

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday, April 26, 2006 beginning at 3:02 p.m. in the Public Hearing Room, CNSC Offices, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

A. Graham, Chair

C.R. Barnes

J. Dosman

M.J. McDill

M.A. Leblanc, Secretary

P.D. Bourgeau, Recording Secretary

J. Lavoie, General Counsel

CNSC staff advisers were: B. Howden, K. Scissons, D. Schryer, R. Jammal, J. Pyne, I. Grant, B. Lojk, R. Barker, K. Pereira and A. Bouchard.

Other contributors were:

- Cameco Corporation: J. Jarrell and B. Schmitke.
- COGEMA Resources Inc.: B. Pollock.
- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: K. Nash

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The revised agenda, CMD 06-M19.A, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Secretary

2. The presiding member chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. A. Leblanc, Secretary and P.D. Bourgeau, Recording Secretary.

Constitution

3. With the notice of meeting, CMD 06-M18, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.

4. Since the meeting of the Commission held March 30, 2006, Commission Member Documents CMD 06-M18 to CMD 06-M25 were distributed to the Members. These documents are further detailed in Appendix A of these minutes.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held March 30, 2006

5. The Members approved the minutes of the Commission Meeting held on March 30, 2006 (reference CMD 06-M20) without change.

Significant Development Report

6. Significant Development Report (SDR) no. 2006-3 (CMDs 06-M21 and M21.A) was submitted by CNSC staff. The following information was added orally during the meeting.
7. With reference to section 4.1.1 in CMD 06-M21, a follow-up to a mine personnel exposure to gases released from underground blasting at Cameco Cigar Lake operation, the Commission inquired as to why a monitoring system for the critical fan installations had not been in place previously.
8. CNSC staff responded that the fan installations had been identified as critical following the incident. CNSC staff noted that a monitoring system has now been implemented and is effective. Cameco Corporation (Cameco) added that the fans will eventually be connected into the overall monitoring of the ventilation system underground.
9. The Commission sought further information with respect to the contractors' training in health and safety procedures. Cameco responded that additional training for the ventilation officers as well as verification of that training have been included as part of the corrective action plan for this incident.
10. The Commission sought further information with respect to the evaluation of Cameco's post blast re-entry procedure. CNSC staff responded that the post blast re-entry procedure was implemented on December 1, 2005 and has been effective and well received by the workers.
11. With reference to section 4.1.5 in CMD 06-M21.A, regarding the flooding of Shaft Number 2 at the Cigar Lake project, Cameco described the operational set-up and activities associated with the

- probing and grouting that lead to the flooding event. Cameco indicated that it was still analyzing the possible cause of the event to develop solution options. Once a solution option is chosen, reviewed by a third-party expert and approved by CNSC, Cameco noted its intention to implement the solution and resume the activities to complete the shaft. Cameco noted that it was considering ground freezing in the remaining zone between the base of the shaft and the underground workings as a possible solution to control water migration into the mine.
12. CNSC staff expressed its satisfaction with Cameco's rapid and safe response to the event and its implementation of the contingency plans. CNSC staff concluded that the event posed no significant risk to the environment and public health and safety.
 13. CNSC staff noted that it was expecting a root cause assessment of the event and a proposed risk-informed path forward by Cameco. CNSC staff also noted that the proposed solution would be assessed through the Joint Regulatory Group review process and CNSC's assessment and compliance team for Cigar Lake.
 14. The Commission expressed concern that this event could have been prevented if sufficient information on the geological conditions had been known and understood. CNSC staff noted that, during the licence hearing held in 2004 to consider the proposed Cigar Lake project, there were extensive discussions on ground control and the potential for groundwater inflow to the mine, including the sinking of Shaft Number 2. At that time, the Commission indicated the need for ongoing close monitoring and assessment. In this regard, CNSC staff noted that it had carried out close monitoring and assessment of the project throughout the construction. CNSC staff further noted that its concerns with the integrity of the standpipe had been discussed with Cameco prior to the event.
 15. With respect to Cameco's safety programs at the site, CNSC indicated that its main focus remains on the programs needed for safe operations and the underlying processes needed to assess and manage the risks on a continual basis at Cigar Lake. This includes examining the linkages from this shaft sinking work to the underground workings for developing the infrastructure, to the preparations for the mining.
 16. The Commission sought further information on several aspects surrounding the event, including Cameco's understanding of the geological conditions, the accuracy of the physical model of the area and the integrity of the valve in question. In this regard,

Cameco noted that it would consider such aspects in its analysis of the event. CNSC staff stated that it will report to the Commission on Cameco's root cause analysis and possible solutions at a future Commission meeting.

ACTION

17. The Commission enquired as to the possible licensing action to be taken with regard to the type of solution to be proposed by Cameco. CNSC staff indicated that depending on the nature of the proposed solution, it could be considered under a licence condition or as a licence amendment. If the latter, CNSC staff noted that the proposed solution would be considered in the context of a Commission hearing.
18. With reference to section 4.1.2 in CMD 06-M21, a follow-up to a sulphuric acid incident at the Key Lake operation, Cameco stated that it had submitted a root cause report and a corrective action plan to the CNSC staff. Cameco noted that an additional investigation and some recovery of the contaminated soils would be carried out in the summer months of 2006.
19. With reference to section 4.1.3 in CMD 06-M21, a follow-up to the Snake Lake North American truck accident at the COGEMA Resources Inc. (COGEMA) McClean Lake operation, the Commission sought further information from COGEMA regarding the remedial measures that have been taken at the site.
20. COGEMA replied that the area had been reconfigured for one-way traffic and separate access to the pit to ensure that vehicles do not meet. COGEMA further noted that they now have closer oversight of the area and the actual work in progress.
21. The Commission sought further information from CNSC staff on whether the measures taken by COGEMA will result in the prevention of a future similar event. CNSC staff confirmed that it was satisfied with the measures implemented by COGEMA to minimize the risks of reoccurrence.
22. With reference to section 4.1.3 in CMD 06-M21, concerning a stolen nuclear gauge, the Commission sought clarification regarding the safe recovery of the gauge. CNSC staff confirmed that the gauge, which is normally kept in a double-locked storage container, had been found intact and secured in the recovered vehicle. CNSC staff also reported that the public had not been exposed to any radiological risk as a result of this event.
23. The Commission sought further information regarding the policy

currently being used by the company with respect to keeping its vehicles warm. CNSC staff responded that the company will no longer be conducting start-up with the keys in the ignition for warm-ups and that external heaters have been installed. CNSC staff noted that the licensee has taken extensive measures to prevent a reoccurrence of the event, including the installation of Global Positioning Systems in its vehicles.

Status Report on Power Reactors

24. There were no updates to the Status Report on Power Reactors (CMD 06-M22).

Annual Report on Decommissioning Plans and the Financial Guarantee for Nuclear Facilities owned by Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG)

25. With reference to CMD 06-M23, CNSC staff provided a summary of the third annual report provided by OPG on the status of its financial guarantee for decommissioning. Annual reports on this matter were requested by the Commission in its *Record of Proceedings, Including Reasons for Decision* of May 14, 2003.
26. The Commission sought clarification regarding CNSC staff's recommendations to change how the information is provided to the Commission. CNSC staff explained that it would report on the status of the financial guarantee for OPG owned facilities in the context of licensing hearings pertaining to OPG or Bruce Power facilities and include, when applicable, information on OPG's 5-year comprehensive review of the financial guarantee. CNSC staff further explained that it would also report to the Commission in the context of significant development reports.
27. CNSC staff noted that, as part of its normal compliance activities, it will continue to assess OPG's yearly reports on the status of OPG's aggregate financial guarantee. In this regard, CNSC staff would only report to the Commission an extraordinary item should there be issues with the report.
28. The Commission approved the CNSC staff recommendation as set out in CMD 06-M23 with the above noted clarifications described by CNSC staff. Accordingly, CNSC staff's annual report to the Commission on the decommissioning plans and the financial guarantee for nuclear facilities owned by OPG is no longer required.

DECISION

Information from CNSC staff regarding Designated Officers

29. CNSC staff presented CMD 06-M24 regarding the need to replace CMD 05-M23 to respond to operational need and organizational changes at the CNSC.
30. The Commission approved CNSC staff's proposal for changes to the list of Designated Officers in CMD 05-M23 and to the duties under subsection 37(2) of the *Nuclear Safety Control Act* as set out in CMD 06-M24. With this approval, CMD 06-M24 replaces CMD 05-M23.
31. The Commission instructs the Secretary of the Commission to issue Designated Officers' Certificates accordingly.

DECISION

ACTION

Closure of the Public Meeting

32. The public meeting closed at 4:40 p.m.

Chair

Recording Secretary

Secretary

APPENDIX A

CMD	DATE	File No
06-M18	2006-03-24	(1-3-1-5)
Notice of meeting held on Wednesday April 26, 2006 in Ottawa.		
06-M19	2006-04-12	(1-3-1-5)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday April 26, 2006.		
06-M19.A	2006-04-20	(1-3-1-5)
Updated Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday April 26, 2006		
06-M20	2006-04-11	(1-3-1-5)
Approval of minutes of Commission meeting held March 30, 2006.		
06-M21	2006-04-07	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report No. 2006-3 for the period of March 9, 2006 to April 7, 2006.		
06-M21.A	2006-04-19	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report No. 2006-3 for the period of March 9, 2006 to April 7, 2006 – Supplementary Information.		
06-M22	2006-04-11	(1-3-1-5)
Status Report on Power Reactors for the period of March 15 to April 10, 2006.		
06-M23	2006-04-07	(26-1-0-0-0 / 37-0-0-0)
Annual Report on Decommissioning Plans and the Financial Guarantee for Nuclear Facilities owned by Ontario Power Generation Inc.		
06-M24	2006-04-12	(1-3-1-5)
Need to replace CMD 05-M23 to respond to operational needs and changes at the CNSC.		