16 of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, and all of the required assessment factors were addressed during the assessment;
- b) the project, taking into account the mitigation measures identified in the Environmental Assessment Screening Report, is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects;
- c) it will not refer the project to the federal Minister of the Environment for his referral to a review panel or mediator;
- d) it will proceed to consider the application for licence amendment under the provisions of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, consistent with paragraph 20(1)(a) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*.

11. The commission also approves the EA Guidelines, including statements of the scope of the project and scope of the assessment, as approved by the Designated Officer on December 31, 2004.

Issues and Commission Findings

12. The Commission addressed the four issues identified in paragraph 7 under three main headings: (1) the completeness of the Screening Report, (2) the likelihood and significance of the environmental effects, and (3) the nature and level of public concern. The Commission's findings in each of these areas are summarized below.
13. The findings of the Commission presented below are based on the Commission's consideration of all the information and submission available for reference on the record for the hearing.

Completeness of the Screening Report

14. In its consideration of the completeness of the Screening Report, the Commission considered whether the assessment had adequately addressed and appropriately defined the scope of the project and the assessment factors.
15. AECL noted that during the operation of research reactors at the CRL site, nuclear fuel is burnt-up producing irradiated nuclear fuel waste. The purpose of the proposed project is to stabilize the metal fuels and store them in a controlled and monitored environment. This will avoid the hazards and costs associated with continued storage under current conditions. The design life of the storage system is 50 years and it is anticipated that a long-term waste management storage or disposal facility will become available during this period. AECL noted that the project will:
 - Retrieve the reactor fuels from the selected tile hole arrays;
 - Re-package and stabilize the fuel through drying to remove free water; and
 - Store the fuel in an atmospherically controlled, monitored storage system.
16. CNSC staff stated that the FPS facility would house two fuel packaging and drying systems and a monitored storage structure and that no new waste arising from ongoing operations at the CRL would be added to the new storage structure. Were the project to move forward, the fuel would later be stored in an atmospherically controlled storage structure followed by continuous monitoring of the fuel and fuel canisters for the designed life span of the FPS facility (50 years). CNSC staff submitted that the project would provide safe and interim storage for the repackaged fuel until disposal or long-term storage facility is available. CNSC staff state that the emptied tile holes would be placed in a sustainable state and be regulated under the Facility Authorization and would continue to be monitored in accordance with existing monitoring programs.

17. CNSC staff recommended that the EA Guidelines, as attached to CMD 08-H8.A, be ratified by the Commission during the current proceeding. In 2004, a CNSC Designated Officer reviewed and approved the EA Guidelines which were then used to delegate to AECL, in accordance with Section 17 of the CEAA, the conduct of the supporting technical studies, the public consultation and the preparation of the EASR.
18. The Ontario Ministry of the Environment (OMOE) was also provided the opportunity to participate in the preparation of the draft EA Guidelines and the draft Screening Report. The OMOE determined that there are no provincial environmental assessment requirements under the Ontario *Environmental Assessment Act*⁵ for this project.
19. CNSC staff indicated that it was confident that the EA had identified and assessed the likelihood and significance of the impact of the project.
20. Based on this information and the Commission's review of the EA Guidelines and Screening Report, the Commission concludes that the scope of the project and the scope of the factors for the assessment were appropriate, and that all of the required factors were addressed during the assessment. The Commission thus approves the EA Guidelines as approved by the Designated Officer in 2004.
21. The Commission also concludes that the Screening Report is complete and in accordance with the requirements of the CEAA. The Commission is therefore able to proceed with its consideration of the likelihood and significance of the environmental effects of the project, the adequacy of the proposed mitigation measures, and the public concerns about the project.

Likelihood and Significance of Environmental Effects

22. This section contains the Commission's findings with respect to whether the project, taking into account the identified mitigation measures, is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects. In examining this question, the Commission first considered the adequacy of the study methods used to identify and evaluate the potential environmental effects, including the public consultation process, followed by a consideration of the predicted effects on the relevant components of the environment.

Adequacy of the Assessment Methods

23. CNSC staff reported that the assessment of the effects of the project on the environment was carried out following pre-determined steps, including identifying each interaction with the environment and evaluating each interaction to determine any change to the environment and to the Valued Ecosystem Components. CNSC staff further noted that the assessment process also included ways to mitigate the environmental effects and to identify the residual environmental effects. Both radiological and non-radiological effects were assessed.

⁵ R.S.O. 1990, c. E.18.

24. CNSC staff noted that all project activities were examined to identify those that could possibly interact with any of the seven following environmental components: atmospheric environment, hydrology and surface water quality, geology and hydrogeology, aquatic environment, terrestrial environment, worker and public health. For each environmental component, the assessment considered activities related to normal operations, i.e. the construction and the operation of the FPS facility and the effects of probable malfunctions and accidents.
25. With respect to the adequacy of consultations, CNSC staff reported that AECL's public consultation program has given the general public, elected officials, First Nations, special interest groups and the media the opportunity to become informed about the project and raise issues of concerns. There was limited interest in the project from these groups.
26. CNSC staff further reported that the draft Screening Report, including supporting documents, was made available for review and comments from January 2, 2008 to February 1, 2008 to the FAs, NRCan and the OMOE. The draft Screening Report was also sent directly to 18 stakeholders, as listed in the report. Copies of the draft Screening Report were available at libraries in Pembroke, Deep River and Chalk River and a notice, in regards of the availability of the report, was posted on CNSC's Web site. The Golden Lake Algonquin First Nation was provided an opportunity to comment on the draft of the Screening Report but did not send any comments. One member of the public provided comments on the draft of the report.
27. CNSC staff concluded that AECL had consulted extensively with the public and interested stakeholders and, in its opinion, the quantity, variety and quality of the proponent's consultation were of a high standard.
28. The Commission is satisfied that the methods used to consult with the public during the EA, including opportunities to comment and review the Screening Report, were appropriate and provided a suitable basis for the Commission to evaluate the concerns from the public. The Commission's findings on the public concerns are discussed further in the section below entitled **Nature and Level of Public Concern**.
29. Based on its review of the Screening Report and the above information, the Commission concludes that the EA methods were acceptable and appropriate.

Effects of the Project on the Environment

30. CNSC staff reported that the environmental assessment considered the environmental components listed in paragraph 22. In all, 61 potential project-environment interactions were identified. Each of the 61 potential interactions was assessed using criteria such as regulatory standards and guidelines, existing conditions, scientific literature and the experience of the technical specialists to determine which of the potential interactions may result in a likely measurable effect on the environment. Several interactions were not expected to result in measurable effects, thus, no further assessment was required for these interactions. For each potential adverse effect associated with an identified possible interaction between the project and a component of the environment, possible mitigation measures were identified to eliminate, reduce or control the adverse effect.

31. CNSC staff submitted that the main project activities expected to result in likely measurable effects, requiring consideration of mitigation measures and assessment of the residual effects, included:
 - Fuel retrieval, transfer, packaging and drying operations;
 - Excavation activities at WMA “B”; and
 - Site clearing activities at the WMA “B” extension.
32. CNSC staff noted that these activities could result in airborne radioactive and hazardous substance releases of particulates and off-gas emissions to the atmosphere, deposition on terrestrial environment and subsequent uptake by terrestrial biota. There is also potential radiation exposure for the workers when carrying out some of the listed activities.
33. CNSC staff further noted that the dewatering operations expected to be carried out during construction activities of the new FPS facility could result in a localized change in groundwater flow patterns.
34. CNSC staff submitted that the proposed mitigation measures to reduce or eliminate the expected adverse effects include:
 - special measures such as temporary enclosures to control airborne radioactive emissions would be implemented where required, in the event contaminated soil was detected during site preparation and construction activities;
 - adherence to AECL’s Radiation Protection Program for workers , including training, protective clothing and time, distance and shielding restrictions during construction and operations activities; and
 - clearing of the forest during the late summer and early fall to minimize any impact on the bird nesting season.
35. The Commission recognizes the importance of properly implementing mitigation measures to ensure that the effects of the project on the environment are not significant. In this regard, the Commission expects CNSC staff to implement appropriate monitoring activities to verify whether these mitigation measures remain effective, if this project were to proceed.
36. Regarding the concerns from one citizen that this proposed project would spread contamination and increase the inventory of facilities to be later decontaminated, the Commission sought more information on AECL’s long-term plan for waste management. AECL responded that it was working toward the long-term management of radioactive waste, including the management of irradiated nuclear fuel in coordination with the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO).
37. With respect to the spreading of contamination during the activities, CNSC staff noted that no significant residual effects are likely to occur, taking into consideration the application of the mitigation measures described in the Screening Report.

38. The issue of groundwater contamination as a result of excavation work during the construction of the FPS building was also raised by the Commission. AECL confirmed that the excavation work was not expected to cause contamination. AECL also mentioned that a groundwater monitoring program was in place and that a map of the contamination levels in groundwater will be provided to the Commission by AECL when it comes before the Commission for licensing.
39. The Commission further enquired about the life span of the FPS. AECL noted that the FPS would have a 50-60 years life span and explained that the proposed project would move the waste fuel to above-ground storage the next 50 years before a long-term waste disposal is available. When accommodation for the waste fuels would be available from the NWMO, the FPS facility could be decommissioned.
40. CNSC staff confirmed that the FPS was designed to last for 50 years and that by this time there should be a long term waste management facility available in Canada. CNSC staff also noted that if this was not the case, decommissioning of the FPS would be reevaluated accordingly.
41. The Commission was concerned with the decommissioning of the tile holes from which the fuel would be removed. AECL confirmed that a decommissioning plan for the tile holes would be presented to CNSC in the future. CNSC staff further noted that the tile holes would continue to be monitored on a regular basis.
42. AECL confirmed that half of the FPS building would be used for storage of fuel rods from the corroded tiles holes and that the other half would be used for the fuel repackaging and the drying equipment. No new fuel generated by AECL's facilities would be stored in the FPS. AECL noted its plan to store new used fuel to be generated in the next few years in the available tile holes and ultimately in a new dry storage system. AECL further noted that it needed to move forward with the FPS project at this time and could consider the dry storage system at a later time. In response to the Commission's question on why the FPS could not accommodate any new used fuel, AECL explained that each storage system has different design requirements based on whether it would store old or new used fuel.
43. The Commission asked if there was a possibility that contaminated water could leak into the environment due to the corrosion in some of the tile holes used as fuel storage at the present time. AECL reassured the Commission that no leak into the environment has been identified. The Commission asked further about the quality of the seals of the tile holes and the reason why there was some corrosion. AECL reported that, with time, some of the seals became less effective and that some water infiltrated the tile holes leading to the corrosion of the fuel rods. AECL also reassured the Commission that since corrosion has been identified, it has increased its surveillance program and water that accumulates is dried out to minimize further corrosion.
44. Considering the length of time this project has taken to date, the Commission asked for an estimate of when the FPS would be operational. AECL estimated the retrieval of the used fuel would take approximately 35 weeks. Regarding the time associated with the regulatory approval process, CNSC staff noted that improvements to streamline the process were being considered and would be presented to the Commission at a later time, following consultation with stakeholders.

45. The Commission asked for details on the nature of the waste in the tile holes and how it would be classified in terms of level of contamination. CNSC staff clarified that there was presently no existing classification for nuclear waste in Canada but that CNSC has been working with the Canadian Standard Association (CSA) to develop a standard soon to be available. CNSC staff reported to the Commission that the onus to present to CNSC a type of classification for their nuclear waste was on the licensees and that CNSC staff was revising the proposed classification for its adequacy. CNSC staff reported that the AECL's current classification was deemed acceptable and that the used CANDU fuel waste to be stored in the FPS storage could be considered a high level waste.
46. CNSC staff noted that, in its view, no significant residual effects are likely to occur, taking into consideration the application of the mitigation measures described in the Screening Report and that under normal operating conditions, with the application of these measures, the proposed construction and operation of the FPS facility are not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects.
47. Based on its review of the Screening Report and the above-noted information provided on the record, the Commission concludes that the proposed project, taking into account the mitigation measures, is not likely to cause significant adverse effects to the environment.

Effects of the Environment on the Project

48. CNSC staff noted that non-routine environmental events are defined as naturally occurring events that can produce extreme conditions affecting the performance of project activities. For the CRL site, the naturally occurring events that can produce extreme conditions affecting the performance of the project activities include the following: extreme weather conditions (temperature, precipitation and wind); tornadoes; overflow of the Ottawa River due to extreme precipitation and snowmelt or due to failure of upstream water control structures; earthquakes or forest fires. Potential climate change was also considered during the assessment.
49. CNSC further noted that design features and operational measures to reduce potential effects have been implemented at the CRL site and will continue to be developed. The probability of occurrence of such events is low and with the mitigation measures in place, radiological consequences remain low.
50. CNSC staff is therefore of the view that the environment is not likely to cause adverse effects on the project, when proposed design and operational mitigation measures and contingency plans are put in place to prevent or reduce potential effects.
51. Based on the above information, the Commission concludes that the environment is not likely to cause adverse effects on the project.

Effects on Renewable Resources and Non-Renewable Resources

52. CNSC staff submitted that the capacity of renewable resources to meet the present or future needs would not be adversely affected by the proposed project. Building materials for construction is expected to be small relatively to material used for construction activities in the surrounding areas. No significant quantities of chemicals or other materials will be required during operation activities.
53. Based on the above information, the Commission concludes that the project would have no significant adverse effects on the capacity of renewable and non-renewable resources to meet the needs of the present or the future.

Effects of Accident and Malfunction Events

54. CNSC staff indicated that no significant adverse environmental effects were predicted for any of the accidents or malfunctions that were considered when the mitigation measures recommended to prevent these accidents are in place. Accidents and malfunctions that were considered of importance to this EA include: fire, hydrogen explosions, problems with the storage containers or retrieval flasks, leaks and spills of radioactive and/or hazardous liquids, nuclear criticality, loss of power and failure of ventilation systems. The Screening Report outlines the mitigation measures, such as adherence to the criticality safety program, robust packaging and existing emergency preparedness plans for the CRL. With these mitigation measures, adverse effects would be limited in magnitude and geographic extent and clean-up measures are available to ensure that any adverse environmental effects are largely reversible. Therefore CNSC staff concluded that residual adverse environmental effects are not significant.
55. The Commission asked if there was a potential danger of explosion from hydrogen generated by the used fuel. AECL answered that the amount of hydrogen generated was too low to be explosive.
56. The Commission sought information on the potential incidents that could occur during the retrieval of the fuel and the moving of the containers. AECL confirmed to the Commission that some tests have been performed to assess and evaluate potential risks and that these risks were low. CNSC staff confirmed that it was aware on these tests. AECL also reported that ninety (90) percent of these fuels were natural uranium or thorium and that there was very low probability of significant criticality issues with any of the retrievals. AECL also confirmed that these fuels were presently subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and supervision.
57. Based on the above information and considerations, the Commission concludes that accidents and malfunctions are not likely to cause adverse effects to humans or the environment.

Cumulative Effects

58. CNSC staff noted that cumulative effects are the effects on the environment which result from the effects of the FPS project when combined with those of other past, existing, and future projects and activities such as the proposed new dry storage system and the construction and operation of future shielded modular above-ground storage buildings. Cumulative effects would occur over a certain period of time and space. The environmental components that could potentially experience cumulative effects from the FPS project combined with other projects at the CRL are the atmospheric environment and the terrestrial environment. The airborne emissions from the FPS project combined with those from current and future projects would not increase the site-wide airborne emissions and they would remain at a fraction of the public dose limit. Cumulative loss of forest habitat from the project and future project is considered negligible at the CRL site.
59. CNSC staff is of the view that effects from the construction and operation of the FPS facility, in combination with other projects or activities that have been or will be carried out, are not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, with the implementation of mitigation measures identified in the Screening Report. CNSC staff stated that a follow up program would be used to confirm these predictions.
60. Based on the information received, the Commission concludes that, taking into account proper mitigation measures, significant adverse cumulative effects are not expected to occur as a result of the project.

Follow-Up Monitoring Program

61. CNSC staff indicated that the RAs must consider whether a follow-up program, as defined by the CEAA, would be warranted for AECL's proposed construction and operation of the FPS. CNSC staff recommended that the follow-up activities be integrated with the current monitoring requirements under AECL's CRL site licence. NRCAN and CNSC staff have agreed that the CNSC would be responsible for oversight of the program. The results of the follow-up program would be reported in the next appropriate *AECL Status Report on Follow-up for Environmental Assessments at Chalk River Laboratories*.
62. CNSC staff stated that the follow-up program will be in place to confirm the results of the environmental assessment, to assess the performance of the planned mitigation measures and to identify the effects of the project that may not have been predicted. The key elements of the follow-up program include monitoring of airborne and liquid emissions, and monitoring of the cover gas to prevent rewetting of the fuel.
63. The Commission is satisfied that the CNSC licensing and compliance program responsible for ensuring the final design and implementation of the follow-up monitoring program should be adequate to verify and identify where additional mitigation measures may be required.

Conclusions on the Likelihood and Significance of Adverse Environmental Effects

64. Based on the considerations and reasons noted above, the Commission agrees with CNSC staff's conclusion of the Screening Report that the proposed project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, taking into account the identified mitigation measures.
65. The Commission is also satisfied that the likelihood and significance of the effects have been identified with reasonable certainty.

Public Consultation

66. With respect to public concern as a factor in its consideration of whether to refer the project to the federal Minister of the Environment for reference to a review panel or mediator, the Commission examined whether the public had sufficient opportunity to become informed about the project and the Environmental Assessment and express their views on it.
67. As noted in paragraph 26 of this Record of Proceedings, the Commission is satisfied that the methods used by the proponent and CNSC staff to consult with the public, other interested stakeholders, and First Nations (Golden Lake/Pikwakanagan Algonquin First Nation) were appropriate.
68. CNSC staff stated that no comments on the draft Screening Report were received from the First Nation and that only one member of the public submitted comments on the draft Screening Report. AECL reported that, during their consultation, the First Nation had no concern with the proposed project.
69. CNSC staff noted that the issues raised by NRCan, Environment Canada and a concerned citizen and the changes made as a result do not affect the conclusion that the proposed project would not result in any significant adverse environmental effects. The dispositioned comments are included in CMD 08-H8.
70. Based on this information, the Commission is satisfied that the public had adequate opportunity to become informed about the project and express any concerns. The Commission decides not to refer the project to the Minister of the Environment for referral to a review panel or mediator under paragraph 20(1)(c) of the CEAA.


Licence Amendment Application for the Construction of the FPS

71. Pending the decision of the Commission on the results of the EA screening, the Commission asked AECL when it was planning to come before the Commission to seek approval of a licence amendment for the construction of the FPS. AECL confirmed that it would be ready to proceed to the next stage by the end of 2008.

72. The Commission asked why it took so long for AECL to decide to move forward with the construction of the FPS, considering that the project was first presented in 2004. AECL reported that although the planning for the FPS had been done some time ago, it had to identify which fuels had to be moved first. AECL also confirmed that, from a business perspective, the time period was not an issue as funding from NRCan for the construction of the FPS was assured until 2011.

Conclusion

73. The Commission concludes that the environmental assessment Screening Report attached to CMD 08-H8, and as corrected in CMD 08-H8.A, is complete and meets all of the applicable requirements of the CEEA.
74. The Commission concludes that the project, taking into account the appropriate mitigation measures identified in the Screening Report, is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects.
75. Furthermore, the Commission also concludes that, at this time, it will not refer the project to the federal Minister of the Environment for a referral to a review panel or mediator in accordance with the provisions of the CEEA.
76. The Commission expresses its understanding that NRCan, as the other RA for this project, will reach its own conclusion on the EA screening results.



M. Binder,
President
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Date of Release of Decision: June 25, 2008