April 2, 2008

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday, April 2, 2008 beginning at 11:00 a.m. in the Public Hearing Room, CNSC Offices, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

M. Binder, President
A. Graham
C.R. Barnes
M.J. McDill
A. Harvey
R. Barriault

M.A. Leblanc, Secretary
J. Lavoie, General Counsel
S. Dimitrijevic, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisers were:
B. Howden, E. Langlois, T. Viglasky, P. Elder, C. Taylor, T. Schaubel, K. Lafrenière, M. Dallaire, P. Thompson, B. Ecroyd, A. Régimbald, B. Theriault, S. Faille, R. Jammal and B. Poulet

Other contributors were:

- Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: B. McGee
- Bruce Power Inc.: F. Saunders, S. McDougall,
- Cameco Corporation: D. Neuburger, by teleconferencing D. Razansoff and M. Balych
- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: M. Tulett, R. MacEacheron
- New Brunswick Power Nuclear: by teleconferencing, R. Gauthier
- Hydro-Québec: P. Desbiens

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The revised agenda, CMD 08-M19.A, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Secretary

2. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. A. Leblanc, Secretary and S. Dimitrijevic, Recording Secretary.

Constitution

3. With the revised notice of meeting, CMD 08-M16.A, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.

4. Since the meeting of the Commission held February 21, 2008, Commission Member Documents CMD 08-M16 and CMD 08-M19 to CMD 08-M25 were distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held February 21, 2008

5. The Commission Members approved the minutes of the February 21, 2008 Commission Meeting without modifications.

STATUS REPORTS

Significant Development Report

6. The Commission considered the Significant Development Report (SDR) no. 2008-3, submitted by CNSC staff as documents CMD 08-M21, CMD 08-M21.A, CMD 08-M21.B, CMD 08-M21.C and CMD 08-M21.D.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) – Update on NRU Reactor

7. With reference to CMD 08-M21 regarding the update on the NRU main heavy water pumps P104-P105 connection to the emergency power supply (EPS), CNSC staff reported to the Commission that there has been no events of significance since the last update to the Commission on this topic[1].

8. CNSC staff noted that during its March 12, 2008 visit to the facility, it inspected the pumps and related switch and starter panels, looked at the historic dockets for the new qualified motor starters and received a verbal update from AECL on the status of the work performed to date.

9. CNSC staff stated that all the necessary steps for a safe installation and commissioning of the qualified DC motor starters had been taken by AECL and noted that the system was operational. CNSC staff also noted that training had been provided to the operating and maintenance staff.

10. AECL confirmed that the heavy water pumps were properly connected and operational, and expressed its agreement with CNSC staff's review of the NRU status.

[1] The event was reported to the Commission at the December 5, 2007, January 9 and February 21, 2008 meetings.

11. AECL informed the Commission that Mr. Bill Pilkington would take over the position of Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer for AECL.

12. The Commission inquired on the mid- and long-term maintenance procedures. CNSC staff stated that these procedures are intended for future preventive maintenance and would not affect the current operation of the facility. AECL concurred and added that the remaining work is typical for project closure or engineering change control closure.

13. In response to the Commission's question if there will be any remaining work not completed by April 10, 2008, marking the end of the 120-day period defined in Bill C-38[2] , CNSC staff stated that all the physical work has been completed and the only remaining work would be of an administrative nature.

14. The Commission asked about the status of the other upgrades stemming from the directives and action notices from the 2006 upgrades audit. CNSC staff responded that, by April 10, 2008, the seven upgrades will be operational and that the reactor will be operating within the prescribed risk level. CNSC staff added that the work to declare the upgrades in-service was on schedule.

15. CNSC staff further informed the Commission that it will do a follow-up inspection of the NRU upgrades to close the directives and action notices. CNSC staff noted that it will also continue with daily routine compliance work related to the operation of the NRU reactor.

16. The Commission sought more information on the lessons-learned exercise undertaken by CNSC staff and AECL. CNSC staff responded that the report was anticipated for mid-May 2008[3]. The Commission welcomes the opportunity to discuss the lessons-learned report at an upcoming public meeting. **ACTION by June 2008**

[2] House of Commons of Canada – Bill C-38: An Act to permit the resumption and continuation of the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River, adopted December 11, 2007.
[3] CNSC staff has since indicated that the activity would be completed by mid-June 2008.

Cameco Corporation – Rabbit Lake Operation – Contaminated Waters / Spill under Rabbit Lake Mill

17. With reference to section 4.1.3 of CMD 08-M21.A regarding contaminated waters and spill at the Rabbit Lake Mill, CNSC staff provided a preliminary explanation of the immediate causes of this event. CNSC staff stated that there were no security impacts from the event and there were no radiation or health consequences to the personnel or to the public.

18. With respect to the actions taken to date, CNSC staff informed the Commission that several meetings with Cameco staff and Saskatchewan Environment had been held to discuss initial findings, significance of the event and planned activities. Environment Canada has also been notified of this event.

19. CNSC staff stated that a joint Saskatchewan Environment and CNSC response to the initial assessment included a list of conditions to be met by Cameco prior to restart of the Rabbit Lake Mill. CNSC staff added that Cameco has since met all the conditions for the restart of the mill and that CNSC staff has issued a letter to Cameco to allow the restart.

20. Cameco provided detailed information on the event and described the specific actions undertaken to contain the contamination and remediate the site. Cameco has developed a short and long-term action plan that comprises dye tracer tests of mill sumps, collection and recovery of contaminated waters, postponement of the mill re-starting until early April 2008, and implementation of a hydro-geological investigation program. A root cause analysis is also expected to be completed in the following months.

21. The Commission asked Cameco if its efforts to contain the leakage were effective. Cameco responded that the concrete repairs and all areas that had contributed to the groundwater contamination have been leak-tested and the results indicate that there has been no further leakage.

22. The Commission inquired on how long the contamination may have existed before it was actually noticed. Cameco described the sequence of operations and the details of the excavation leading up to this event but could not state how long the breach of containment had existed. Cameco noted however that the ongoing investigation will provide further information on the extent of the contamination. Cameco also stated that none of the regional piezometers have indicated contamination.

23. The Commission asked about the estimated amount of contaminated water that Cameco expected to treat during the clean up. Cameco responded that it did not have an estimate, but would continue with the treatment until the water is no longer contaminated.

24. Noting Cameco's similar problems at other facilities, the Commission asked if Cameco's senior management was planning a company-wide examination of its in-ground containment structures. Cameco responded that it has begun to carry out containment inspections and process practice reviews at its facilities, as part of its lessons-learned. CNSC staff confirmed that Cameco was carrying out this company-wide examination, in a coordinated effort between Cameco's Nuclear Fuel Division and Mining Division.

25. The Commission sought more information on Cameco's intention to defer certain remedial actions until the site decommissioning. Cameco responded that certain remedial actions such as extensive soil and ground removal could take place during decommissioning, after the dismantlement of the mill. CNSC staff noted that the site remediation could be carried out over different timeframes, based on the level of risk, but this decision will be taken only after the remedial action plan is completed.

26. The Commission stressed the importance of hydro-geological data in understanding the magnitude and extent of the contamination and expressed its concerns that Cameco did not present sufficient data in this regard. Cameco stated that it will address the Commission's concerns and provide relevant data and an assessment of the ongoing investigations at a future proceeding.

27. In addition to the information requested above, the Commission expects an update on the root cause analysis and further information on the environmental monitoring and the corporate safety culture. This information is to be submitted by Cameco, as part of its licence renewal application to be considered at a public hearing of the Commission in June and September 20008. **ACTION by June 2008**

28. The Commission expressed general concern over the practice of reporting significant events, noting that it expects more comprehensive information supplemented by visual aids to be presented in a timely manner. CNSC staff noted that Significant Development Reports (SDR) present a challenge with respect to both reporting timelines and the level of detail presented, and committed to improve the SDRs.

Bruce Power Inc. – Bruce B Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 6 – Level 1 Impairment

29. With reference to section 4.1.2 of CMD 08-M21.A regarding a level 1 impairment of the emergency coolant injection (ECI) system, CNSC staff informed the Commission on the details of this event and provided a preliminary explanation of the immediate causes. CNSC staff stated that there were no environmental or security impacts from the event and there were no radiation or health consequences to the personnel or the public.

30. CNSC staff noted that the event remained undetected for nine hours, but, once identified, Bruce Power Inc. (Bruce Power) took the proper corrective actions and addressed the safety concerns within a three and a half hour period. CNSC staff stated that the event had been reported verbally to the CNSC site inspectors as soon as the licensee became aware of the impairment. A written report was received two days later, consistent with the reporting requirements of the operating licence.

31. Informing the Commission on the nature of its concerns, CNSC staff explained the potential implications if the a special safety system, such as the ECI system, becomes unavailabe simultaneously with another design-based accident. These might include a loss of coolant accident, local overheating of the reactor core and fuel failures leading to the release of radioactivity into the containment structure.

32. The Commission asked about potential radioactive releases in a worst-case scenario caused by similar impairment events. Bruce Power responded that a release to the environment might occur only if there were a simultaneous loss of coolant accident, ECI impairment and containment impairment. Bruce Power noted that it is not a high probability that these three events occur simultaneously.

33. CNSC staff noted that Bruce Power is required to perform a root cause analysis and to provide CNSC with a detailed report by April 19, 2008. Bruce Power should also identify any outstanding work that might be required according to the report. CNSC staff added that the focus of the root cause analysis would include the impact maintenance work may have had in causing the event and why the possibility of the impairment had not been anticipated, as well as the length of time taken before the personnel noticed the impairment.

34. Bruce Power noted that it has implemented interim measures to prevent reoccurrence of a similar event, such as formal panel status checks and modifications to the maintenance work procedures.

35. The Commission asked if a similar problem has been encountered in other power generating stations. Bruce Power responded that Level 1 impairment such as this one is a very rare event.

36. The Commission also asked whether this event will be communicated to the other nuclear generating stations. CNSC staff responded that the industry shares information on this type of generic action issues. Bruce Power added that it has standard practices of sharing lessons learned with other CANDU utilities and worldwide nuclear industry peers.

37. In response to the Commission's questions regarding human performance, Bruce Power stated that the technicians were qualified to perform the electrical work being carried out but that the mindset was such that the work had been considered non-intrusive in nature, while, in reality, it was intrusive.

38. The Commission sought more information on other potential problems caused by similar warning system errors. Bruce Power responded that it was reviewing its other systems to verify if there are other cases where potential impairment situations might occur without triggering an enunciated alarm. This review will be done as part of the root cause follow-up actions.

39. The Commission expects CNSC staff to report on the root cause analysis once it has completed its review. **ACTION by Aug. 2008**

Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG) – Pickering A – Unit 1 Reactor Trip

40. With reference to section 4.1.4 of CMD 08-M21.B regarding a reactor trip on the shutdown system E, CNSC staff provided a summary of the event to the Commission and gave some background and historical information. CNSC staff stated that there were no environmental or security impacts from the event and there were no radiation or health consequences to the personnel or public. CNSC staff indicated that OPG will submit an S-99[4] Detailed Event Report and a root cause analysis report.

[4] Regulatory Document S-99, *Reporting Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Plants*, March 2003.

41. OPG noted that governor valve fluctuations were experienced on Pickering A Unit 1 in January and February 2008. Fluctuations were small and did not challenge the safety systems. OPG further noted that the cause of the governor valve fluctuations has been identified and that the Unit 1 governor is now operating well at high power.

42. The Commission sought more information on the function of the governor and on the potential worst-case scenario of such an event. OPG explained the role of the governor in regulating the turbine speed during run-up, and stated that such an event is not safety significant. CNSC staff remarked that, although the events may have no safety significance, reactor trips are a matter of interest to make sure that root causes are identified and corrected.

43. CNSC staff noted that it will continue to monitor the status of this issue, review the S-99 report and issue an internal memorandum on its findings. There is no further update to the Commission planned in this matter.

Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG) – Pickering A – Level 1 Emergency Coolant Injection Impairment

44. With reference to section 4.1.5 of CMD 08-M21.C regarding a level 1 emergency coolant injection (ECI) system impairment due to a failed shutdown cooling (SDC) valve, CNSC staff updated the Commission on the status of the activities[5]. CNSC staff stated that an apparent cause analysis has been conducted in lieu of a root cause analysis, due to the lower significance level of this event. It has been concluded that the loose wire, which had caused the event, originated from the work done on Unit 1 for its return to service in 2004. The event has been attributed to human performance.

45. The Commission inquired if there had been any review regarding work practices not being followed in other areas. OPG responded that since no maintenance had been done on these valves, it intends to introduce a preventive maintenance program to prevent occurrence of similar events.

[5] The event occurred on February 9, 2008 and was reported to the Commission at the February 21, 2008 meeting.

46. The Commission sought more information on any outstanding actions. CNSC staff informed the Commission that it had reviewed the S-99 report and that it will follow-up on corrective actions to ensure their completion. CNSC staff stated that OPG has committed to complete the last action, which is the update to the maintenance manual, by July 15, 2008. There is no further update to the Commission planned in this matter.

New Brunswick Power Nuclear – Unexpected Shutdown of the Point Lepreau Generating Station

47. With reference to section 4.1.6 of CMD 08-M21.D regarding the unexpected shutdown of the generating station from its high power operation, CNSC staff updated the Commission on the status of the activities[6]. CNSC staff stated that there were no environmental or security impacts from the event and there were no radiation or health consequences to the personnel or the public.

48. CNSC staff informed the Commission that it has reviewed the S-99 Detailed Event Report submitted on November 9, 2007 and was satisfied with the identification of the problems and the follow-up corrective actions. The event was initiated by the false low level indications from the Liquid Zone Control System (LZCS) level instrumentation. New Brunswick Power Nuclear (NB Power) has concluded, and CNSC staff concurred with this assessment, that this event was not a serious process failure.

49. The Commission inquired about the possibility of a reverse situation where the instruments would not show a change of level. CNSC staff responded that such a possibility exists, but that the other monitoring parameters would catch up with this error and that a backup failsafe system is in place for all these parameters.

50. The Commission asked whether this type of event had been reported by other facilities as well. CNSC staff responded that other facilities had not reported such an event. There is no further update to the Commission planned on this matter.

<u>Status Report on Power Reactors</u>

51. With reference to CMD 08-M22 regarding the status report on power reactors, CNSC staff updated the information presented in the document and reported on the changes that have recently occurred.

[6] The event occurred on September 24, 2007 and was reported to the Commission at the December 5, 2007 meeting.

52. The Commission sought more information on the standby generators for Pickering A. OPG responded that there is a bank of three standby generators (SG1, SG2 and SG3) that service Units 1 and 2 and three standby generators (also named SG1, SG2 and SG3) in a second bank that service Units 3 and 4. OPG stated that a standby generator was available at all times during the event[7].

53. The Commission asked if Hydro-Québec had been given approval to operate the Gentilly-2 Radioactive Waste Facility Operating facility. Hydro-Québec noted that the facility was still under construction but that it has sufficient storage capacity from the existing facility until fall 2008. CNSC staff noted that Hydro-Québec will be required to submit a Commissioning Report and seek approval from the Designated Officer to authorize the operation of the facility.

54. The Commission requests CNSC staff to inform the Commission at a future proceeding once is has accepted the Commissioning Report. **ACTION by Fall 2008**

INFORMATION ITEMS

Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG) – Notification of Acceptance of the Commissioning Report for the Darlington Waste Management Facility (DWMF)

55. With reference to CMD 08-M25 regarding the Commissioning Report for the Darlington Waste Management Facility (DWMF), CNSC staff notified the Commission that it had accepted the Commissioning Report authorising thus the operation of one building of three to be operated at this facility.

56. The Commission sought clarification on the procedure for authorising the operation of the other buildings. CNSC staff responded that OPG will have to submit another Commissioning Report and seek approval from the Designated Officer to authorize the operation of the other buildings. Consequently, CNSC staff will inform the Commission on any issued authorisation in this regard.

[7] Following the meeting, CNSC staff indicated that the SG2 that services Units 1 and 2 tripped on February 27, 2008 and was declared available March 10, 2008.

Technical Briefing: Periodic Safety Review

57. With reference to CMD 08-M23, regarding a technical briefing to the Commission, CNSC staff presented an approach in power reactor licensing called Periodic Safety Review (PSR), as described in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Guide NS-G-2.10 *Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants.* CNSC staff noted that this approach is practised by most of the IAEA member countries. It represents a systematic reassessment of the safety of an operational plant carried out periodically to deal with the cumulative aspects of ageing, modifications, operating experience and technical developments.

58. Noting that the objective of a PSR is to determine the extent of a plant's conformance with safety, CNSC staff added that a similar approach through the conduct of integrated safety reviews (ISR) is currently used as part of the Canadian regulatory approach for life extensions and refurbishments. However, the ISR approach is a one-time requirement for plant refurbishment while a PSR is a systematic approach performed at regular intervals throughout the life of a plant.

59. CNSC staff emphasized that a PSR is complementary to and does not replace routine and special safety reviews and inspections carried out as part of the normal regulatory oversight.

60. The Commission inquired about support for such an approach from the industry and research facilities. CNSC staff responded that it has concentrated its effort to the power reactor industry which has shown support for the PSR approach while research facilities will be contacted in the near future. CNSC staff also noted that PSR-related activities would be cost-recovered from the licensees.

61. With respect to the implementation of a PSR approach for new-build reactors, CNSC staff presented an example concept of carrying out a PSR at ten-year intervals, which has been the typical interval used by IAEA member countries who are already carrying out this approach. The Commission expressed its concerns with such long intervals and sought assurance that the several areas that change over long periods, such as staff fluctuations, quality assurance, corporate safety culture, human performance, continue to be addressed in the lapse of time between PSRs. The Commission also expressed its interest to obtain more information about implementation of this approach in different countries.

62. The Commission welcomed CNSC staff's presentation as an introduction to the PSR approach. However, the Commission expressed its opinion that more detailed information on specific aspects of this concept, more consultation with all interested parties and more consideration of the available data and others countries' experience would be required before considering its implementation in Canada. This is expected to come back to the Commission by the fall of 2008. **ACTION by Fall 2008**

DECISION ITEMS - REGULATORY DOCUMENTS

Status Report on the Regulatory Document Framework Improvements and Initiatives

63. With reference to CMD 08-M23, CNSC staff provided an update on the regulatory framework initiatives and an update on the five regulatory documents (RD) presented to the Commission at the September 2007 meeting.

64. Since September 2007, CNSC staff noted that the following regulatory documents have been published: RD-204, *Certification of Persons Working at Nuclear Power Plants*, RD-310, *Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants* and RD-360, *Life Extension of Nuclear Power Plants*.

65. CNSC staff noted that more that 500 individual comments were received during the public consultation on RD-337, *Design of New Nuclear Power Plants* and RD-346, *Site Evaluation for New Nuclear Power Plants*. CNSC staff informed the Commission that it intends to organize a second information session in late spring 2008 to provide stakeholders with the results of the consultation.

66. The Commission inquired whether regulatory documents RD-337, *Design of New Nuclear Power Plants* and RD-346, *Site Evaluation for New Nuclear Power Plants* would be completed and presented for final approval in time for the June 2008 meeting. CNSC staff reiterated its goal to have the documents ready for the Commission's consideration at that time. **ACTION June 2008**

67. With respect to the transparency of the consultation process and posting the stakeholders' comments on the internet, and the issue of protection of privacy, CNSC staff noted that all comments would be made public. However, stakeholders would be asked to submit their commercially confidential information separately so that it could be managed appropriately.

Regulatory Document RD-58, *Thyroid Screening Programs for Volatile Radioiodines*

68. With reference to CMD 08-M24.A regarding regulatory document RD-58 submitted for final approval, CNSC staff presented the draft of this regulatory document for the Commission's consideration. CNSC staff noted that the proposed document is based in part on the American National Standards Institute document ANSI/HPS N13.39-2001, *Design of Internal Dosimetry Programs* and supersedes the document *Bioassay Requirements for I-125 and I-131 in Medical, Teaching and Research Institutions*.

69. The Commission noted the absence of requirements for pre-employment exams, periodic health exams and evaluations for return to work. CNSC staff explained that these issues are addressed in other documents. The Commission suggested that the proposed document RD-58 should make reference to other existing documents. The Commission also suggested that those other documents be scheduled for the Commission's consideration sometime in the future.

70. The Commission expressed its concern regarding the limited participation during the consultation period and sought more information on the public consultation process and on the procedure followed to provide feedback information to stakeholders and other intervenors. CNSC staff noted that in the past the disposition reports had been available to all parties to know how the comments had been addressed. CNSC staff added that it is seeking new ways to provide a higher level report on the disposition of comments. CNSC also stated that, in addition to the opportunity to comment during the public consultation, the document had also been issued for a one-year trial use.

71. Following its deliberation on the matter, the Commission approved RD-58 for publication, as presented in CMD 08-M24.A. The Commission notes however that CNSC staff should consider the comments and suggestions made by the Commission members, as noted in the transcripts of the meeting, and address them where feasible. **DECISION**

Regulatory Document RD-150, *Designing and Implementing a Radiobioassay Program*

72. With reference to CMD 08-M24.A regarding regulatory document RD-150 submitted for approval to proceed with public consultation, CNSC staff presented the draft of this regulatory document for the Commission's consideration.

73. Following its deliberation on the matter, the Commission approves that draft RD-150 be released for public consultation as presented in CMD 08-M24.A. **DECISION**

Regulatory Document RD-364, *Joint Canada – United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transportation Packages*

74. With reference to CMD 08-M24.B regarding regulatory document RD-364 submitted for approval to proceed with public consultation, CNSC staff presented the draft of this regulatory document for the Commission's consideration. CNSC staff stated that this document has been prepared through a joint project between the CNSC, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the United States Department of Transportation.

75. The Commission inquired about synchronisation of public consultation periods in Canada and in the United States. CNSC staff responded that the 75-day consultation period would coincide very closely in both countries.

76. The Commission further inquired on the possible development of an international guide of this type. CNSC staff responded that this has been considered by the IAEA for the long-term but, in order to meet the present need, Canada and the United States have developed the one presented today and in which the United Kingdom has also shown an interest. The European Union is also developing a similar guide for use by their member countries.

77. Following its deliberation on the matter, the Commission approves that draft RD-364 be released for public consultation as presented in CMD 08-M24.B. **DECISION**

Closure of the Public Meeting

78. The public portion of the meeting closed at 5:39 p.m.

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President *Recording Secretary*

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Secretary

APPENDIX A

CMD	DATE	File No

08-M16 2008-02-29 (6.02.01)
Notice of meeting held on Wednesday, April 2, 2008 in Ottawa

08-M16.A 2008-03-19 (6.02.01)
Revised Notice of meeting held on Wednesday, April 2, 2008 in Ottawa – Supplementary Information

08-M19 2008-03-19 (6.02.02)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday, April 2, 2008

08-M19.A 2008-03-26 (6.02.02)
Updated Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday, April 2, 2008 – Supplementary Information

08-M19.B 2008-04-01 (6.02.02)
Updated Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday, April 2, 2008 – Supplementary Information

08-M20 2008-03-18 (6.02.04)
Draft Minutes of the Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held on February 21, 2008

08-M21 2008-03-18 (6.02.04)
Significant Development Report no. 2008-3 for the period of February 19, 2008 to March 18, 2008

08-M21.A 2008-03-25 (6.02.04)
Significant Development Report no. 2008-3 for the period of March 19, 2008 to March 25, 2008

08-M21.B 2008-03-31 (6.02.04)
Significant Development Report no. 2008-3 for the period of March 26, 2008 to March 31, 2008

08-M21.C 2008-04-01 (6.02.04)
Significant Development Report no. 2008-3 for the period of March 31, 2008 to April 1, 2008

08-M21.D 2008-04-01 (6.02.04)
Significant Development Report no. 2008-3 for the period of March 31, 2008 to April 1, 2008

06-M22 2008-03-18 (6.02.04)
Status Report on Power Reactors for the period of February 1, 2008 to March 14, 2008

06-M23 2008-03-14 (6.02.04)
Technical Briefing - Periodic Safety Review

08-M24 2008-03-18 (1.03.04)
Status Report on the Regulatory Document Framework Improvements and Initiatives and introduction of one new regulatory document for final approval: RD-58, and two new regulatory documents for approval to consult: RD-150 and RD-364

08-M24.A 2008-03-18 (1.03.04)
Regulatory Document RD-58, *Thyroid Screening Programs for Volatile Radioiodines*; and Regulatory Document RD-150, *Designing and Implementing a Radiobioassay Program*

08-M24.B 2008-03-18 (1.03.04)
Regulatory Document RD-364, *Joint Canada – United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transportation Packages*

08-M25 2008-03-19 (37-2-5-0)
Ontario Power Generation Inc. Notification of Acceptance of the Commissioning Report for the Darlington Waste Management Facility